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3 PREFACE  OF  THE  COMMISSION 
It was  today generally accepted that action taken solely on  prices 
and  wages  is insufficient to maintain a  non-inflationary growth policy.  Fbr 
these reasons,  the Commission  has  deemed  it useful to have  independant  ex-
perts study,  in the different member  countries,  the possible part played by 
certain primary non-employment  incomes  in the inflationary process. 
Fbr  the time being,  two  of these studies are available: that of 
Professor  MOCKERS  concerning France  and that of Professor  VANDEWALLE  for 
Belgium.  Analogoas  studies are being prepared for  Germany,  the United Kingdom, 
Italy and the Netherlands.  It is  expected that the other member  states will 
be the object  of similar stQdies  during the course of next year. 
Given  that it is an  important  subject  just  as  much  for  eoono~ic 
viewpoint  as  the political,  which  justifies as  large a  discussion as possible, 
the  Commissio~ is publishing in the current  broch~e the complete  study presented 
by  Professor  VAND~IALLE •  The  opinions  expressed are the sole responsibility 
of the author and should not  be ta.'l<en  to the attitude of the  Commission  concerning 
the many  qu.estions  involved. 
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5 FUREWORD 
The  purpose of this  stu~ is to analyse the influence of the 
development  of certain primary forms  of non-wage  income  on that of 
inflation in Belgium. 
Tne  study was  carried out  under ~  direction by  a  research group at  the State 
University Center at Antwerp. 
Dr.  J.  VAN  DEN  BROECK  and Dr.  W.  WINKELMANS,  assistant lecturers, 
carried out the econometric analyses and assembled the documentation 
for the other chapters. 
Dr.  M.  VAN  HECKE,  vice-chairman of the Commission  for the Regulation 
of Prices,  supplied invaluable information on  Belgian policy on 
prices.  In addition,  he  checked all the texts and,  on  my  behalf, 
obtained information and  advice regarding the  composition of the 
various chapters. 
I  myself  am  responsi8le for producing the text in its final  form. 
In conclusion,  I  should like to thank the officials of the Institut 
National de Statistique, the Societe Nationale du  Logement,  the 
Institut National du Logement  and  other quasi-governmental  and 
Common  Market  organizations for their cooperation in providing me 
with additional information concerning certain statistics and certain 
research done  by them. 
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Dr.  G.  VANDEWALLE, 
Professor at the State University 
Center in Antwerp 3u..·runary  of the 8tl.l.d;t  of Profl3ssor  VANDS~·IALLE concerning 
t!le  e1Tcct  of  ccrt~in  prial.l.!',}~"  non-wa.ge  incomes  on  the development  of 
infl:1:tion in Bel <du.>1l 
The  study begins with a  brief analysis of the  advantages  and  drawbacks 
of inflation. From  this it can be  concluded that the  harmful effects of 
inflation on  economic  development  by far outweigh the  favourable  effect which 
inflation has  on  investment.  Governments  must  therefore  take  appropriate 
measures to combat  the  inflationary tendencies which  are  becoming increasingly 
prevalent in most  nee-capitalist type  economies. 
The  measures raken to curb price rises have  generally been based on  the 
neo-classical,  Keynesian and  post-Keynesian theories which  pay little attention 
to any  influence  which  increases in non-wage  incomes  m~  have  on  price move-
ments and vice  versa. 
One  thing that  can be  said for the  theory of structural inflation is 
that it ol.dines the  various circumstances and  events which  can trigger off an 
inflationary movement,  and the  economic  factors which accentuate  or curb the 
rise in prices; but it has not worked  out  a  complete  theory of the  role  of 
non-wage  incomes  in the  trend of inflation. The  modern  Anglo-American  theories 
of inflation stress above  all the  role  of the  trade unions  and  of groupings 
of enterprises  (cartels,  trusts) in explaining the  lack of downward  flexi-
bility in response  to falls in demand  and also attach much  importance  to the 
economic  factors which  slow down  inflation.  As  in the  other theories of 
inflation,  any  influence  of the rise in non-wage  incomes  is disregarded. 
After this brief look at the theories of inflation which  serves as the 
introduction to the  study,  an analysis is given of the  progression of non-
w~  incomes  in Belgium  between 1953  and  1971  as recorded in the national 
accounts.  The  first conclusion to be  drawn  from  this analysis is that between 
1953  and 1971  the rise  in agricultural prices was  fairly small  and  consequently 
7 the  increase  in incomes  in crop farming,  horticulture,  forestry and  livestock 
farming did not  contribute decisively towards higher prices.  In 1972  and  1973 
the  rise in farm  prices was  sharper but was  brought  about  by  a  general  increase 
in the  world prices of cereals,  oils, fats and meat,  and was  not  therefore the 
consequence  of autonomous  increases in the  income  of the  farming community 
in the  country.  In view of this there is no  point  in analysing this income, 
as the  results arrived at would not  correspond to the  aims of the  study. 
The  other types of non-wage  income  are  divided into three  groups: 
(a)  Income  of the  self-employed not  working in agriculture  (traders,  craftsmen, 
the  professions); 
(b)  Interest and  rent; 
(c)  Company  earnings:  distributed (dividends,  directors'  reumerations) 
and retained  (general  and specific reserves,  direct taxes). 
The  first category represents  some  40%  of the  increase  in non-wage 
incomes  between 1953  and 1971,  while  the  second accounts for  some  26%  and 
the  third for  28%.  Consumer  prices are  directly influenced by the  income  of 
the  self-employed,  but not by  interest and rents,  which are not  included in the 
consumer  price  index.  Corporate  earnings depend  on  companies•  pro~ margins 
and  therefore have  much  the  same  effect on  the  cost  of living as  the  income 
of the  self-employed.  It is for this reason that in Chapter III, which analyses 
the  correlation between prices and  wage  and non-wage  incomes,  a  distinction 
is made  between total non-wage  incomes  on  the  one  hand,  and this total less 
interest and  rent  on  the  other. 
The  following conclusions were  drawn  from  this econometric research: 
(a)  The  continuous increase  in productivity in industry enabled wages  to 
grow  much  more  rapidly than  consumer  prices have  risen. 
8 In services,  the  improvement  in productivity was  less,  with the  result 
that the rise in the  income  of the  self-employed had a  fairly marked 
repercussion on  the  prices of services and  so  indirectly on  consumer 
prices. 
(b)  The  growth in the  income  of companies  limited by  shares did not  have  much 
influence  on  the  wholesale  prices of industrial products.  In most  countries 
higher productivity saved prices from  the effect·s of the  increase  in 
eorporate earnings. 
(c)  Wages  and the  income  of self-employed workers were  pushed upwards  by 
adjustments to the  consumer  price  index.  This  feedback process was 
apparent  throughout  the  whole  period covered by  the  study but more 
especially in the  latter years. It occurred with a  time  lag of several 
months. 
Chapter IV  contains a  detailed study of the  various  items  in the 
consumer  price  index,  in order to discover which  increases in non-wage  incomes 
did influence this index in an important  w~. 
As  the  prices of few  services were  incorporated in the  consumer  price 
index before  1967,  it could not be  influenced much  by  the  growth in the 
income  of several  categories of self-employed workers.  In 1967,  however, 
changes were  made  in the weighting attached to the  prices of various groups 
of products and  the  prices of more  services were  included in the  index,  with 
the  result that increases in the  incomes  of self-employed workers  came, 
overall,  to have  a  greater effect on  this index. 
Since  the  payment  for  services accounts for an  increasingly large  part 
of private  consumption,  we  can  s~ that the  post-1967  consumer  price  index is 
a  truer measure  of the  cost  of living than that of the  previous years. It is 
for this reason that the  movements  in the  various components  of this index 
were  studied much  more  closely for the  period 1967  - 1972  than for the  period 
1953  - 1966. 
9 We  found that the rise in consumer  prices between 1967  and 1972  was 
given additional momentum  by: 
{a)  Repeated increases in the  price of certain basic foodstuff  such as bread, 
beef and veal; 
(b)  Higher indirect taxes caused by  the  introduction of VAT  and the  increase 
in certain excise duties  {on  cigarettes and motor fuel); 
(c)  The  raising of the  charges for most  public services  (railw~s, municipal 
trams and buses,  post etc); 
{d)  The  favourable  economic  climate  throughout most  of the period, which 
created an employment  situation which lent itself to wage  inflation and 
increases in wholesale  and retail prices. 
The  very  sharp rise in prices cannot  therefore  be  attributed solely to 
the  increase  in certain non-wage  incomes.  It was  evident,  however,  that 
intermediaries frequently use  methods for fixing their selling prices which 
bring into play the  cumulative  increase effect  (not  only is the  increase  in 
the  purchase  price passed on  in full in the  selling price but the  profit 
margin is also adjusted in line with this increase)  and the  ratchet effect 
(intermediaries adjust their selling prices when  purchase  prices increase but 
not when  they fall). 
It is above  all when  consumers have  little information about  changes 
in the  wholesale  prices of a  product  or in the  prices of the  raw materials 
that the  cumulative  increase  and the  ratchet effects are evident  (e.g. 
furniture,  magazines  and  footwear).  When,  however,  these  changes are  of a 
seasonal nature  and are  therefore fairly common  knowledge  and when,  in 
addition,  there is  keen competition to find outlets, distributors are forced 
to adjust their prices in line with the  real level of wholesale  prices. 
Consequently it is difficult to  say whether, in general,  the  relative profit 
margins of intermediaries have  increased,  or whether,  under the  influence  of 
competition of supennarkets,  they have  diminished. 
In Chapter V,  paragraph 1,  we  sought to put  a  figure  on  the  average 
turnover of small  traders and  craftsmen between 1953  and 1971  in order to 
relate it to their income  and thus to see  approximately how  the net profit 
margins developed. 
10 The  series obtained show  no  clear trend.  Up  to 1969,  average  margins 
hovered around  40%,  but  in 1970  a  downward  movement  appeared to set in.  As 
no  figure  was  available  for 1972,  it was  impossible  to  say whether this was 
a  structural movement  set off by  the proliferation of supermarkets or 
a  temporary  setback brought  on  by  the  1971  recession.  Supermarkets increased 
their share  in the  turnover of retail trade  from  10.9%  in 1953  to 19.5%  in 
1971,  but  the modernization of the  distributive trade  seems  to have  had only 
a  limited restraining effect  on  the  rise in consumer prices.  Traders'  cash 
margins  increased almost  as much  as the  selling prices of manufacturers and 
wholesalers. 
Between  1953  and 1971  there  was  a  very large rise in professional 
incomes  and  in particular those  of doctors and  pharmacists.  From  1959  to 
1971  the  incomes  of doctors and dentists calculated on  a  per capita basis 
went  up  at a  rate  of 7  .8'fo  per year. For pharmacists the  rate was  7  .9%. 
These  rates are  slightly above  the  7-5%  at which  gross wages  increased in 
real terms. 
Allowing for the fact that tax on  the  incomes  in the  higher brackets 
is heavier in view  of the  progressive rates,  the  conclusion arrived at is that 
the net  incomes  of doctors,  dentists and  pharmacists increased almost at the 
same  pace  as those  of manual  workers.  But  as no  sliding scale  s,ystem exists 
for adjusting the  incomes  of the  professions in line with rises in prices, 
the  average  real incomes  of members  of the  professions fluctuate  to a  fairly 
large extent.  Doctors'  and  dentistsJ  fees expressed in real terms increased 
sharply in 1958  - 1959  and  then again in 1964 - 1965  and 1968  - 1971. 
In the  latter years the  increase  was  well  above  that of the  cost  of a  con-
sultation,  and this would  indicate that the  rise  in the  incomes  of the 
medical profession in this period was  due  in part to the fact that more 
services were  rendered.  It is also possible  that the  incomes  statistics for 
the  professions for the  period 1968  - 1971  overestimate  the  real increase, 
being based on  tax returns.  This is because  following a  tightening of controls, 
a  number  of professional people  had to declare  a  larger proportion of their 
income  than in previous years. 
II It is furthermore  possible that during these  ye~rs the doctors' 
professional associations stepped up their action to have  charges for their 
services increased,  in response  to the  desire  of many  members  of the 
profession to offset the effects of heavier taxes b,y  a  rise in their gross 
fees. 
The  number  of pharmacists grew very regularly from  1953  to 1971,  but 
there  were  large fluctuations in their gross per capita incomes.  Sharp 
increases occurred from  1958  to 1965  inclusive,  then the  growth rates fell 
and in 1969  and 1971  there was  even a  downward  movement.  This was  probably 
due  firstly to the  stricter control of prices of pharmaceuticals between 
1969  and 1971  and  secondly to the  less marked growth in the  consumption of 
medicines.  More  pharmacists had to  sha.re  out an almost  constant  amount  of 
gross profits on  sales of pharmaceuticals  ..  It is also possible that the 
extension of the practice  of allowing a  10%  refund in response  to the keener 
competition between private pharmacists  and cooperative  chemists lowered the 
average earnings of pharmacists. 
The  income  of owners  of dwellings did not keep up with building costs, 
which,  between 1965  and 1972,  increased much  more  than consumer prices. 
This can be  attributed on the  one  hand to the activities of companies 
approved by the  Societe National  du Logement,  which by building low-rental 
homes  influenced the  rents of small dwellings,  and on the  other hand to the 
policy of home  building subsidies pursued by the  Oentral  Government  and the 
provinces. 
'l'his policy prompted many  young married couples to build or buy a 
home,  regularly reducing the  demand  for homes  to rent,  while  old houses 
remained in large  supply and affected the  trend of average rents. 
Interest  income  grew sharply as a  result of the  increase  in invested 
capital. 
12 But  as the  continual  increase  in consumer  prices between 1954 and 1972 
steadily reduced the  purchasing power  of invested capital,  much  of the 
increase in interest income  is fictitious. In  t~e years  wh~n prices climbed 
steeply (1966  and  1972),  most  savers lost money.  Moreover,  the typical 
"rentier" has almost  completely disappeared and the  purpose  of most  invest-
ments is not to create  income  for consumption,  but to obtain an income  to 
offset the  loss of the  purchasing power  of capital. 
The  effect of the  increase  in interest income  on  the  demand  for goods 
and  services oan  therefore  be  considered minimal,  or in other words it is 
not  a  source  of demand-pull  inflation. 
In view  of the movement  in prices,  the  lending rates charged by the 
SNCI  (Societe Nationale  du Credit a l'Industrie)  and  by  private banks 
remained in general fairly low. 
This policy encouraged  investment  and thus contributed towards  main-
taining a  high level of economic  activity through almost  the entire period 
from  1960  to 1972. 
By  making it easier to resort to bank  lending,  it contributed towards 
a  rise  in prices.  In view  of the  complex  character of inflationary movements, 
caution must  be  the  watchword  when  deciding on  economic  policy measures to 
combat  inflation. 
Since  structural inflation as it exists today is above  all the 
consequence  of a  clash of excessive material aspirations of various social 
classes,  any  policy which  sets out to combat  the  rise in the  cost of living 
must  conflict with many  economic  interests. 
A rational anti-inflationary policy therefore  requires that the 
government  should firstly determine  to what  extent it is willing and  able 
to get the  various interest groups to moderate  their demands  allowing for 
any resistance  that they might  show,  so that  these  demands  can be  reconciled 
with greater price  stability. This is primarily a  political problem  rather 
than an economic  one. 
13 In Belgium,  the  main  curb on  the  upward  price movement  was  the  system 
requiring notice to be  given of any  proposed rises.  B.y  imposing a  waiting 
period on  enterprises before  they can  increase their prices,  the  government 
prevents recipients of non-wage  incomes  from  immediately adapting these 
incomes  in line with increases in costs.  This  system is fairly effective 
and explains in part - accountmust  also be  taken of other factors  such as 
the  high  savings ratio,  the  moderation  shown  by the  trade unions in their 
claims,  etc - why  the rate  of inflation has  generally been lower  in Belgium 
than in the neighbouring countries.  But  if the  policy of curbing price 
rises is pushed too far,  it creates distortions in the economic  structure, 
for  investments will no  longer be  channelled into industries where  selling 
prices are kept  too  low  in comparison to  costs. 
It is for this reason that the  price  commission,  which must  give 
the Minister an opinion on  every application for price  increases,  very 
rarely refuses an increase,  but  in most  cases looks for a  compromise  between 
the  interests of the  applicant  firms and  the  interests of consumers.  In 
general  the Minister accepts the  commission's  opinion or if he  considers 
it too generous  or too restrictive,  he  himself tries to find a  more  satis-
factory solution. 
The  drawback  of this policy is that it prompts  organizations in 
trade  and  industry to apply for price rises which  are  well above  those  required 
to keep  firms profitable. 
The  action of the  commission  and Ministry does not  therefore  restrain 
price rises as much  as  could be  imagined  from  a  comparison of increases 
applied for and those  granted.  Moreover,  controls are not  alw~s adequate 
and  the penalties imposed  by  the  courts for infringements of the  price 
regulations would  not  in most  cases act as an example  to deter others. 
I~ In the  conclusions a  number  of measures are  proposed  (better 
coordination between the  bodies responsible  for price policy,  setting up 
of economic  courts,  powers  of the  commission extended to cover all prices 
and  charges,  strengthening of the  consumer  representation in the  commission) 
which  could make  the  prices policy more  effective. It was  also seen that 
the  price  commission  has in the past almost totally disregarded possi-
bilities of lowering certain prices without  jeopardizing the normal 
profitability of firms.  This is because  the  commission  lacks information 
on  the  structure of the  various markets and the  trend of costs in most 
industries. It would  therefore be  desirable to set up  a  commission of 
specialists,  similar to the Monopolies Commission  in Britain,  to study 
the  markets of various products and to report regularly to the Minister 
of Economic  Affairs and to the  price  commission  on  profit margins which 
are  clearly excessive.  The  Minister would  then be  able  to impose  price 
reductions which would  more  or less offset,  in the  cost of living,  the 
price rises which  are  considered inevitable 'because  of higher prices of 
raw materials or an increase  in wages  well above  the  increase  in productivity. 
The  commission  should also look closer at the effects on  the  cost 
of living of exclusive  dealing agreements and resale price maintenance. 
Where  an exclusive dealer charges selling prices well  above  those  prevailing 
in the  other Community  countries,  the  commission  should propose  that the 
Minister lay down  a  maximum  price. 
It is to be  regretted that in Belgium there is no  law which  in 
principle - certain exceptions would have  to be  allowed - prohibits resale 
price maintenance  practiced by producers and wholesalers.  Such  a  law would 
enable  the Minister to take  legal action against  firms which use  these 
methods  to allow distributors excessive  profit margins  and would  bring 
to an end the  tendency for Belgian Courts to rule that  such agreements 
must  be  respected. 
None  of these measures is contrary to maintenance  of competition, 
as only cases where  competition has been eliminated from  the  market  are 
under attack. 
15 In addition,  the  Belgian Government  should,:like the  governments 
in the neighbouring countries,  seek to establish a  policy to promote 
competition both in production and distribution. This policy should 
continue,  at national level,  the efforts made  by  the  EEC  Commission.  As 
the  EEC  Commission directs its action in particular against the  powerful 
cartels and thus  seeks to  stimulate  competition between  large  producers, 
the  Belgian Government  should turn its attention towards restrictive 
practices and  agreements which  are  likely to limit  competition in the 
distributive trade. This requires not  only a  complete  revision of the 
law of  27  May  1960 against abuses of economic  power,  but also a  careful 
watch over all measures taken by  professional or other associations which 
limit competition by restricting the  freedom  of establishment. 
Examplesquoted in the  study are  the efforts made  by  the  association 
of pharmacists to restrict the  right to open new  cooperative  chemists and 
other chemists  shops,  and  the efforts of small traders to prevent new 
supermarkets being established. 
We  feel it desirable that various forms  of distributive outlets 
(corner shops,  chain stores,  department  stores,  cooperative  supermarkets) 
should continue  to exist,  so  that no  group  can acquire  a  dominant  position. 
The  conclusions to the  study also contain a  number  of  suggestions 
on  the  policy to be  pursued to hold down  rent increases.  The  conclusion 
reached is that as rents have  increased less than the  price  of land and 
building costs, it would not  be  right to pass a  new  law prohibiting rent 
increases.  The  Government  should endeavour to lower the  price  of building 
land and to slow down  the  rise in building costs. 
B,y  introducing a  special tax on  building land in towns  which lies 
undeveloped,  the  government  can prompt  owners  to sell it to persons wishing 
to build houses  and thus bring about  a  drop in the  price. 
16 - ...!.-
The  introduction of a  tax on  second homes,  as in Frace,  could ease 
the  demand  of the well-off for flats and houses and thus curb demand-pull 
inflation in this sector.  The  increase  in building costs caused by a  much 
faster increase in wages than in productivity could be  tempered by 
standardizing building materials,  thus reducing costs,  and by introducing 
industrialized methods to building with systems  of prefabrication,  thus 
reducing the number  of man-hours  spent  on each construction. 
As  regards credit policy,  the  study explains why  we  feel that expensive 
money  policy is not  a  suitable answer to the  dangers of demand-pull inflation. 
Such a  policy is generally only a  makeshift  solution which does not 
get at the very sources of inflation, i.e. the  claims by various social 
groups for excessive increases in their income. 
17 CHAPrER  I 
THE  STUDY 
The  development  of non-wage  income  according to the 
various theories of inflation 
1.  Introduction 
Inflation has become  a  serious problem for industrialized and developing 
countries alike.  Whereas  it has been held by  certain American  (1) and 
Latin-American  (2) authors that inflation encourages industry to invest 
and  increase production,  most  economists are of the opinion that the 
overall effects of inflation on  economic  activity are clearly detrimental. 
The  economists maintain that inflation increases demand  for high-value 
luxury goods  which  can be  used as a  hedge  against  monetary depreciation, 
but  makes  little contriaution towards the  enhancement  of general  well-
being (3).  Production of these luxury goods  (jewellery,  furniture,  furs, 
second homes,  etc.) claims a  substantial proportion of availamle capital 
and  skilled manpower,  thereby holding back the development  of the 
industrial potential of sectors which  are of more  importance from  the 
point  of view of economic  growth. 
This type of unbalanced industrial development  is accompanied by  the 
emergence  of an unjust  social climate which is unfavourable to the 
encouragement  of the will to work  and  save. 
Savers lose the fruits of their sacrifices through the erosion of the 
purchasing power  of money.  Manual  and  clerical workers realise that 
their real incomes  are falling as prices rise steadily,  and this 
creates tensions which  can  lead to disruption of production through 
industrial disputes. 
(1)  A.  HANSEN  holds that,  in the developing countries,  savings are at too 
low  a  level to finance the capital expenditure required for  economic 
growth.  Inflation is necessary to enaale the state and industry to 
find the necessary capital for the development  of aasic structures 
and industrial capacity.  (A.  HANSEN  :  "Inflation and  Growth",  in 
"Stabile Freise in wachsender  Wirtschaft ",  Tiibingen,  1960,  PP•  181-187.) 
(2)  Particularly mem~ers of the United Nations Economic  Commission  for the 
Latin-American Countries,  among  whom  Preaisch occupies a  leading pos-
i tion (Martin BRONFENBRENNER  and Franklyn D.  HOLZMAN  :  "Survey of 
Inflation Theory",  The  American  Economic  Review,  Septem'Der  1963,  p.610). 
(3)  c.  ZE:ooT  :  "Inflationskrafte in pluralistischen Marktwirtschaften",  in 
"Laissez-faire Pluralismus - Demokratic und  Wirtschaft  der gegen-
wartigen Zeitalters'',  Goets Briefs (Ed.),  Berlin,  1966,  PP•  397-398. 
19 Steady inflation - with prices rising at  an annual rate of not  more  than 5 
to 6  per cent  - can be  contained by  moderate government  action which is not 
very harmful to economic  growth.  Beyond  the 10 per cent threshold it 
becomes  impossible to curb inflation without  recourse to sharply deflationary 
measures,  such as a  substantial reduction of the money  supply (1). 
Where  prices are rising at an annual rate of more  than 5 per cent  but  less 
than 10  per cent,  the economy  is in a  transitional situation which,  if it 
lasts too long,  almost  inevitably leads to an acceleration of the rate of 
inflation.  Rising prices cause  a  speculative mentality to develop in the 
various strata of society,  and this gives rise to excessive stock-piling and 
an increase in demand  in excess of production capacity,  thus causing prices 
to rise continually (2).  It may  be  observed that,  in all the  countries of 
Western  Europe,  the rise in the  cost  of living between the first quarter of 
1972  and the first quarter of 1973  was  in excess of 6  per cent.  The  figures 
for  each  country are  :  approximately 6.3 per cent  in France,  6.9 per cent  in 
the Federal Republic of Germany,  7.0 per cent  in Belgium,  7.1  per cent in the 
Netherlands,  7.6 per cent  in Great  Britain,  8.2  per cent  in Switzerland,  7.8 
per  cent  in Denmark,  8.8 per cent  in Italy and 10.1  per cent  in Ireland (3). 
Responding to the protests of the mass  of consumers,  who  felt that their 
legitimate interests were  being undermined,  the governments  of these  countries 
have  taken measures to reduce the rate of inflation,  but  without  applying 
the brakes too harshly to  economic  growth. 
Most  of these measures have been inspired by neo-classical,  keynesian and post-
keynesian  economic  theory.  Until the middle of the  sixties,  they proved 
successful in keeping the rise in the  cost  of living below 5 to 6 per cent 
per annum,  but it would  appear that their effectiveness has been lessening 
during the last  5 years. 
(1)  E.M.  LERNER  has  shown  that the galloping inflation which  developed in the 
American  Confederacy during the  War  of Secession was  brough under control 
in April-M~ 1864  by  the expedient  of taking a  substantial volume  of 
money  out  of circulation (E.M.  LERNER  :  "Inflation in the Confederacy 
1861  -'65",  Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money,  M.  FRIEDMAN  (Ed.), 
Chicago  1956,  P•  172).  The  Gutt  experiment  in Belgium also proved that 
a  substantial reduction of the money  supply  can put  an end to galloping 
inflation. 
(2)  C.  ZEBOT,  op.cit.,  P•  398. 
(3)  Calculated on the basis of the figures for the period February 1972  to 
February 1973  (March  1972  to March  1973  in the case of  Bel~ium, the 
Federal Republic of Germany,  Great  Britain and Switzerland).  Source  : 
United Nations Monthly Statistical Bulletin,  May  1973,  PP•  176-185 
(French version). 
20 Many  economists are of the opinion that the reason for this is that the 
essential causes of inflation can no  longer be  explained by the neo-classical, 
Keynesian and  post-Keynesian theories and that,  consequently,  measures based 
on  these theories are  no  longer suited to actual  conditions. 
During the Second  World  War,  some  economists were  already stressing the 
possibility of cost-push as opposed to demand-pull  inflation (1).  Keynes, 
in his "The  General Theory of Employment,  Interest and Money",  had maintained 
. that,  even before full  employment  is reached,  wage  increases can bring about 
a  general  increase in prices (2).  In "How  to Pay  for the War"  (1940),  how-
ever,  he  no  longer took this possibility into account  and the only means  of 
combatting inflation recommended  were  measures designed to reduce overall 
demand  (3). 
After the War,  the trade unions in many  European  countries  (France,  Belgium) 
and the United States made  regular demands  for  wage  increases which  t-rere 
higher in percentage terms than the  growth in productivity,  thereby making 
price rises inevitable. 
This  situation prompted  economists to develop the theory of wage-pull 
inflation which,  by its very  simplicity,  impressed a  great  many  people and 
led to the adoption of political measures designed to reduce the  power  of 
the trade unions  (the Taft-Hartley Law  of 1948  in the United States). 
Politicians gradually realised that  wage  and  price controls alone are not 
sufficient to prevent  cost-push inflation.  A distinction must  be  made  between 
autonomously motivated wage  increases and those motivated by  external factors, 
namely  a  general rise in the  standard of living and  (or) price increases; 
in other words,  in most  cases,  wage  increases represent  only one  phase of 
the overall process of rising incomes  and  prices.  It is just as possible 
for  such  an  inflationary spiral to be  set  in motion by  an increase in non-
wage  income  as by  excessive  claims by manual  or clerical workers' trade 





T.C.  KOOPMAN'S  :  "Dynamics  of Inflation",  Review  of Economics  and Statistics, 
February 1942,  p.53-65 and  A.  SMITHIES  :  "Behaviour of Money,  National 
Income  under Inflationary Conditions",  Quarterly Journal  of Economics, 
November  1942,  p.ll3-129. 
J.M.  KEYNES  :  "The  General Theory  of Elnployment,  Interest  and Money", 
London,  tenth edition,  1954,  P•  301. 
R.J.  BALL  :  "Inflation and the Theory of Money",  London  1964,  p.63. 
R.  GOErZE  GIREY  :  "Salaires et inflation depuis la seconde  guerre mondiale", 
Rapport  au  Congres  des  economistes de  langue franyaise  (18 k~  1953), 
Revue  d'economie politique,  ~~-June 1953,  pp.287-289. 
21 It is for this reason that the French economist  Francois  PERROUX  preferred to 
use the term "structural inflation" rather than "wage-pull inflation" to describe 
the type of inflation characterised by regular increases in prices and  wages  (1). 
This term has the advantage of placing the accent  on  the  preponderant  role of 
the  economic  and  socialogical structures of modern  industrial  societies in 
setting off the acceleration of an inflationary trend.  Before making  an in-
depth analysis of the theory of structural inflation, it is necessary,  in 
order to determine the role attributed to the development  of non-wage  income 
in this theory,  to provide brief parallel analyses of the neo-classical, 
keynesian and  post-keynesian theories of inflation. 
2.  The  development  of non-wage  income  according to the neo-classical theory 
of inflation. 
The  neo-classical theory of inflation is primarily a  monetary theory.  Accord-
ing to Irving FISHER's  famous  formula,  Pr  = MV  + M'V',  if V and  V'  are more  or 
less constant  and the elasticity of the  supply of goods  and  services is limited, 
any increase in M and(or) M'  must  cause a  rise in the price index P. 
If the increase in M or M'  is caused by a  chance  event,  it is a  case of 
"accidental inflation";  on  the other hand,  if the  growth in the money  supply 
flows  fron  strong expansion of trade and  industrial activity during a  period of 
prosperity,  this is a  case of "cyclical inflation"  (2). 
In the monetary  conception of inflation,  there is little scope  for an inde-
pendent  theory on  the behaviour of social groups.  The  neo-cl8.ssical theoret-
icians assume  that all individuals are  aware  of their interests and  behave 
accordingly.  Any  increase in the disposable monetary resources of one  or more 
groups of individuals will  cause their demand  to rise and  encourage  producers 
and  intermediaries to increase their prices.  Wages  will adjust to this 
increase at  a  certain remove  in time.  Indeed,  it is necessary for  several 
months to pass before industry can adapt  production to increased demand  and, 
consequently,  before there is any  significant  increase in demand  for factors 
of production. 
(1)  F.  PERROUX:  "Quelques formes  contemporaines de l'inflation",  Proceedings 
of the  Congress  of French-speaking Economists,  1953,  PP•  163-164. 
(2)  M and M'  represent  money  and  bank money  respectively,  V and  V'  their 
velocity of circulation,  and T the total number  of transactions during the 
period concerned,  recalculated at  the  prices obtained during the base period. 
(I. FISHER  :  "The  Purchasing Power  of Money  - Its Determination and Relation 
to Credit,  Interest  and  Crises",  Second  Edition,  1922,  reprinted New  York, 
1963,  PP•  47-49.) 
22 Knut  WICKSELL  (1),  Irving FISHER  (2)  and  Gustav  CASSEL  (3)  propounded 
purely monetary theories on  the economic  cycle.  According to them,  at the 
beginning of a  period of prosperity,  the market  interest rate is much 
lower than what  Wicksell calls the natural rate, that is the return on 
capital invested in factors of production (4).  Initially, therefore, 
prosperity brings about  a  redistrieution of income  which  benefits 
entrepreneurs and is detrimental to  employees  and  those living on  fixed 
incomes.  Then,  as manpower  shortages begin to make  an impression and  wages 
begin to rise,  causing prices to rise more  rapidly,  it is mainly those 
living on  fixed incomes  who  suffer from  the development  of the cyclical 
situation.  Their capital frequently does not  earn sufficient interest to 
make  up for its loss of purchasing power  caused ~  inflation. 
Towards the  end  of the boom,  wages  and interest rates rise more  rapidly 
than prices.  The  supply of products and  services grows  fairly rapidly 
towards the  end  of the period of prosperity since,  at this stage,  a  high 
proportion of investments are bearing fruit  and this holds back rising 
prices. 
Then,  there is a  spectacular decline in undertakings'  profits,  whereas 
there is an improvement  in the position of workers  and  those living on 
fixed incomes.  According to the neo-classical theory of cyclical infla-
tion,  then,there is no  general movement  of non-wage  income,  since a  dist-
inction must  be made  a  priori between profits and interest.  As  regards the 
fees  charged by the liberal professions,  little research has been carried out 
into their development.  At  the beginning of the twentieth century,  there 
were  too  few  doctors,  lawyers,  architects,  chemists,  etc. to constitute a 





K.  WICKSELL  :  "Interest and  Prices", Translation by F.R.  Kahn,  New  York 
1965,  PP•  110-111. 
I. FISHER  :  "The  Purchasing Power  of Money  •••  ",  op.cit.  PP•  57-60. 
G.  CASSEL  :  '~heoretische Sozialokonomie,  Lehrbuch der  allgemeinen 
Volkswirtschaftslehre",  L.  Pohle  (Ed.),  deel II, Leipzig,  1919, 
pp.435-436. 
According to I. FISHER,  an increase in prices reduces the real rate of 
interest,  so that  as  soon as prices begin to rise,  investment  also 
increases at  such a  pace that a  boom  becomes  inevitable (I. FISHER, 
op.cit.,  P•  57). 
23 3.  The  development  of non-wage  income  according to Keynesian and  post-
Keynesian theory of inflation. 
As  has  already been pointed out  in the first  section of this Chapter, 
Keynes  in fact  developed two  theories of inflation,  one  based on  increases 
in wages  and the other on  excess demand  in relation to supply. 
These  two  phenomena  normally occur during the upturn in the economic  cycle. 
Excess  effective demand  is actually the cause of economic  recovery following 
a  period of depression. 
It will not  cause any  substantial increase in prices as long as productive 
capacity is able to adapt to the  growth in demand.  As  soon as full 
employment  is reached demand-pull  inflation will begin to bite. 
The  multiplier action of excess demand  will then materialise through the 
medium  of prices.  Prices will rise in such a  way that, in real terms,  the 
value of overall demand  will be  reduced to that of supply. 
At  the  same  time,  the trade unions will take advantage of the higher demand 
for  labour to press for  wage  increases exceeding the normal  growth in 
productivity,  thus obliging undertakings to increase their prices to 
maintain their profit margins.  This is cost-push inflation (1). 
In his book  "How  to Pay  for the  War",  KEYNES  indicated means  by which the 
Government  could curb excess demand,  but  he did not  offer any  remedy  for 
cost-push inflation.  When  writing "The  General Theory",  he  was  mainly 
concerned with measures to combat  economic  stagnation which,  at the time, 
was  jeopardising the very existence of the capitalist society. 
He  was  therefore of the opinion that inflation was  a  lesser evil and that 
the most  important  thing was  to avoid any action which  could cause a 
recession at the  peak of the economic  qycle.  To  hold back wage  increases 
during a  period of economic upturn is tantamount to favouring employers 
and those on  fixed  incomes at the expense  of manual  and clerical workers. 
Since the propensity to save is on  average  lower among  workers than among 
entrepreneurs and those on  fixed incomes,  any increase in real wages  will 
place  a  brake on  the growth in overall  savings,  thereby reducing the risk 
of savings  exceeding the level of planned investment  and an economic  down-
turn becoming inevitable (2). 
(1)  J .M.  KEYNES 
(2) Ibidem. 
"The  General Theory  "  ....  ' 
24 
op.cit.  PP•  253  and  301. On  similar grounds,  Keynes  was  opposed to the raising of the rate of interest 
when  the economic  cycle is at its peak  (1 ).  He  was  in favour of a  monetary 
policy designed to keep the rate of interest down  to a  level at which  there 
is alwS\Y's  sufficient investment to maintain full employment  (2). 
The  fact that this can lead to a  partial expropriation of the assets of 
those on  fixed incomes - the rate of interest they receive will be  lower 
than the annual rate at which  the value of their capital is eroded by 
inflation - was  a  matter of indifference to Keynes,  since he did not  believe 
in the traditional theor.y  of the benefits to be derived from  saving (3). 
According to his conception,  the monetar.y  system  should be  sufficiently 
elastic to be able at any moment  to make  available the resources required 
for investment  purposes.  In his view,  recession is not  caused by  shortage 
of financial resources,  but by a  lack of sufficiently profitable investment 
projects (4). 
In "How  to Pay  for the War",  he called for increased direct taxation and 
compulsor.y  saving to reduce private sector demand  to the level of prod-
uction available for civilian needs. 
This is the basis of the inflation gap theor.y (5). 
At  first, Keynes's disciples concentrated entirely on  demand-pull  infla-
tion,  which  was  the great  problem  of the warring countries during the 
Second  World  War  and the early post-War years.  Two  trends emerged.  One 







J.M.  KEYN:E5  :  "The  General Theory ••  ",  op.cit.,  PP•  320-323. 
Ibidem,  P•  375• 
Ibidem,  P•  373• 
Ibidem,  P•  323. 
S.A.  HARRIS  :  "Keynes'  Influence on  Public Policy" - "The  New  Economics  -
Keynes'  Influence on  Theory and  Public Policy  ,  S.F. HARRIS  (Ed.), 
London,  fifth edition,  1968,  P•  23. 
In his book  "Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles",  A.H.  HANSEN  placesemphasis 
on the decline in the profitability of investments towards the end of the 
peak in the economic  cycle.  This decline is the result of the exhaustion 
of the opportunities for exploiting new  technological processes.  Inevitably, 
it brings about  an economic  downturn  sooner or later.  An  increase in the 
interest rate caused by a  shortage of money  can accelerate the downturn. 
(A.  HANSEN  :  "Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles,  New  York  1941,  PP•  315-319.) 
In his book  ''Monetary Theory and Fiscal Policy"  (1949),  he  expressed a  fear 
that the monetary  expansion necessary to economic  growth  could not  be 
sustained until 1975.  (A.H.  HANSEN  :  "Monetary Theory  and Fiscal Policy", 
New  York,  Toronto,  London,  1949,  PP•  194-195.) 
25 J.R.  HICKS  (1),  believes that,  after a  long period of economic  expansion,  a 
slowing-down becomes  inevitable because of the exhaustion of monetary 
reserves.  Others,  like J.  TOBIN  (2),  have  emphasised the great  elasticity 
of the monetary  system which,  through the creation of "inside money"  (3), 
adapts relatively easily to the  economist's liquidity requirements. 
If one  adopts the monetary version of the post-keynesian theory of the 
trade cycle,  the development  of the various types of non-wage  income  is 
roughly the  same  as if one  accepts the neo-classical theory. 
Those  on  fixed  incomes lose money  at  the beginning of the  peak of the  cycle 
but  regain the advantage towards the  end of the  peak  and  during the recession, 
when  rates of interest are high and the rise in prices is held back by 
expanding production and falling demand. 
If,on the  other hand,  there is no  monetary ceiling,  inflation can continue 
ad infinitum,  but  need not  necessarily accelerate.  Various braking mech-
anisms  can be used to prevent  prices from  rising at  a  rate of more  than 
5  - 6  percent. 
DUESENBERRY  (4) lists them  as follows  : 
1)  A time  lag in the adjustment  of wage  increases to price increases.  This 
increases profits,  a  high proportion of which is normally withheld,  thus 
bringing about  an increase in the  level of savings,  which  has a  distinctly 
deflationary effect; 
2)  A time  lag in the adjustment  of dividend increases to increases in profits. 
Commercial  companies normally only pay  a  dividend at the  end  of the year. 
If their profits rise,  the  volume  of money  which  they keep in hand to  p~ 
dividends will  become  higher,  in other words,  their savings will grow; 
(1)  In his book  "A  Contribution to the Theory of the Trade  Cycle",  J.R.HICKS 
used the term  "monetary ceiling" to indicate that the nominal  expansion 
of national  income  by inflation will be  held back by  lack of liquidity. 
( J .R.  HICKS  :  "A  Contribution to the Theory of the Trade  Cycle",  Oxford 
1950,  PP•  136-138). 
(2)  J. TOBIN  :  "Money  and  Income  :  Post  Hoc  ergo  Propter Hoc?",  Quarterly 
Journal  of Economics,  May  1970,  PP•  301-303. 
(3)  The  theory of "inside money"  has been fully developed by J.G.  GURLEY 
and  E.G.  SHAW  in their book  :  "Money  in the Theory of Finance", 
Washington,  sixth edition,  1970,  pp.  72-75• 
(4)  J ..  DUESENBERRY  :  "2'he  Mechanics  of Inflation",  The  Review of Economics 
and Statistics",  1950,  p.l45• 3)  The  rise in prices diminishes the purchasing power  of the pensions and 
interest received by pensioners and those  on  fixed  incomes,  benefitting 
the public authorities,  institutions and undertakings.  This transfer 
produces  a  deflationary effect,  since those on fixed incomes and 
pensioners  spend most  of their income  on  consumer  goods,  which  is not 
the  case of the authorities,  institutions and undertakings,  which bear 
the  cost  of the  ac~ired rights of those  on  fixed  incomes  and  pensioners. 
4)  Direct taxation,  being progressive,  increases in volume  as the cost 
of living rises aftd  incomes  are adjusted to the rise.  This also  causes 
a  reduction in the purchasing power  of private individuals,  which  shifts 
to the State and its dependencies. 
5)  Any  increase in production creates additional  income,  part  of which will 
normally be  saved,  so that the  supply of goods  and services will rise 
more  rapidly than demand. 
If the growth in production is due  to increased productivity,  two  possible 
situations can occur. 
Either selling prices will be reduced,  in which  case there is a  direct 
deflationary effect  on  the general  level of prices,  or the majority of 
the additional  income  will remain in the hands of the undertaking,  which 
will keep it in its reserves during a  certain period (there may  be  an 
increased dividend later),  thereby bringing about  a  reduction in overall 
demand  from  which a  deflationary effect will result. 
The  theory of braking mechanisms  can explain why,  in a  modern  industrial 
economy  characterised by  substantial growth  of productivity and  a  high level 
of savings,  the inflationary process generally remains  steady.  At  the  same 
time,  this theory places the accent  on the  structural rather than cyclical 
nature of this type of inflation. 
In fact,  if there is no  monetary  ceiling,  but  only a  series of braking 
mechanisms,  the period of prosperity need not  be  followed  by  one  of downturn, 
but,  under the influence of the braking mechanisms,  it may  lose  some  of its 
strength and be  followed  by  more  moderate growth. 
This in fact  is what  took place during the period of the sixties.  In most 
countries,  even during the  1961-62  and 1966-67  recessions,  the gross 
national product  did not  stop growing and nor  was  inflation completely 
27 eliminated ( 1 ) • 
In fact,  prices continued to follow a  ste~  upward  trend and  qyclical 
fluctuations only caused rates of increase to vary.  This gave rise to 
a  situation which Keynes  did not  foresee  (2),  namely  one  in which the 
various social classes are confronted with a  gradual  erosion of their 
incomes by inflation. 
The  efforts of these various groups to adapt their incomes to rising 
prices in turn become  an  important factor contributing to rising prices. 
This is the very 'basis of the structural inflation theory which,  unlike 
the neo-classical, Keynesian and  post-Keynesian theories of inflation,  does 
not attriaute as much  importance to the factors which  set off the inflation-
ary trend as to those which  ensure that it continues. 
4.  The  development  of non-wage  income  according to the structural 
inflation theory. 
The  structural inflation theory had its origins in France,  where  the inflation 
of the post-War years had  shown  that  a  strong,  constant rise in prices 
cannot  be  explained by either the neo-classical mechanism  of the quantity 
theory of money  nor by the post-Keynesian inflationary gap theory. 
Henri  AUJAC  gave  a  succinct version of what  m~  be  called the structural 
inflation theory in an article published in 1950.  He  maintained that 
(1)  From  1962  to 1963  the gross national  pr~~ct calculated at  constant prices 
rose b.y  4.8 per cent  in Belgium,  4.6  per cent  in Great  Britain,  5·3  per 
cent in France and 3.2  per cent in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
From  1966  to 1967,  these countries' gross national products rose by 
3.7  per cent,  2  per cent,  4•4  per cent,  and  zero respectively.  (Monthly 
Statistical Bulletin,  United Nations,  December  1969,  PP•  196-197). 
Between 1962  and 1963,  consumer  prices rose by  2.15  per cent  in Belgium, 
1.94 per cent in Great  Britain, 4.82  per cent  in France and  2.88  per cent 
in the Federal Republic of Germany.  Between 1966  and 1967,  they rose by 
2.52  per cent in Belgium,  2.49  per cent in Great  Britain,  2.66  per cent 
in France and 1.74 per cent  in the Federal  Republic of Germany. 
(Ibidem,  PP•  176-183). 
(2)  In "The  General  Theory",  Keynes  did indeed envisage the possiaility of 
continual inflation in the event  of demand  exceeding supply to such an 
extent that full  employment  results and  wages  rise more  rapidly than prices. 
He  did not  visualise the repercussions of this situation on  the behaviour 
of the social classes,  but  took the view that,  in this event,  the rise in 
prices would,  in accordance with the neo-classical theory,  be  proportional 
to the growth of MV,  that is the product  of the quantity of money  and 
its velocity of circulation (J•M.  K~  :  "The  General Theory  •••"• 
op.  cit., P•  289). 
28 "it is the behaviour of the various social groups in relation to the network 
of monetary interrelationships which  causes inflation"  (1 ).  By network of 
monetary relationships,  AUJAC  means  the general habits of the various social 
groups and  public authorities regarding policy on  cash holdings,  frequency 
of  ~ents, levels of saving and hoarding,  and also legal obligations 
concerning the payment  of wages,  interest,  dividends,  contributions and 
remuneration.  All these relationships go  to make  up  a  structure,  and this 
structure is contested from  time to time by  one  or another social group 
which attempts to break down  or modify  certain monetary relationships that 
it deems  to be prejudicial to its interests.  Such rejection gives rise to 
a  series of reactions from  the other groups in their attempt  to avoid becoming 
victims of the  changes to the monetary relationships brought  about  at the 
behest  of the  challenging group.  If, for example,  the workers in an 
industrial sector demand  and  obtain a  wage  increase, the entrepreneurs in 
this sector will attempt to pass on  the  cost to the  consumer  who,  in turn, 
will  seek to adjust his income to this rise in the cost  of living and his 
behaviour in so  doing will lead to the disruption of other monetary relation-
ships. 
The  relative economic  power  of the various social groups determines which  of 
them  will benefit  from  this inflationary process and which will suffer. 
H.  AUJAC  has illustrated his theory with a  number  of examples  proving that 
it is possible for fortuitous incidents (the  l~ing-off of a  workers'  delegate) 
to spark off a  dispute resulting in an inflationary spiral (2). 
As  an extension of the  concept  of structural inflation, it may  be  pointed out 
that the breakdown  of relationships need not necessarily be brought  about 
by a  social group.  Circumstances outside the control of the various groups, 
such as a  bad harvest,  an increase or decrease in external demand,  a  rise 
in raw materials prices or the application of new  production processes,  can 
also set  off an inflationary movement. 
The  factor giving rise to a  price increase,  therefore,  is not necessarily a 
root  cause of all inflation.  It m~  be  concluded from  this that it is often 
more  important to analyse the manner  in which  increases in prices and  incomes 
spread and accelerate than to determine the point at which  the movement  begins. 
(1)  H.  AUJAC  :""L'influence du  comportement  des groupes  sociaux sur le 
developpement  d'une inflation",  2  Economie  Appliquee,  April-June 1950, 
P•  287. 
(2)  Ibidem,  P•  287. 
29 H.  AUJAC  also  stressed the need  for the establishment  of a  new  type of 
compatibility between the behaviours of the various  social groups  (1).  The 
"dominant" relationships,  as described by  F.  PERROUX  in various articles (2) 
and in his "book  "L'economie du  20ieme  siecle"  (Paris 1961 ),  play a  decisive 
role in establishing this new  structure of monetary relationships and in 
obtaining acceptance  of it by the various social groups  (3). 
H.  AUJAC  did not  make  any detailed analysis of the  causes  of the 
deceleration or reversal of an  inflationary trend.  This  problem  was 
studied by  Jean  GABILLARD  in his doctoral thesis entitled "Recherches 
sur la fin de !'inflation" which  he  submitted at the University of 
Poitiers in 1950.  GABILLARD  put  forward the opinion that  inflation can 
be  brought  to an  end  by  : 
a)  the disappearance  of the tensions which  gave  rise to it; 
b)  resistance to the  spread of inflation; 
c)  the creation of deflationary tensions. 
Where  inflation has  been  caused by  a  decline in production or by an 
excessive increase in demand  or a  reduction in consumption or capital, 
expenditure will relax the  situation and take the  impetus  out  of the 
inflationary trend,  or even  cause it to disappear (4). 
The  principal  cause  of resistance to the  spread of inflation,  according to 
GABILLARD,  lies in the inertia of the behaviour of the various  social 
classes and in the structural  and  institutional rigidity arising out  of 
the banking and financial  structure and the existence of the  State, 
which  will normally  seek to hold back the rise in prices (5). 
As  regards deflationary trends,  they may  arise out  of external factors 
(exceptional harvest,  influx of goods  from  abroad)  or they may  be  caused by 
inflation itself (excessive  expansion of production capacity in certain 
sectors,  exhaustion of the banks'  capacity to create money,  need 
(1)  H.  AUJAC:  op.  cit.,  P•  300. 
(2)  F.  PERROUX:  "Esquisse d'une theorie de  l'economie dominante",  Economie 
Appliquee,  April-June 1948  and  "Note  sur le dynamisme  de  la domination", 
Economie  Appliquee,  April-May  1950. 
(3)  E.  JAMES  :  "Problemes monetaires d'aujourd'hui - Etude des  fondements 
d'une theorie et  d'une politique monetaire moderne",  2nd  edition,  Paris, 
1970,  P•  193. 
(4)  J.  GABILLARD  :  "Recherches  sur la fin de  !'inflation", Paris,  1952, 
PP•  38  and  234-257• 
(5)  Ibidem,  PP•  199-233. 
30 to clear stocks which have  risen to excessive levels (1).  In general, 
deflationary trends will not  only put  an  end to inflation,  but  they will 
bring about  a  reversal of the trade cycle  (2). 
Neither H.  AUJAC  nor  GABILLARD  gave  any  explicit description of the role 
of self-employed workers,  members  of the professions and those living on 
fixed  incomes  in the development  of structural inflation,  but  they did 
however  give  some  information concerning the possible contributions of these 
social groups to the setting in motion,  spreading or restraining of inflation. 
AUJAC  attributed great  importance to the pricing policies of undertakings. 
According to him,  where  entrepreneurs accupy  a  dominant  position in the 
market  and  are able to obtain sufficient  credit  from  the banks,  they are 
always able to maintain their income,  even when  production is falling,  while 
employees  and those on fixed incomes are obliged to accept  limitations on 
their purchasing power  (3).  If employees manage  to adapt  their incomes to 
rising prices by  the application of scales of pay  geared to the cost  of 
living,  there is a  risk that inflation will  continue indefinitely (4),  or at 
least until other factors  (for example,  increased production)  intervene to 
block its development.  J.  GABILLARD  laid stress on  the inertia of the 
behaviour of  self-employed groups  who  helped to restrain inflation through 
actions ill-suited to their own  interests.  He  found,  for  example,  that  when 
food prices rise,  farmers use their increased income  to repay their debts  and 
increase their savings  (with a  view to land purchases and investments) rather 
than increasing their current  consumption (5).  Thus,  an increase in farm 
prices will not  normally give rise to demand-pull  inflation,  but  it will 
bring considerable pressure to bear on  wages,  since workers will wish to 
defend their purchasing power,  and therefore on  costs  (6). 
Like  AUJAC,  GABILLARD  finds that those  on fixed  incomes have  no  means  of 
defence against  inflation.  They  are unable,  during a  period of inflation, 
to obtain an increase in the rate of interest  so that the income  from  their 
capital  compensates for the loss caused by the reduction of its purchasing 
power. 
(1)  J. GABILLARD:  "Recherches  sur la fin de l'inflation",  Paris 1952, 
PP•  152-186. 
(2)  H.  AUJAC,  op.cit.,  PP•  298-299· 
(3)  Ibidem,  PP•  298-299· 
(4)  Ibidem,  P•  298. 
(5)  J.  GABILLARD,  op.cit.,  PP•  211-215. 
(6)  Ibidem,  PP•  216-217. 
31 The  trader,  on  the other hand,  is in the privileged position of the bull 
Who,  being obliged to hold stocks,  makes  eas.y  profits with  each price rise (1). 
From  this it may  be deduced that,  whereas farmers  and those on fixed incomes 
generally contribute by their behaviour to the curbing of inflation, the 
trader is tempted during a  period of rising prices to increase his stoCks, 
thereD.y fuelling demand-pull inflation (2). 
The  structural inflation theory has the merit  of placing inflation in an 
economic  and sociological context,  but it has not yet 8een developed in 
sufficient depth to furnish a  valid answer to the many  questions raised b,y 
such  a  complex phenomenon.  Consequently,  it is necessary to graft theories 
explaining certain specific mechanisms  of the inflationary process in detail 
onto the structural inflation theory,  which is of a  general nature.  During 
the last two  decades,  most  such partial theories have 8een developed b.y  the 
Anglo-American  school. 
5•  The  modern theories of inflation of the Anglo-American  schoo~ 
In America and  England towards the end of the 1940s,  there arose a  lively 
controvers.y between the proponents of the demand-pull inflation theory and 
those of wage-pull inflation.  This controvers.y has continued until this 
day,  but  has not  led to any definitive conclusions since,  in most  cases, 
it is not  possible to determine  b,y  statistics whether the setting-off of 
an inflationary trend is the result of higher demand  or of autonomous  wage 
increases beyond the level of the normal rise in productivity (3). 
Most  observers have  concluded by  accepting the idea that all inflationary 
trends are mixed  in character.  This "mixed inflation" (4)  can be brought 
about  by one  or more  of the following mechanisms 
(1)  J.  GABILLARD,  op.cit.,  P•  216. 
(2)  GABILLARD  points out that, in general,  during a  period of inflation, 
wholesale prices rise more  rapidly than retail prices and wages,  this 
lDeing  attributable to speculative profit-making 'Dy  traders (I'Didem,p.216). 
(3)  If prices and wages  are rising virtually continually, it cannot  be  claimed 
that the rise in prices pre-dates that in wages,  or vice versa,  except  by 
making an arbitrary decision as to the starting point  of the period of 
inflation.  (F.  MACHLUP  "Another View  of Cost-Push and Demand-Pull 
Inflation",  Review  of Economics  and Statistics,  Mey  1960,  and again in 
"Inflation Demand  Pull or Cost  Push",  R.  PERLMAN  (Ed.),  Boston, 
Englewood,  Chicago,  London  •••••  ,  1965,  P•  72.) 
(4)  The  expression "mixed  inflation" was  employed  lty  the Australian 
J.D.  PITCHFORD,  in his article "The  Inflationary Effects of Excess Demand 
for Goods  and E:xcessi  ve Real  Income  Chains",  Oxford Economic  Papers, 
Fe8ruary 1961,  P•  59. 
32 - ~ 
a)  shifts in demand  from  one  sector to another as a  result  of economic 
growth  and  technological progress (sectorial shift in demand  inflation). 
Such  shifts lead to an increase in prices in certain sectors without 
there being any  compensator,y  reduction in others,  where  there is 
generally little flexibility for price reductions because of oligopolistic 
situations and resistance from  the trade unions to a:ny  reduction in 
wages.  A rise in certain prices causes an increase in the cost  of 
living which,  in turn,  causes wage  adjustments to ensue  inevitably. 
In other words,  the "sectorial shift in demand  inflation" sets wage-
pull inflation in motion  (1). 
b)  rising costs caused,  for  example,  b,y  increased prices of raw materials 
or labour lead to rises in selling prices in excess of the increase in 
production costs.  In particular,  manufacturers  and  intermediaries 
usually increase the cost  price by  what  is considered to be  a  reasonable 
fixed percentage in order to cover overheads and make  a  profit.  This 
practice causes a  general  increase in prices,  since what  is produced by 
one  factor,y is used as a  raw material or component  by  another.  Finally, 
the increase works  through to consumer  goods  and  services,  prompting 
claims from  the trade unions. 
Thus,  "mark-up inflation" leads to generalised inflation (2 ). 
c)  The  benefits of higher productivity in sectors with monopolistic or 
oligopolistic markets are not  passed on to consumers,  but  are used 
initially to increase the profits of the companies  concerned.  Subsequently, 
in order to avoid industrial disputes,  these companies  grant  wage 
increases and  other benefits to their personnel.  Workers  in other sectors 
where there is a  less marked  rise in productivity feel that they are not 
receiving just reward for their efforts,  since they receive less pay 
than their counterparts doing identical work.  Such  a  situation leads to 
industrial disputes and wage  increases far in excess of increased 
productivity. 
Undertakings pass on  the costs to the consumer,  thereby creating what  the 
English economist,  P.  STREEI'EN,  has called "productivity inflation"(3). 
(1) c.  SCHULTZE  :  "Recent  Inflation in the United States",  Joint  Economic 
Committee,  Study Paper No.1,  1959,  and  again in "Inflation Demand  Pull or 
Cost  Push",  op.cit.,  P•  33. 
{2) J. DUESENBERRY  :  "The  Mechanics  of Inflation",  op.cit.,  PP•  144-145  and 
G.  ACKLEY  :  ''Macro-economic Theor,y",  New  York,  1961,  PP•  452-454• 
(3) P.  STREE.l'EN  :  "Wages,  Prices and Productivity - Labour  and Inflation", 
Kyklos,  1962,  fasc.  4,  PP•  726-727. 
33 It is clear that these mechanisms fit in very well  with the  structural 
inflation theory.  It may  be  said that the "sectorial shift in demand 
inflation",  "mark-up inflation" and  "productivity inflation" theories 
explain how,  once inflation has been set  in motion in one  sector, it can 
spread to other areas of the  economic  structure;  put  another way,  these 
forms  of inflation act  like "driving belts". 
From  the  point  of view of non-wage  income,  the  "mark-up inflation" theory 
is by  far the most  important.  According to this theory,  in the  event  of a 
gene~al rise in prices,  the  earnings of all intermediaries (wholesalers, 
small traders,  craftsmen) rise in parallel with prices,  so that the rise 
in prices becomes  cumulative.  We  shall use the term  "cumulative increase 
effect" to describe this phenomenon  and,  in Chapter IV,  we  shall be trying 
to determine  whether this is what  occurred in Belgium during the period 
between 1953  and 1971.  English and  American  economists have  also developed 
a  number  of theories explaining the phenomenon  of the  curbing of the 
inflationary movement.  In general,  these are new  formulations of theories 
already developed by  neo-classical or post-keynesian authors.  There are 
nevertheless  some  new  theories,  notably  : 
a)  theory of the  curbing of excessive wage  increases by the trade unions 
The  trade union organizations oppose  excessive wage  increases in situations 
which are  highly favourable to the  workers.  One  of their motives for this 
is that they foresee that, if such  increases became  widespread,  a  certain 
number  of firms  would disappear and  some  of their union members  would 
lose their  jobs.  As  long ago  as 1951,  A.  REES  suggested that the fact that 
there was  a  system of collective contracts for the \ihole  steel sector in 
America  had  been instrumental in causing the trade unions representing 
the  workers in this sector to accept  wage  increases below the  levels which 
the major  firms  were  prepared to grant  (1).  His paper was  severely crit-
icised by  the  champions  of the  wage-pull  inflation theory. 
L.  ULNAN,  for  example,  maintained that this was  a  special  case  (2 ),  but 
studies carried out  by  other authors maintained that,  although the trade 
unions try to reduce  wage  differences between different  firms,  they do  not 
however try to bring about  the  complete  elimination of the influence of 
differences of marginal  productivity from  one  undertaking to another  on  the 
(1)  A.  R:t.~S  :  "Wage  Determination in the  Basic Steel Industry,  Postwar", 
American  Economic  Review,  June  1951,  pp.  389-404 
(2)  L.  U~Jrn pointed out  that  the  steel workers had  enjoyed  a  position of advant-
age  during the  war  so that,  after the World  liar,  their trade union could 
not  make  substantial wage  claims without  provoking protests from  the other 
trade union organizations and  a  vigorous press campaign  which  would  have 
been damaging to the image  of trade unionism  (L.  ULMAN  "The  Union  and  Wages 
in the Basic Steel  :  A comment",  American Economic  Review,  June 1958, 
PP•  409-410). 
34 earnings of workers  (1). 
Donald  E.  CULlON  has  proved that the  same  phenomenon  as that  indicated by 
REES  occurred on the occasion of the  conclusion of a  collective agreement 
between a  civil engineering undertaking,  which  was  to carry out  a  major 
contract in the north of the United States (construction of the  St.Lawrence 
Sea~), and  the construction workers'  trade union (2). 
b)  limited price flexibility theory : 
Neo-classical theory makes  the assumption that  an increase in demand  beyond 
the level of supply will normally  cause an increase in prices,  but it does 
not  take  any account  of the fact  that,  in an oligopolistic market,  in 
which  prices are usually fixed at  a  level at  which  even the least 
efficient  producer still makes  a  reasonable profit, it is often not  in 
the interests of undertakings to increase their prices.  They  prefer to 
take advantage of the opportunity to increase their turnover,  thereby 
reducing their fixed unit  costs.  This explains a  certain degree of price 
inflexibility in relation to fluctuations in demand  (3). 
The  English and  American theoreticians have  paid little attention to the 
development  of the  prices and  profit margins of small traders and craftsmen; 
at this ievel,  ologopolistic structures are non-existent,  but the major 
producers and  wholesalers often impose  selling prices on retailers to the 
exclusion of all free  competition.  We  shall return to this problem in 
Chapter IV. 
(1)  J.T.  DUNLOP  :  "Productivity and the  Wage  Structure",  published in Income 
Employment  and  Public Policy  :  Esseys in Honor  of Alvin H.  HANSEN  (1948) 
taken up again in "Wage  Determination-Market  or Power  Forces?",  R.PERLMAN 
(Ed.) Boston,  1964,  PP•  59-62  and  c.  KERR:  "Wage  Relationships- The 
Comparative  Impact  of Market  and  Power  Forces",  published in "The  Theory 
of Wage  Determination",  London  1957  and again in "liage  Determination •••"• 
op.cit.,  PP•  84-83. 
(2)  D.E.  CULlON  :  ''Union  Wage  Policy in Heavy  Construction",  American 
Economic  Review,  March  1959,  PP•  70-75. 
(3)  G.  AKLEY,  op.cit.  P•  449,  R.J.  BALL,  op.cit.  PP•  97-99  and  R.F.  LANZILlOTTI 
"Pricing Objectives in Large  Companies",  American  Economic  Review, 
December  1959,  PP•  931-940. 
35 CONCLUSIONS. 
1)  The  role of the development  of non-wage  income  in that of inflation has 
not  been analysed in detail in any of the theories of inflation.  Neo-
classical, Keynesian and post-Keynesian theory merely makes  a  distinction 
between employees,  entrepreneurs and  those on fixed incomes  and  shows 
little interest in the analysis of the development  of the income  of 
self-employed workers  (small traders,  craftsmen,  members  of the professions, 
farmers).  The  structural inflation theory has the merit  of providing a 
general outline of the various circumstances and events which  can set 
inflation in motion,  the forces  which  cause it to accelerate and obstacles 
to its development,  but it has not  formulated  a  complete theory on the 
role of non-wage  income  in the development  of inflation. 
The  primary  concern of modern  Anglo-American theory on inflation has been 
the role of the trade unions and the groupings of large manufacturing 
companies,  and they have not  paid very much  attention to the role of 
intermediaries and  other self-employed workers. 
2)  A complete  study of the influence of the development  of non-wage  income 
on inflation should answer three questions,  namely  : 
a)  under what  circumstances has an increase in certain non-wage  income 
set  inflation in motion ? 
b)  to what  extent  have  induced increases in non-wage  income  contributed 
to the generalisation and(or)  acceleration of inflation? 
c)  has resistance by certain non-wage  income  to uplvard  movements 
contributed to curbing or reversing inflationary trends ? 
For the  purposes of our  study,  it is almost  superflous to enquire whether 
increases in certain types of income  have had the effect of setting inflation 
in motion,  since the rise in consumer  prices was  unbroken throughout the 
period studied,  1953-1972.  Only in the autumn  of 1954  and the spring of 1955 
was  there any  pause in the upward trend (1).  The  interruption was  too  short in 
(1)  "Prix ala consommation",  Bulletin d'information et de  documentation, 
January 1954,  P•  39,  January 1955,  P•  47  and  January 1956,  P•  38. 
36 duration for it to be possible to maintain that the resumption in the 
upward trend during the  summer  of 1955  was  exclusively attributable to 
new  factors rather than to the effects of factors and  situations 
obtained prior to 1954. 
Our  research has therefore been directed towards the formulation of 
valid answers to questions b) and c). 
37 CHAPrER  II  .Analysis  of the development  of non-wage  income  within the 
010nt-ext  p-r-o-vi-ded-:$:  th~-n-'lti on-'ll  accounts. 
A.  Introduction. 
The  analysis covered the period from  1953  to 1971  inclusive.  The  year 1953 
was  chosen because it marked the beginning of a  quasi-normal  period.  Indeed, 
before 1953,  prices and  incomes had been influenced heavily,  first by the 
shortages of goods  during the  post-war period and  then by  the effects of 
the  speculative cycle to which  the Korean  war  had given rise. 
1971  was  the latest year which  could be  chosen for the  end  of the period in 
view of the delay in the publication of national accounts data.  tVhen  the 
study was  carried out,  the statistics for the year 1972  were  not yet known. 
Before proceeding to a  group-by-group analysis of non-wage  income,  it is 
desirable to compare  its overall development  with that  of wages. 
We  have  found that,  during the period 1953-1971,  non-wage  income  declined 
steadily as a  proportion of national  income.  In 1953,  non-wage  income 
accounted for 45.77%  of national income,  but  only 35.2%  by  1971,  so that 
there was  an average annual fall of about  0.55%.  Should it be  concluded 
from  these overall statistics that, if there has been cost-push  inflatio~ 
the main  cause  will have  been too rapid a  rise in wages  and that non-wage 
income  has only followed in the wake  of the trend ? 
No,  because it is necessary to take into account  the fact  that the 
economic  functions of family businesses,  the income  from  which is either 
exclusively or mainly of the non-wage  type,  have  been transferred to 
capitalist  companies  with large numbers  of employees.  This  phenomenon 
has been particularly striking in the commercial,  banking and  insurance 
sector,  where  the number  of self-employed fell from  254,200 in 1960 to 
230,100 in 1971  (1),  whereas the number  of employees rose  from  277,300 to 
(1)  Calculated on  the basis of the statistics on  overall  employment  and 
wage-earning employment  in the various sectors as published in the 
Annuaire Statistique de  la Belgique,  Bruxelles 1972,  volume  92, 
PP•  488-489. 
38 454,900  (1). 
It is also discernible to a  less marked  extent  in the transport 
sector.  The  number  of self-employed operators in this sector rose 
by  7.38%,  from  29,800 in 1960 to 32,000 in 1971  (2),  whereas the 
number  of employees  rose by  14.88%,  from  225,200 in 1960 to 258,700 
in 1971  (1 ). 
Consequently,  details of the overall development  of wages  and  non-wage 
income  cannot  serve as the basis for conclusions regarding their 
repercussions on  prices.  It is necessary to make  an in-depth study 
of the various categories of non-wage  income  in order to determine the 
extent to which they are to be held responsible for inflation. 
B.  Stu&y  of the development  of the various categories of non-wage 
~· 
1.  Classification af non-wage  income  : 
According to the Belgian national accounts,  the following are deemed 
to be non-wage  income  : 
1)  the income  of individual  entrepreneurs and associations of persons; 
2)  private individuals'  income  from  property; 
3)  undistributed profits of commercial  and civil companies; 
4)  direct taxation levied on  commerical  and civil companies; 
5)  the State's income  from  property and  entrepreneurial activities. 
An  increase in any of these  components  can trigger off a  double 
inflationary effect,  on  the one  hand through its repercussions on 
costs,  and  on  the other by its effects on  demand  for goods  and 
services. 
(1)  Annuaire Statistique de  la Belgique 1972,  op.cit.,  pp.  488-489. 
(2)  Calculated on the basis of the statistics on  overall  employment  and 
wage-earning employment  in the various sectors as published in the 
Annuaire Statistique de  la Belgique,  Brussels 1972,  volume  92, 
PP•  488-489. 
39 An  effect of the  cost-push type occurs if the increase in income 
is not  compensated for by  an increase in turnover and/or product-
ivity,  so that the weight  of this income  becomes  greater in terms of 
units produced or sold.  It is therefore necessar,y to determine the 
repercussion of each type of income  in terms of units produced or 
sold.  In retail trade, it is possible in this ~  to calculate 
average profit margins. 
According to the national accounts rules,  income  from  property is 
looked upon  as services rendered b,y  capital.  An  increase in the rate 
of interest will normally create an  inflationary situation,  since 
entrepreneurs will attempt to recover the higher cost  of money  b,y 
increasing their prices.  In order to assess the inflationar,y effects 
of an increase in income  from  property,  it is therefore necessary to 
compare it, not  with the value of the  services rendered,  but  with the 
capital invested. 
As  regards the undistributed profits of commercial  and civil companies, 
any increase in such profits per unit  produced or sold leads directly 
to cost-push inflation.  In so  far as they are passed on to the 
consumer  by  companies,  direct taxes levied on  commercial  and civil 
companies  have  a  comparable  effect  on  selling prices to that  of 
indirect taxes,  which are almost  al~s included in the price to 
the consumer.  This is the general rule in monopolistic and  oligo-
polistic markets. 
Income  earned b.y  the State from  property and  entrepreneurial 
activities has only limited influence on  consumer  prices.  Rent  from 
property accounts for the majority of thi.s income,  which  is both 
expenditure and  revenue  and  does not therefore plS\Y'  a.n;y  role in the 
determination of the  level of taxation.  It cannot  therefore have 
any effect  on  the cost  of living,  so that this type of non-wage 
income  can be  ignored for the  purposes of a  study on  inflation. 
40 The  effect of increased income  on the rise in prices is also 
dependent  on the growth in demand  which it causes.  If a  rise 
in one type of income is counterbalanced by an equivalent fall 
in one  level of another type of income,  there will be  no  demand-
pull inflationar.y effect. 
If, for example,  a  rise in selling prices has led to an increase 
in the income  of entrepreneurs and  reduced the purchasing power 
of consumers by an amount  equal to -che  additional profits of the 
entrepreneurs,  overall demand  will normally remain static.  If 
the proportion of income normally set aside for the purposes of 
saving is higher in the case of income in the form  of profits than 
in that of income  in the form  of wages,  it is possible that the 
rise in prices will lead to a  decline in overall demand,  thereby 
exerting a  deflationary influence,  at least in the short term. 
If,  on the other hand,  the increase in prices occurs mainly in the 
capital goods  sector, the increase in the amount  of investment 
caused by this rise will generally be financed by additional bank 
credit or by more  extensive recourse to the money  market. 
In this event,  there will be no  counterbalancing factor and overall 
demand  will rise by the proportion of the additional profits used 
to finance  consumption and investment  •  Demand-pull  inflation will 
result. 
These  examples will  serve to  show  how  difficult it is to make  an 
a  priori assessment  of whether an increase in income will contribute 
to inflation by increasing demand. 
2.  Development  of the income  of individual entrepreneurs and associations 
of persons  : 
The  following table shows  the rise in the various forms  of non-wage 
income  between 1953  and 1971. 
41 TABLE  1  Share of the income  of individual  entrepreneurs and  associations of 
persons in the growth of non-wage  income  (1953 to 1971) 
Percentage 
Sub-headings  growth  Share in the growth  :  between 
1953 & 1971 
of  of  of all 
the  sub- the  non-wage 
heading  heading  income 
1)  Farming,  horticulture and 
forestry,  including stock-
breeding  +  72  100  12,0  5,3 
2)  Professions  : 
- doctors  and dentists  +  428,3  50,1 
- chemists  +  448,8  16,1 
- barristers, 
solicitors and 
notaries  +  192,6  9,6 
- other  +  222,7  24,2  ---
total  +  322,8  100,0  22,4  9,9 
3)  Self-employed traders 
and  craftsmen  +  117,6  100  60,4  26,8 
4)  Income  of associations 
of persons  +  133,3  100  5,2  2,3  --- --- --
Total  for the heading  +  125,0  100,0  44,3 
Source  :  Calculated on the basis of I.N.S. data. 
In 1953,  the income  of traders and  craftsmen represented 41.7%  of non-wage  income 
but,  by  1971,  had fallen to  35.5%  (1),  an annual fall of 0.33%.  The  I.N.s. 
estimates the  income  of this group  on  the basis of data from the tax authorities. 
To  eliminate underestimation of these data,  the I.N.s. adds a  factor of  50· per 
cent  (2).  Thus,  these statistics are only very approximate. 
(1)  See Table  2. 
(2)  Institut National  de  Statistique,  Etudes Statistiques et  Econometriques -
Comptes  Nationaux 1953-162,  1963,  No.  4,  P•  34• 
t2 However,  since the  same  process is applied each year,  it is possible to 
derive an  idea of the real movement  of this income  from  these data. 
The  progress of the major trading concerns has brought  about  a  decline 
in the number  of individual  entrepreneurs in the retail and  crafts 
sector.  On  31  December  1947,  there were  312,903  wholesale  and retail 
trading undertakings and  by  31  December  1961,  there were  only 206,288, 
a  reduction of 34.1  per cent,  or 3.02  per cent  per annum  (1).  The 
number  of  such undertakings has  undoub~edly falled further  since 1961. 
This,  then,  is a  group which still accounts for a  substantial proportion 
of total non-wage  income,  although the proportion is declining slowly. 
The  income  of members  of the  professions only accounted for 5.6  per  cent 
of non-wage  income  in 1953•  B,y  1971,  the figure  had risen to 9.2  per 
cent  (1).  The  most  rapid rise has been among  chemists,  reflecting the 
steady increase in the  consumption of medicines.  Little is known 
concerning the turnover in pharmaceutical products or the  development  of 
profit margins in t'his  sector.  It is not  therefore possible to 
determine whether this substantial rise in the earnings of chemists 
has  contributed to cost-push inflation. 
Doctors and  dentists constitute a  larger group whose  total income  rose 
between 1953  and  1971  by the  same  order  of magnitude  as that  of chemists, 
namely  by 428.3  per cent. 
The  doctors'  strike in 1965  led to a  sharp rise in their income  in 1965 
and 1966.  During the years following,  their total income  stabilised at 
approximately 4.2  per  cent  of all non-wage  income,  as against  2.1  per 
cent  in 1953.  It fell back slightly during the period 1967-70,  but, 
by 1971  had risen again to 4.3  per cent  (1). 
(1)  See Table 2. 
43 TABLE  2' Income of individual  entrepreneurs and associations ot persons as  a  percentage of non-wage  income. 
53  54  55  56  51  58  59  60 
1)  Farming,  horticulture and 
forestry,  including stock-
breeding  13,6  12,4  12,1  11,2  12,8  12,4  12,5  12,1 
2)  Professions : 
- doctors and dentists  2,1  2,1  2,1  2,2  2,2  2,5  2,6  2,6  - chemists  0,1  o,6  0,7  o,6  o,6  0,9  1,0  1,0 
- barristers,  solicitors and 
notaries  o,B  0,9  o,a  0,9  0,9  o,a  0,9  0,9 
- other  2,0  2,0  1,9  1,8  1,8  2,0  1,9  1,9 
total  5,6  5,6  5,5  5,5  5,5  6,2  6,4  6,4 
3)  Self-employed traders and 
craftsmen  41,7  41,2  40,4  39,7  38,7  39,9  39,7  38,8 
4)  Incom• of associations of 
persons  3,2  3,3  3,5  3,6  3,4  3,1  3,3  3,3 
Total  64,1  62 .. 5  61,5  6o,o  60,4  61,1  61,9  60,6 
Source  Calculated on the basis of I.N.s. data. TABLE  2aa  Income of individual entrepreneurs  and associations of persons  as  a  percentage 
ot non-wage  income. 
61  62  63  64  65  66  67  68  69  70  71 
13,1  11,8  12,2  11,9  11,8  10,7  10,3  10,4  10,8  8,8  9,0 
2,5  2,7  2,8  2,7  3,6  4,2  4,2  3,7  3,8  3,9  4,3 
1,0  1,1  1,1  1,0  1,5  1,5  1,4  1,6  1,4  1,4  1,4 
0,9  0,9  0,9  0,9  1,0  1,0  1,0  1,0  1,0  0,9  1,0 
2,0  2,0  2,1  2,2  2,3  2,3  2,3  2,3  2,2  2,4  2,5 
6,4  6,7  6,9  6,8  8,4  9,0  8,9  8,6  8,4  8,6  9,2 
38,3  38,3  40,0  41,1  39,7  41,0  39,9  39,3  37,4'  35,9  35,5 
3,4  3,3  3,4  3,4  3,2  3,1  2,9  2,8  2,9  3,0  2,9 
61,2  60,6  62,5  63,2  63,1  63,8  62,0  61,0  59,5  56,3  56,7 
Source  :  Calculated on the 'basis of I.N.S. data. In Chapter v,  a  more  detailed analysis will be made  of the factors which 
have  contributed to developments in the income  of doctors and dentists. 
The  income  of barristers,  solicitors,  notaries and  other categories 
(architects,  estate agents,  stockbrokers) accounted for only 2.8 per 
cent  of all non-wage  income  in 1953.  B.y  1971,  their share had risen 
to 3.5  per  cent  (1).  It is unlikely that this increase has made  any 
great  contribution to rising prices.  Indeed,  these are groups offering 
services for  which demand  has gr0wn  considerably,  so that the rise in 
their overall  income is probably more  attributable to the increase in 
the volume  of services rendered than to higher fees.  The  overall income 
of farmers,  horticulturalists,  foresters and  stockbreeders has risen 
little in comparison with other groups.  It rose by only 71  per cent 
between 1953  and  1971.  Consequently,  the  share  of this group in total 
non-wage  income  fell back from  13.6  per cent in 1953  to 9.0  per cent  in 
1971  (1).  This  cannot  be  looked upon as proof that the position of 
farmers  and those in related occupations deteriorated during the period 
1953-1971,  since account  must  be  taken of the decline in the number  of 
farmers. 
The  income  of associations of persons is of only slight  importance by 
comparison with that  of the other groups making up the total of non-
wage  income.  It accounted for only 3.2  per cent  in 1953,  and 2.9  per 
cent  in 1971  of the total (1). 
(l)  See  Table  2. 
46 3.  Increase in private individuals'  income  from  property as  a  proportion 
of the growth of non-wage· income. 
TABLE  3. 
Percentage  Sub-headings  growth  Share  in the  growth 
between 
1953  & i971 
of  of  of all 
the  sub- the  non-wage 
heading  heading  income 
1)  Interest 
a)  savings deposits and 
capi  tali  sat  ion 
operations  + 761,5  22,1 
b)  bank  deposit s  +1803,3  13,6 
c)  insurance policies  + 497,2  7,01 
d)  public securities  + 433,3  33,4 
e)  debenture  and 
mortgage  loans  + 205,5  3,4 
f)  imputed interest  (1)  + 548,7  _.?.Q,j_ 
total  +  551,2  100,- 55,3  20,2 
2)  Rentals 
a)  buildings  + 122,7  228,4 
b)  properties not  built 
on  +  31,0  7,4 
c)  charges  (depreciation)  - 209,1  -135,8 
total  +  64,9  100,- 15,8  5,8 
3)  Dividends1  preference 
and directors'  shares1 
a) 
gifts 
dividends from  Belgian 
companies in Belgium  + 133,3  24,1 
b)  dividends from  Belgian 
companies  abroad  - 3,3  -0,1 
c)  income  from  foreign 
investment  +1869,0  70,6 
d)  preference and  direct-
ors'  shares  +  48,9  3,0 
e)  gifts  + 207,0  2,4  ---
total  +  325,2  100,- ~  ~ 
total for the heading  + 231,2  100,- 36,6 
Source  Calculated on the basis of I.N.S.  data. 
(1)  The  I.N.S. lists as· imputed interest the difference between the interest 
received by banks and the interest  paid to their creditors.  This 
difference  should be  considered as income  for the banks which they 
should normally pay to their creditors,  but  retain in consideration 
of services rendered free of 'charge to their clients. 
47 TABI.E 4: Private individuals' income  tro._ property as  a p§rcenta,p ot non-wa,p  income. 
53  54  55  56  57  58 
1)  Interest 
a)  savings deposits and capitalisation operations  1,1  1,1  1,2  1,2  1,3  1,5 
b)  bank deposits  0,3  0,3  0,3  0,3  0,3  0,3 
~~ 
insurance policies  0,5  o,6  o,6  0,7  0,7  o,B 
public securities  2,8  3,0  3,2  3,3  3,5  4,0 
;~ 
debenture and morgage  loans  o,6  0,6  o,6  0,5  0,5  0,5 
imputed interest  1,4  1,4  1,4  1,5  1,6  1,8 
total  6,7  7,0  7,3  7,5  7,9  8,9 
2)  Rentals 
a)  buildings  20,9  22,0  21,9  21,5  22,0  23,3 
!~ 
properties not built on  2,7  2,6  2,4  2,3  2,4  2,5 
charges  (depreciation)  -7,3  -7,3  -7,2  -7,3  -7,8  -8,5 
total  16,3  17,3  17,1  16,5  16,6  17,3 
3)  Di  vidends1  :ereference and directors' 
shares1  gifts 
a)  dividends from Belgian companies in Belgium  3,5  3,1  3,5  3,7  4,0  3,8 
b)  dividends from Belgian companies abroad  0,4  0,5  0,5  o,6  o,6  o,6 
c)  income from foreign investment  0,7  o,s  0,9  1,1  1,1  1,0 
:~ 
preference and directors  1  shares  1,1  1,1  1,1  1,2  1,3  1,3 
gifts  0,2  0,2  0,3  0,3  0,3  0,2 
total  5,9  5,7  6,3  6,9  7,3  6,9 
total for the heading  28,9  30,0  30,7  30,9  31,8  33,1 
Source  Calculated on the basis of I.N.s. data. TABLW.  4a:  Private individuals'  income  from property as  a  percetrtage of non-wage  income. 
59  60  61  62  63  64  65  66  67  68  69  70  71 
1,6  1,7  1,8  1,9  1,9  1,9  1,9  2,1  2,1  2,7  2,8  3,3  3,6 
0,4  0,6  0,7  o,6  0,7  o,8  1,0  1,1  1,2  1,2  1,6  2,1  2,1 
0,9  0,9  0,9  1,0  1,0  1,0  1,0  1,1  1,1  1,1  1,2  1,2  1,2 
4,1  4,3  4,5  4,7  5,1  4,9  4,8  5,1  5,3  5,3  5,4  5,4  5,9 
0,5  0,4  0,4  0,5  0,4  0,4  0,4  0,5  0,5  0,7  0,7  0,7  0,7 
1,9  ?,1  2,1  2,4  2,6  2,6  2,7  3,0  3,1  3,1  3,3  3,4  3,5 
9,4  10,0  10,4  11,1  11,7  11,6  11,8  12,9  13,3  14,1  15,0  16,1  17,0 
23,1  22,5  21,9  21,8  22,0  20,6  20,3  21,6  21,1  20,2  18,7  17,8  17,9 
2,5  2,4  2,3  2,2  2,1  2,0  1,9  1,8  1,7  1,6  1,5  1,4  1,4 
-8,4  -8,4  -8,4  -8,7  -9,3  -9,3  -9,2  -9,6  -9,5  -9,0  -8,5  -8,4  -8,8 
17,2  16,4  15,8  15,3  14,8  13,3  13,0  13,8  13,3  12,8  11,7  10,8  10,5 
3,4  3,7  3,9  4,1  3,6  3,1  3,2  3,1  2,9  3,2  3,2  3,4  3,1 
0,5  o,6  0,3  0,2  071  0,1  o,1  o,o  0,1  0,1  0,1  0,1  0,2 
1,0  1,2  1,6  1,8  1,7  1,8  2,1  2,5  2,6  2,8  3,5  5,1  5,6 
1,0  1,0  0,9  1,1  0,9  o,8  o,8  0,9  0,7  0,7  0,7  0,7  o,6 
0,2  0,2  0,3  0,3  0,3  0,3  0,2  0,2  0,2  0,3  0,3  0,3  0,3 
6,1  6,7  7,0  7,6  6,6  6,1  6,4  6,7  6,5  7,1  7,8  9,6  9,8 
32,7  33,1  33,2  34,0  33,1  31,0  31,2  33,4  33,1  34,0  34,5  36,5  37,3 
Source  Calculated on the 8asis of I.N.S.  data. Interest accounted for 6.7  per cent  of non-wage  income  in 1953  and 
17.0  per cent  in 1971.  The  proportion rose steadily between 1953  and 
1967,  but  accelerated sharply from  1968  to 1971  (1).  This is attributable 
to the  combined  effects of rising rates and  a  more  rapid increase in 
the  volume  of savings.  Approximately 33.4 per cent  of the  growth in 
income  in the form  of interest is due  to the issue of public securities, 
and this shows  that the major  cause of this sharp rise is the major 
public spending policy pursued over the later years in the period 
considered. 
The  income  derived from  rents on buildings and unbuilt  property 
increased by only 1.65 times from  1953  to 1971.  Rents did of course 
rise sharply,  but  maintenance  costs rose  even more  quickly,  so that 
net  rents did not  follow the  strongly rising trend in income  from 
property.  In 1971,  it accounted for only 10.5 per cent  of income  from 
property as  against  16.3  per cent  in 1953,  an  annual fall of 0.31  per 
~~. 
On  the  other hand,  earnings in the form  of dividends,  preference and 
directors'  shares and gifts rose almost  as rapidly as those made  in 
the  form  of interest. 
When  income  from  foreign investment is excluded,  the rise is seen to 
be  very much  weaker,  no  stronger than the overall growth rate of 
income  from  property.  Income  from  foreign investment  has made  much 
better progress than other forms  of income  from  property;  since it 
does not  affect  prices in Belgium,  it cannot  give rise to cost-push 
inflation,  but it has no  doubt  co~ributed to an increase in domestic 
demand  and  sustained demand-pull  inflation. 
(1)  See  Table 4. 
50 4.  Undistributed  compe;y  profits. 
This heading covers  : 
a)  the undistributed profits of  joint  stock  companies, 
b)  the undistributed profits of autonomous  public sector undertakings. 
TABLE  5.  Increase in undistributed profits as  a  proportion of the 
p-o~fth of non-wage  income  {1953-1971). 
Percentage  Share in the growth 
growth  of  of all  Sub-headings  between  the  1953  & 1971  non-wage 
heading  income 
1)  Undistributed profits of 
joint  stock  companies  333,3  97,7  7,6 
2)  Undistributed profits of 
autonomous  public sector 
undertakings  12,9  2,3  0,2 
Total  316,- 100,- 7,8 
Source  :  Calculated on  the basis of I.N.s. data. 
All the growth in the income  classified under this heading is attributable 
to the undistributed profits of  joint  stock companies.  The  rate of growth 
is higher than that  of the dividends of Belgian companies.  Consequently, 
companies are devoting an increasing proportion of their profits to 
self-financing.  This development  may  be regarded as the  consequence 
of the integration of the Belgian economy  into the framework  of a  wider 
market  economy.  Belgian undertakings have had to  cope  with sharper 
foreign competition,  and this has obliged them to modernise their production 
facilities.  At  the  same  time,  the expansion of their market  has induced 
51 them to increase production and this again has  called for  substantial 
investment.  Part  of this investment  has been covered by  self-financing 
and  part by the raising of loans,  most  of them  placed with para-State 
organizations. 
This policy has had a  twofold inflationary influence  :  firstly,  the 
need for self-financing has  caused the large companies to pursue  a 
policy of high prices for most  of their new  products;  secondly,  the 
strong demand  for capital goods  has contributed towards the  creation 
of a  climate of prosperity,  which is favourable to the raising of 
prices. 
The  autonomous  public sector undertakings have not  followed these 
same  policies because,  in its efforts to curb inflation, the State 
has generally prevented them  from  increasing their prices in proportion 
to their costs. 
5•  Direct taxes levied on  companies  of all types. 
Direct taxation of  companies  rose more  rapidly than profits appropriated 
to self-financing.  In 1971,  it was  at  a  level 307.89  times higher 
than that  of 1953,  whereas  self-financing increased by only 233.33 
times.  Companies  were  obliged to increase their profits more  sub-
stantially in order to attain in 1971  a  level of self-financing equal 
to that  of 1953.  Without  doubt,  this has  contributed to cost-push 
inflation.  The  growth in State expenditure  covered by these taxes 
compensated for the reduction in purchasing power  caused by rising prices. 
6.  The  State's income  from  property and  entrepreneurial activities. 
This heading includes imputed rents and interest,  dividends and  profits 
received by the State,  the other public authorities and the  social 
security organizations. 
52 TABLE  6  The  increase in income  in the form  of imputed rents and 
interest,  dividends  and  profits of the public authorities 
as a  proportion of the growth of non-wage  income. 
Percentage 
Sub-headings 
growth  Share in the growth 
between  of  of  of all  1953  & 1971  the  sub- the  non-wage 
heading  heading  income 
1)  Imputed rents 
a)  central authority  +  611,4  50,5 
b)  other public 
authorities  +  294,3  49,5  ---
total  +  402,2  100,- 262,9  1,9 
2)  Interest,  dividends, 
profits 
~~ 
central authority  -1775,4  -372,3 
interest from  math-
ematical reserves 
under pension 
legislation  +  234,5  96,-
c)  other public 
authorities  +  382,9  176,3 
total  - 92,6  100,- -162 29  -1 12 
Total for the heading  +  41,1  100,- 0,7 
Source  :  Calculated on  the basis of I.N.s. data. 
Imputed rents play no  part in explaining inflation,  since they did not 
give rise to any disbursement  by the State.  As  to interest,  dividends 
and profits received by the public authorities,  they represent  a  small 
negative net  balance,  in other words,  the public authorities had to 
cover deficits which  were  slightly larger than the dividends and other 
profits they received from  public sector undertakings.  It may  therefore be 
stated that,  whereas  some  charges  (for electricity, for  example)  were 
kept  at rates higher than necessary,  thereby exerting an inflationary 
influence,  others (rail fares,  for example)  were  kept  at  levels below cost, 
so that they exerted a  moderating influence on  rising prices,  and that 
these two  influences more  or less cancel each other out. 
53 CONCLu'SIONS. 
The  following Table  sununarises the proportions of the total growth of 
non-wage  income  between 1953  and 1971  accounted for by the  various 
sub-headings. 
TABLE  7  The  various forms  of non-wage  income  as  a  proportion of 
tl1e  grodth of  non-~-ic.-,ge  inc·:>lne  bet·r~een 1953  and 1971. 
1)  Agriculture,  horticulture and forestry, 
including stockbreeding 
2)  Professions 
3)  Self-employed traders and  craftsmen 
4)  Income  of associations of persons 
5)  Interest 
6)  Rent 
7)  Dividends,  preference and directors'  shares, 
gifts 
8)  Undistributed profits of  joint  stock companies 
and public sector undertakings 
9)  Direct taxes paid by companies 












The  table proves that,  at  least until 1971  (farm prices rose more  rapidly 
in 1972  and 1973),  the  increase in the  income  of farmers,  horticulturalists, 
foresters and  stockbreeders probably did not  play any decisive role in 
the rise in prices.  We  can therefore ignore this form  of non-wage 
income  for the purposes of our  study.  As  for the other forms  of non-wage 
income,  they m~  be classified in three broad groups which  played a  role 
of almost  equal  importance in accounting for the rise in prices. 
The  first  group is made  up  largely of the income  of self-employed 
persons working out side the  farming sector,  vlho  account  for 40  per cent,  or 
somewhat  more  than a  third,  of the growth in non-wage  income  between 
1953  and 1971. 
54 In second place,  there are interest and rents, that  is,income  from 
capital which is more  or less fixed and  subject to little or no  riSk. 
This income  accounted for 26  per cent,  or somewhat  more  than a  quarter 
of the  growth in non-wage  income  between 1953  and 1971. 
Finally,  there are all the forms  of income  associated with  joint  stock 
companies  (dividends,  preference and directors'  shares,  gifts, 
undistributed profits,  direct taxes paid by  companies),  which together 
account  for 28  per cent  or,  once  again,  somewhat  more  than a  quarter. 
Before  proceeding with the detailed analysis of these various groups, 
it will be of interest to examine  whether there is any  correlation 
between the development  of the overall income  of each of these groups 
and the development  of consumer  prices,  which is taken as the  criterion 
by which to  judge the intensity of inflationary trends. 
55 CHAPTER  III: Ebonometric  analysis  of the relationships between the various 
forms  of non-wage  income  and prices. 
1.  General  development  of the various  indices 
Analysis  of non-wage  income  has  enabled us  to group  these indices  into 
four  categories,  namely: 
a)  farmers'  income; 
b)  the gross  income  of joint stock companies  (distributed and undistributed 
profits plus  direct taxes); 
c)  the income  of self-employed \vorkers  (traders,  craftsmen,  members  of 
the professions); 
d)  income  in the form  of interest and rent. 
An  appropriate means  of assessing the inflationary effect of the growth of 
these  forms  of income  is to calculate the coefficient  of correlation between 
the indices for these forms  of income  (base year 1953)  and  the various price 
indices.  Since we  may  assume  that  tvage  increases  also played an  important role 
in the inflationary process,  it is necessary to include them  in the analysis. 
In order to determine the extent to which  these indices  have  been  influenced 
by the phenomena  of economic  growth  and  cyclical factors,  it is also useful 
to calculate coefficients  of correlation between the series  on  prices and 
incomes  and.  the series indicating progress  over the yeara  c.r..d  overall cyclical 
development.  For  the purposes  of measuring this  development,  we  have  used 
the indices devised by the  "Kredietbank".  The  results  of all these calculations 
are shown  in the two  matrices  contained in Table 8. 
In the first matrix,  non-wage  income  has  been treated as  a  single entity, 
and  in the second,  a  distinction has  been  made  between  the non-wage  income 
of self-employed workers  and the income  of joint stock companies. 
Since rent  and interest are not  represented in the wholesale price and 
consumer  price indices,  it may  be  assumed  that increases in these forms  of 
56 income  will only 8ecome  discerni'ble indirectly {through the rise in the 
costs of companies and in household expenditure),  and  only after a 
consideraale del~ in relation to the development  of these indices. 
It is therefore preferaale to restrict the analysis to two  categories 
of non-wage  income,  namely those of self-employed workers and those of 
joint stock companies.  In the calculation of overall non-wage  income, 
the income  of farming units was  included,  but rent  and interest were 
not. 
57 TAN¥ 8  :iatri% of corra1ation,  QQeff~  'I~ ~:t~  +'~:;:;t  ~w,..i QU~ p.gJm:lcnao:lis 
cOAtr.ib~t.i.n.g to the phenomenon  of  :~.n£1a.tion. 
PD  A  NA  u  PG  L  M 
-*  I  s  s  T  c 
D 
~: PD  :  Consumer  (retail)price index 
PD  1.00  PG  :  Wholesale  price index 
A  ·998  A :  Food  prices 
NA  ·998  .994  1.00  NA  :  Non-food  prices 
u  ·998  ·994  .997  1.00 
U  :  Prices of services 
PG  ·968  .970  .961  .963  L  :  Prices of agricultural produce 
produce 
L  ·935  .949  .923  .928  ·950  1.00  M  :  Raw  materials prices 
M  .397  .3B9  ·392  .387  ·554  .393  I  :  Prices of manufactured 
I  ·954  ·950  .948  ·949  ·991  .899  goods 
s  s :  Wages 
1--- -.  -* 
s  ·996  -992  .993  ·997  .973  ·934  I e423  :  .961  1.00  s: Non-wage  income 
-* 
I  T: Time  s  .988  .987  .979  .988  -973  .941  1.426  I  ·958  .988  1.00 
I_-- _I  c : Trade  T  .963  .961  .967  .970  .913  .886  .278  .897  -954  ·955  1.00  cycle 
c 
c  ·983  .981  .985  .987  .946  .915  .338  .931  -978  ·975  ·995  1.00 
-*  SEL  SCM  SSA  T  PD  PG  s  s  c 
T  1.00 
~=  sEt  : Non-wage  income  of undertakings, 
PD  .963  1.00  including farms 
PG  .913  .968  1.00 
-Cld  s  :  Non-wage  income  of self-
employed  workers  (middle-class) 
s  ·954  ·996  ·973 
SSA:  Non-wage  income  of  joint 
-*  stock  companies. 
s  ·955  .988  .973  .983 
gEL  .967  ·994  -971  ·992  ·996 
SCM  .960  .995  -974  -994  -995  -999 
~A  .869  .939  .946  ·958  .962  .941  -943 
c  ·978  ·975  .985  .981 
r 
.Ol,vl7 = -575 
Source  :  Own  calculations. 
58 With  the exception of the price indices for raw materials,  the coefficients 
relating the indices for prices,  wages  and  non-wage  income  to the time 
factor are all in excess of 0.85,  which  proves that the growth movement 
has prevailed over the qyclical movement.  Indeed,  the coefficients of 
correlation between these series and the trade cycle indices are scaroely 
higher than those between these series and the time factor. 
In connection with non-wage  income,  a  distinction has to be made  between the 
income  of self-employed persons and that  of companies.  The  coefficient  of 
correlation between the income  of self-employed persons and the time factor 
is scarcely lower  (0.960) than that between this income  and the trade cycle 
indices  (0.981),  which leads to the  supposition that this form  of income 
is very little influenced by  cyclical movements.  It should nevertheless 
be  borne in mind  that the calculation of the income  of self-employed persons 
is based almost  exclusively on  their tax declarations,  and that it is in 
their interests to level out their declared income  in order to avoid the 
effects of the sharply rising rates applied.  It is therefore possible that 
the actual income  of self-employed persons is more  influenced by  cyclical 
trends than the indices used would  lead one  to imagine. 
The  influence of cyclical factors is no  more  marked  in the case of the 
movement  of the income  of companies,  since the coefficient between these 
indices and  the time factor is 0.869  whereas it becomes  0.904 when  the 
time factor is replaced by  a  series of trade cycle indices. 
Moreover,  most  of the price indices are free  of any  strong cyclical 
influence.  The  coefficient between the indices for raw materials price and 
the trade cycle indices is low and not  significantly different from  zero. 
Farm  prices follow the  same  general upward  trend as all prices,  but their 
progress was  less marked  during the years 1958-61.  Although it is also 
necessary to take account  of developments in the quantities produced,  this 
is part of the reason why  farm  incomes  also rose less rapidly than other 
non-wage  income. 
59 The  coefficient between the farm  prices indices and  the cyclical factor 
is scarcely higher  th~ that between these indices and the time factor, 
and this is explained by the fact that most  of these prices are deter-
mined  by the public authorities (initially by the Belgian Government, 
then,  after 1958,  by the  Council  of Ministers of Agriculture of the  Common 
Market),  whose  decisions have  been guided more  by political and  social 
considerations than by the market  situation. 
The  movement  of the food price indices was  not  parallel to that of fam 
produce,  but followed closely the general upward  trend,  showing  slightly 
faster progress during periods of prosperity.  The  same  phenomenon  occurs 
in the case of the prices of non-food products and  services,  and because 
of this, in the case of the indices for consumer  prices in general also. 
Consequently,  the  simple  correlation coefficients between the  components 
of the  consumer  price index and  non-wage  income  are high without it being 
possible to establish any  cause-effect relationship between the growth 
of non-wage  income  and the rise in consumer  prices. 
One  finds the  same  phenomenon  when  comparing the development  of consumer 
prices with that  of wages,  or even the development  of wholesale prices 
with that of wages  and non-wage  income. 
Since wages  and non-wage  income  follow the  same  upward  trend throughout 
the period under consideration,  there is a  strong collinearity between 
the two  series of indices,  so that ~  calculation of multiple correlations 
between price series on  the one  hand  and  series of indices of wages  and 
non-wage  income  on the other,  cannot  establish the extent to which 
increases in wages  and non-wage  income  respectively are responsible for 
rises in various prices. 
Thi~nevertheless, is the purpose of our study.  In order to avoid this 
difficulty,  we  shall have to employ  more  sophisticated statistical 
methods,  as explained in the following section. 
60 2.  Analysis of multiple relationships between the development  of consumer 
prices and that  of wages  and non-wage  income  during the period 1953=71. 
Three methods  of calculation have  been applied (see Table 9).  First, 
the coefficient of determination was  calculated from  the indices of the 
three  series of variables related to the base per year 1953  (=  100). 
It is not  possible to eliminate the collinearity between the develop-
ment  of wagec  and non-wage  income  by use of this method.  The  Col. 
value is only 0.44  (1)  and,  in addition,  the residuals are auto-
correlated,  which  proves that the explanatory value of the variables 
is not  entirely satisfactory.  It is not  possible to eliminate this 
auto-correlation by transformation of the variables according to the 
Johnston method  (2),  and  moreover the collinearity defect  remains,  while 
the estimated parameter for non-wage  income  (0.05)  is not  significantly 
different  from  zero at the 95  per cent  level. 
It follows that it cannot  be asserted that the development  of non-wage 
income  has had  a  strong influence on  the consumer  price index for the 
same  year. 
A second approach is to assume  that the elasticities of consumer  prices 
in relation to wages  and non-wage  income  are constant  so that 
Dt  =  mSf • sJ or ln Dt  =  ln m + o( ln St  +  flln St 
The  coefficients m,c( and  )5  are determined by means  of multiple regression 
applied to the series of the logarithms of the variables.  It is not 
possible to eliminate the collinearity or to avoid auto-correlation by 
using this method.  In addition,  the coefficient of ln st is not 
significantly different from  zero at the 95  per cent  level. 
A third method is to replace the variables by their growth percentages. 
B.y  using this method,  it is possible to achieve a  Col.  value of 0.99,  or 
in other words to eliminate the collinearity completely.  Moreover, 
the residuals no  longer  displ~ auto-correlation,  since the 
(1)  The  Col.  value is the value of the determinant  of the matrix of the 
simple correlation coefficients.  This value reaches 1 if the  corre-
lations between  explanatory variables are very  low;  it is near  zero 
if there is perfect collinearity. 
(2)  After this iteration, the Durbin-Watson statistic reaches 1.21,  which 
is too low  for it to be  possible to maintain that there is no  auto-
correlation at the 95  per cent  level of significance. 
61 TABLE  g,:  !'l..;,ltiole  resea.rcl~  ::..~:J;;·;)  :.·e!  ..... ti.::::.:d::i.w;,;  bet~"eell the develonment  of orlces  (19'>1-1971 ). 
Variables  FUN<JriONS  IR2c/  lr 
I  7o  I  ~ 
(typical divergences)  (F-ratio) 
I  I 
I 
I 
0  I  1 
I  -*  I 
indices  I  Dt  = o,21 st +  o,o5 st +  o,oo1  I 97% 
I  (0,023)  (0,038)  (0,27)  I  (280) 
I  I 
log 
I  I 
1 ln Dt = O, 321  ln St + 0703  ln St- 0,004  1 94,8 % 
1  (0,04)  (o,o6)  (o,oo1) 1 (156) 
I 
I  -*  as a  I  Dt  = 0,31 st +  o,o2 St+ o,65 
(0,07)  (o,o6)  (o,o2)  per-
I  cent-
I  age of  I  growth 
I 
~: 
D = consumer  prices 
S  = wages 









S = non-1o1age  income  excluding interest and rent 
R 2  = coefficient  of determination adjusted for 
degrees of freedom 
x  y:  x. =partial correlation coefficient 
i  J 
E  elasticity 
D.W.  Durbin-Watson statistic 
COL.  coefficient of collinearity 




p  =  coefficient  of self-regression (Johnston transformation) 
D.L.  =  degrees of freedom 
F  = non-significant result for  o<  =  0.01 
I 
~  I  I  1 Iterations  y:  x. 
J  I  s  I D.W.  I  I  s  COL.  In  pl  ..02  s  I  I  I 
I  I  I  t  I 
2  3  I  4  I  4  15  6  6• 
I  I 
·33  .29  .07  - I  1.211 ·44  2  .69  -
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
.13  .32  .03- I  1.63 I  .51  2  ·75  -
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
.11  .31  .03- I  1.69 I  •99  1  - -
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  I 
I  D.L.  I 
IF  I  vlv2 
1  .01  I 
I 
8  I  7  I 
I 













I Durbin-Watson  statistic is in excess of the value  Du  = 1.54 (1). 
Application of the other methods  only produced  such  a  result after 
transformation by the  Johnston method.  The  coefficient  of determination 
has fallen to 0.50,  but it is significantly different  from  zero  (2). 
Thus,  there is a  certain degree of determination.  When  calculating the 
partial correlation coefficients,  one  finds that the determination 
is much  stronger in the  case of wages  than in that of non-wage  income 
(0.73 as opposed to 0.11).  The  influence of the coefficients of 
growth of non-wage  income  is very weak  and,  basically, its level of 
significance is negligible  (value t  =  0.333  < t.95 =  2.131). 
In the case of the rates of growth of wages,  however,  the  coefficient 
of 0.31 is very significantly different from  zero,  even  at the  99% 
level of significance.  Accordingly,  we  can conclude that,  although 
the  influence of the rates of growth of non-wage  income  on  consumer 
prices during the period 1953-1971 is not  demonstrable,  the growth 
of wages  did have  a  clear effect  on  consumer  prices. 
Taking into account  the fact that the rate of growth of prices was  very 
low throughout  the period 1953-1959 inclusive,  we  can  assume  that this 
difference will emerge  more  clearly if we  limit the  stu~ to the 
period between 1960  and  1971. 
{1)  R.J.  rl>NNACOTT  and  T.H.  'OONNACOTT  :  "Econometrics",  Nevl  York, 
London,  Sydney,  Toronto,  1969,  PP•  427-428. 
{2)  The  F-ratio·9·4 is higher than the critical value ofF 01
=  6.4. 
(Ibidem,  PP•  254-256  at Table VII,  P•  422).  • 
63 TABLE  10  :  Multiple  correlatio~:s  bet~·;oen the de7-s!.opuent  of cons:m.er  prices and  the developillent 
of-wages  and  non~wage income  (1961-1971) 
-2  Varia- Functions  R as  r  •  E  Iterations  'b1es  a%  xiy.xj  n.w.  OOL. 
F-ratio  s  s  s  s  v1  v2  n 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
log  ln Dt  = 0,007  + 0,332  ln St  + 0,071  1n St  98,6 %  .96  ·45  .33  .07 - 1,18  .44  2  .56  -
(0,001)  (0,032)  (0,05)  (360) 
1n Dt  1= 0,006 + 0,41 St - 0,01 St  87,6%  .87  .23  .41  .07  1.  ·45  3  ·44  ·50 
+  (0,002)  (0,01)  (0,11)  (28,6) 
1n  Dt  = 0,003 + 0,306  1n St 1+ 0,109 ln St  99,7%  .96  .64  .30  .11  1.22  .21  1  - -
(0,001)  (0,0307)  +  (0,046)  {1668) 
1n Dt  = 0,03 + 0,27 1n St  1+ 0,15 1n St  l  99,7%  .93  .71  .27  .15  1,997  .16  1  - -
(0,001)  (0,04)  +  (0,05)  +  (2000) 
%of  Dt  = 0,28 +  0,24 st + o,o6 st  30%  .63 
ere- ••••  (0,11)  ••••  (3) 
.43  ·43  .25- 1,47  ·997  2  .60  -
wtll 
!!z :  See Table 9. 
DL  F 
vl/v2  .01 
9  10 
2/7  8,65 
2/6  10,91 
2/8  8,65 
2/8  8,65 
2/7  9,55 The  multiple correlation between the price indices on  the one  hand  and 
wages  and non-wage  income  on  the other was  not  calculated for the period 
1960-1970,  because it could be foreseen that the collinearity defect 
could not be eliminated.  We  tried the logarithm approach,  but without 
success,  since the Col.  value remained  low  and the residuals were 
auto-correlated. 
The  results obtained by  the introduction of lags were  scarcely any 
better,  since the  Col.  value fell still further,  although the auto-
correlation disappeared. 
Calculation in terms of growth  percentage did not  provide  a  solution to 
the problem  either.  The  coefficient of determination fell to 30  per cent, 
which  is no  longer significantly different from  zero  (1). 
The  accentuation of the inflationary movement  during the period 1960-
1971  caused no  change  in the relations between the variables.  The 
collinearity between wages  and non-wage  income  held good  and,  when  it was 
eliminated by the substitution of the variables by  their growth percent-
ages,  the coefficient of determination became  so  low  that it was  impossible 
to  draw any  conclusions as to  any  cause-effect relationship. 
Accordingly,  the multiple regression method  had to be abandoned  and  a 
calculation w~s made  of the simple correlation (2) between,  on  the one 
hand,  consumer  prices ~  wages,  and that between  prices and  non-wage 
income  on  the other. 
(1)  It is possible to avoid the problem  of collinearity by using the 
Bavesian method,  but this method is not  sufficiently developed for 
it to be  possible to avoid the  phenomenon  of auto-correlation at 
the  same  time. 
(2)  J. DUroS  :  "Liaisons  stochastiques en  economie",  Paris,  1971,  P•  268. 
65 3•  Analysis  of  simple regression between  consumer  prices and wages  and 
between  consumer  prices and non-wage  income. 
In order to determine  directly the elasticity of prices in relation 
to wages  and non-wage  income,  we  calculated the  coefficients of 
correlation using the logarithms of the variables. 
For the period between  1953  and  1971,  the coefficient of correlation 
rx: Y  between  consumer  prices and  wages  is far higher than the value 
necessary (0.59)  for it to be  significantly different  from  zero. 
Nevertheless,  the residuamare strongly auto-correlated,  which  proves 
that wages  alone do  not  provide  a  complete  explanation of variations 
in consumer  prices.  This auto-correlation can be  eliminated by means 
of an iteration using the  Johnston method,  without the coefficient 
of correlation diminishing appreciably.  It remains at the level of 
0.97,  which  proves that there is a  strong correlation.  If one 
reduces the  series of variables by one  or two  years,  the  correlation 
\veakens  slightly.  Thus,  the parallelism between prices and  wages 
occurred mainly during the later years.  When  the same method is 
applied to the variables for the years 1960-1971,  1960-1970,  and 
1960-1969  instead of to the years 1953-1971,  1953-1969,  the coefficients 
of correlation obtained were  much  higher,  which  proves that the 
parallelism became  much  more  marked  during the  sixties. 
Correlation is not  synonomous  with causality.  We  find that, if we 
bring the consumer  prices series forward by  one year,  the auto-
correlation of the residues becomes  stronger and  elimination of this 
auto-correlation by the Johnston method  causes a  slight fall in the 
coefficient  of correlation.  If,  on  the  other hand,  we  bring forward 
the  wages  series by  one  year,  the auto-correlation becomes  weaker  or 
disappears  completely  (when  one  limits the calculations to the period 
1960-1971). 
In addition,  the  coefficient  of correlation increases  (from 0.97  to 
0.98  for the period 1953-1971  and  from  0.99  to 0.998  for the period 
1960-1971).  This proves that the influence of prices on  wages  is at least 
as  strong as that of wages  on  prices,  and that this influence is felt 
66 TA3LE  11:  Simple  research into the relation between  prices  ar.d  incomes. 
FUNariONS  -2  Iterations  rO.Ol 
(typical divergences)  R%  rx:y  E.  n.w.  D.L.  (FO.Ol)  Periods 
(F-ratio)  n  p 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
s  Ln D =  0,375  ln s - o,oo6  98)3  %  .99  .37  1.27  2  .59  9  • 73  1960  - 71 
(0,016)  (0,001)  (567  (10,6) 
Ln D = 0,383  1n  S - 0,007  91)6%  .99  .38  1.40  2  .60  8  .76  1960 - 70 
(0,020)  (0,001)  (381  (ll,2) 
Ln  D = o, 3998 1n s- o,ooB  97  %  .99  .40  1.59  2  .62  7  .80  1960  - 69 
(o 025)  (o oo1)  (263)  - J!2L22  1- - - - - - _,_ - - - - ~ - -
,_  _____ 
f- - - - 1---- ----------------- 1-------
Ln  D = 0,338  ln S - 0,003  94)4 %  .97  .34  1.76  2  .77  16  .59  1953  - 71 
(0,020)  (0,001)  (236  (  8,5) 
Ln  D = 0,336  1n  S - 0,004  93 )1  '7~  .97  • 34- 1.74  2  .76  15  .61  1953  - 70 
(0,023)  (0,001)  (219  (  8, 7) 
Ln D = 0,336  1n S- 0,004  91)6 %  .96  .34  1.72  2  • 76  14  .62  1953  - 69 
(0902~)  (0,001)  (165  (  8,9) 
Ln  D =  0,551  ln E*- 0,007  96\8 %  .985  ·55  1.50  1  - 10  .71  1960  - 71 
~ 
·; 
(0,030)-*  (0,003)  (329,  (10) 
Ln D = 0,527  ln S - 0,005  96)7 %  .985  .53  1.31  1  - 9  .73  1960 - 70 
( 0,031 )-*  ( 0,002)  (292  (10,6) 
Ln  D = 0,532  1n s- o,oo6  95)4 1b  .98  ·53  1.34  1  - 8  .76  1960  - 69 
(0,039)  (0,003)  (188 
f----1---- ----------------- - _(,!1~22 1------- - - - - - - - - - =*- - - - -
,_ _____ 
Ln D = 0,520 ln s  - o,ooB  97)1%  .986  ·52  1.12  1  - 17  .58  1953  - 71 
(0,021)-*  (0,002)  (595  (  8,4) 
Ln  D = 0,504 1n  s  - o,oo6  96)8 %  .985  .so  1.04  1  - 16  ·59  1953  - 70 
(0,022)-*  (0,002)  (523  (  8,5) 
Ln  D = 0,503 ln s  - o,oo6  95)9 %  .98  .50  1.03  1  - 15  .61  1953  - 69 
(0,026)  (09003)  (376  (  8,  7) 
s 
WITH  EFFECT  OF  THE  SLIDING  SCALE 
Ln Dt=  0,376  ln st 10,004  99,6 %  .998  .38  1.25  1  - 9  .73  1960  - 71 
(0,008)  +  (0,001)  (2226)  (10,6) 
Ln  Dt=  0,335  1n st+lo,on  97,3  7~  .988  .34  1.67  2  .Bo  9  .73  1960  - 71 
~ ____  (Q,Ql§) ___ Lo~OQ21 1- {3161  - - 1----
..._  ___  ----------------- - _(1.0~6.2  ------
Ln  Dt= 0,357  ln St+1-0,004  96,2  r~  .98  .36  2.04  2  .70  15  .61  1953 - 71 
(0,018)  (0,001)  (406)  (  8,  7) 
Ln Dt =  0'  311  1n  st+ r 0'  004  89,5 %  .95  .31  .99  2  • 74  15  .61  1953  - 71 
(0,027)  (0,001  (137)  (  8,  7) 
~  :  See  Table 9. at  a  certain remove  in time  (1). 
;!:'his  phenomenon  is accounted for by the adjustment  of wages  to prices by 
the  sliding scale method  which  is applied in virtually all industrial 
sectors in Belgium.  This method,  which  consists of adjusting wages  to 
consumer  prices,  each time the  consumer  price index exceeds  a  certain 
threshold several months  in succession,  causes wages  to rise in parallel 
with rising prices,  but  at  a  certain remove  in time. 
The  consequence  of this time lag is that the  correlation between wages 
and  prices is highest  when  one  shifts the wages  series forward by  one 
year  (2). 
The  auto-correlation phenomenon  does not  occur if we  calculate the  simple 
correlation between  consumer  prices and  non-wage  income.  It is difficult 
to draw  any  conclusion from  this finding because,  as must  not  be forgotten, 
non-wage  income  is a  composite macroeconomic  aggregate whose  various 
components  probably have differing behaviour patterns.  It m~  be noted 
that the  coefficients of correlation,  which  are probably overestimated 
because of the  collinearity between wages  and non-wage  income  (see the 
previous section), tail off slightly when  the figures for the years 
1972  or the years  1971  and  1972  are not  taken into account  in the 
calculations.  This proves that the parallelism between the rise in non-
wage  income  and  consumer  prices became  stronger during the last two  years. 
(1)  For the method  of interpretation,  see  :  Edward  J. KANE  :  Economic 
Statistics and  Econometrics - An  Introduction to Quantitive Economics 
International Edition,  London,  1969,  p.360. 
(2)  T~e correlation was  calculated on  the basis of the  logarithms of the 
variables,  but  a  similar result if obtained if one  uses the  indices 
calculated on  the basis 1953  = 100.  Without  the time-lag,  a  strong 
auto-correlation occurs  (the Durbin-Watson statistic is only 0.7183, 
so  that  even  at the 99  per  cent  level of significance,  the non-auto-
correlation thesis must  be rejected (see R.J.  WONNACOTT  and T.H.  WONNACOTT, 
Table  IX,  P•  428).  If the wages  series is brought  forward by one year,  this 
auto-correlation disappears completely  (the Durbin-Watson  statistic is 
1.456) and the  coefficient  of determination becomes  0.996  (with F1  16=  4581) 
as against  0.993  with no  time lag.  • 
68 The  elasticity of consumer  prices in relation to non-wage  income  is 
more  than 0.50,  whereas that of prices in relation to wages  is only 
0.34,  or 0.36 if the wages  series is brought  forward by  one  year. 
This is probably attributable to structural differences between the 
industrial  sector and  the  services sector.  In industry,  wages  generally 
represent  a  larger percentage of selling prices than non-wage  income, 
whereas in the  services sector,  there are many  sub-sectors  (small traders, 
for example)  in which  non-wage  income  accounts for a  much  larger prop-
ortion than wages.  In the industrial  sector,  with rapid improvements  in 
productivity,  it is possible to increase wages  without  introducing 
corresponding increases in selling prices,  whereas in the  services 
sector,  where  productivity improvements  are too limited,  entrepreneurs 
are obliged to increase their prices in order to meet  all wage  increases. 
In view of the  complex  make-up  of non-wage  income,  it is necessary to make 
a  distinction between the  income  of self-employed workers  (traders, 
members  of the professions and  associations of persons)  and the  income 
of  joint stock companies,  making  separate analyses of the extent to which 
parallelism occurs between these  forms  of income  and  consumer  prices. 
4•  Simple regression analysis between the various types of non-wage  income 
and  consumer  prices. 
The  results of this analysis are  shown  in Tables 12  and  13.  In the  case 
of the  income  of self-employed workers  (traders,  members  of the  professions 
and  associations of persons)  (middle class),  we  find the  same  phenomenon 
as with wages.  If we  bring forward the series for the  income  of self-
employed  workers by  one year,  the  auto-correlation disappears and  the 
coefficient  of determination between  consumer  prices and the  income  of 
self-employed persons rises substantially (from 91.1 to 99.1). 
Moreover,  the F-ratio is multiplied by  10,  from  175 to 1,887,  which 
means  that the reliability of the relationship is confirmed. 
69 TABLE  12  Correlation between  consumer  prices  and  the income  of self-employed 
workers,  and  between this  income  and the prices  of services. 
Functions  'R2%  r x:y 
(F-ratio) 
0  (1)  (2) 
ln Dt  = 0,526  -CM  96  %  .982  ln st - o,oo 
(0,03)  (o,oo)  (241) 
ln Dt  = 01495 
-CM  96,8 %  .986  ln St  - Ot007 
(0,03)  ( 0,001)  (277) 
-CM  95,8 %  .982  ln Dt  = 0,487  ln St  - 01007 
___ _  (Q,Q4l  ____  (g,gog)_  (184)  ---- ------ -CM  99,4 %  -997  ln Dt  = 01498  ln St  1- 01003 
(0,01)  +  (0,001)  (1575) 
-CM 
99,3 %  ·991  1n Dt  = 0,487  ln St  1- 0,003 
(0,013)  +  (0,001)  (1301) 
-CM 
99,2 %  ·996  ln Dt  = 0,479 ln St  1- 0,002 
(o  015)  +  (o  001)  19~52 - - -----~------~-- ---
-CM  91,1 %  ·957  ln Dt  = 0,466 ln St  - 01001 
(0,035)  (0,001)  (175) 
ln Dt 
,  -CM 
99,1 %  -996  = 01481  J.n  st 1 -0,001 
(0,011)  +  (1887) 
~  :  See Table 9· 
Ut  = consumer  prices,  services heading. 
SCM  = non-wage  income  of traders,  mem\ers  of the 
t  professions and  associations of persons 
(middle class). 
D.W.  Iternations  D.L. 
n  pl  J>2 
(3)  (4)  5  6  1 
-53  1.77  2  .52  - 9 
.so  2.01  2  .so  - 8 
.49  1.98  2  .so  - 1 
--- r- - ----- ---
.so  1.36  1  - - 9 
-49  1.56  1  - - 8 
.48  1.74  1  - - 7 
-------------------
.47  1.14  2  .70  - 16 
.48  1.00  1  - - 16 
r.Ol  Periods 
(F.Ol) 
8  9 
1960 - 71 
1960 - 10 
1960 - 69 
---- ----------
1960 - 71 
1960 - 70 
1960  - 69 
---------------
1953  - 71 
1953  - 71 TABLE  12a  : Correlation b~tw~en consumer  prices and  the income  of self-empl-o-yed 
workers,  and between this  income  and the prices of services. 
Functions  R'2%  r  D.W.  Iterations 
(F-ratio)  x:y 
n  01  02 
0  {l_l  _{21  (3)  (4)  5  6 
ln ut 
-:::-C]Il 
98,4 %  ·993  -79  1.01  1  = 0,79 ln st  - 0,01  - -
(o,o3)  (o,oo)  (697) 
-=eM  98,9 %  ·995  .76  1.18  1  ln ut = 0,757  ln st - o,oo8  - -
(0,026)  (0,002)  (877) 
-CM  98,6 %  ·994  .74  1.22  1  ln ut = 0,742  ln st- o,oo6  - -
(0,03)  (0,003)  (645) 
~---------------- ------ --------1---- 1- - - -----
-CM 
93,6 %  ·994  .80  1.46  1  ln ut = o,804 ln st 1- 0,002  - -
(0,03)  +  (0,003)  (690) 
'::'CM  98,3 %  .78  1.63  1  ln ut = 0,782  1n st 1- o,oo6  ·993  - -
(0,03)  +  (0,002)  (536) 
-::-CM  97,8%  ln ut = 0,765 ln st 1- o,ooo  ·991  -77  1.71  1  - -
(0,04)  +  (364) 
-eM  92,6 %  .964  .82  2  .60  ln ut = 0,818 1n st  +  0,007  1.11  -
(o,o6)  (o,oo3)  (215) 
-CM  93,2 %  .968  .82  1.40  2  .64  ln ut = 0,818 1n st 1+  o,oo8  -
(o,o6)  +  (o,oo2)  (219) 
D.L.  r.Ol  Periods 
1_F.Ol_1 
1  8  9 
10  1960  - 71 
9  1960  - 70 
8  1960  - 69 
- - - - ----t---------
~-
9  1960  - 71 
8  1960  - 70 
1  1960  - 69 
16  1953  - 71 
15  1953  - 71 
See  Table 9.  -CM  .  St  = non-wage  income  of traders,  ~embers of  th~ profess1ons 
and  associations of persons  ~middle class).  Ut  = consumer  prices,  services heading. This proves that the income  of self-employed workers  adjusts to 
consumer  prices after a  certain time lag,  so that there is a  degree 
of feed-back,  as in the case of the relationship between  wages  and 
prices. 
If we  use the index for the prices of services instead of the overall 
price index,  the auto-correlation effect  subsists after application of 
a  shift in time.  This is attributable to the  shortcomings of the index 
for prices of services prior to the reform of the overall index in 1966. 
The  index for the prices of services had been calculated on  the basis 
of five headings only,  and  was  therefore not  at all representative of 
the development  of the prices of all services. 
The  index for the prices of services is more  representative from  1967 
onwards.  This explains the disappearance of the auto-correlation when 
we  limit the  calculation to the period 1960-1971.  There is no  auto-
correlation when  a  time shift is not  applied and,  in addition,  the 
coefficients of correlation are very high {more  than 0.99)• 
This suggests that the influence of the incomes  of self-employed 
workers  on  the prices of services is as great  as or greater than 
the  influence of these prices on them.  This is not  surprising,  since 
self-employed persons work  main~ in the services sector and  aQy 
increase in their incomes is reflected directly in prices.  The  high 
elasticity of the prices of services in relation to the income  of self-
employed  workers  (o.ao during the period 1960-1971;  o.82  from  1953 
to 1971)  demonstrates the impossibility in the services sector of compen-
sating for the effects on  prices of an increaae in incomes  by improving 
72 productivity (1). 
It should be  noted that,  in the case of the relationship between prices 
and non-wage  income  as in that of the relationship between prices and 
wages,  the correlation is always  slightly higher when  the years 1970  and 
1971  are included than when  they are excluded.  With  the income  of self-
employed -workers,  the parallelism with overall  consumer  prices (and also 
with the prices of services) became  established mainly during the later 
years.  The  behaviour of the gross income  of  joint  stock companies is 
erttirely different from  that of the income  of self-employed workers.  If 
one  calculated the  simple correlation between this income  and  consumer 
prices,  one is confronted with the phenomenon  of auto-correlation,  which 
cannot  be  eliminated by iterations using the Johnston method. 
(1)  The  regression between the series for food  and non-food prices 
and the non-wage  income  of self-employed workers,  which  ~lso 
confirms our earlier conclusions,  is as follows  : 
. a)  - ln At  = Q....21  ln  SCM_  0,007  -2  D.L. = 9  R  = 0,975 
(0,03)  t  (0,002)  D.W.  1,72  F  = 401 
0  =  0,42 
- ln At  = .9..a.2.Q.  ln  scM  - o,oo1  'R2  0,994  D.L.  9 
( o,o1)  t+l  (0,001) D.W.  2,54  F  = 1726 
b)  - ln NA  =  .Q.a..l1  ln  -CM  - o,oo9  -2  D.L.  =  9  st  R  = 0194 
t  (0,03)  (0,002) n.w.  =  1,42  F  171 
0  ==  0,42 
- 1n  NAt=~ ln  -CM  -2  0,987  D.L. = 9  s  - o,oo3  R  = 
(0,01)  t+l  (0,001) n.w.  =  1,65  F  = 797 
73 After the  second iteration using this method,  the Durbin-Watson 
statistic is still only 0.77 whereas,  for a  0.05 level of signifi-
cance,  it should at least reach a  Du  value of approximately 1.41 
for it to be possible to assume  that the  coefficient of auto-
correlation is close to  zero. 
Moreover,  if one  makes  a  multiple correlation calculation choosing 
wages  and the  income  of companies  as independent  variables,  the 
coefficient obtained for these forms  of income  is so low  (0.008) that 
it is not  significantly different from  zero.  This proves that  one 
cannot  demonstrate any  effect of the movements  of the  incomes  of 
companies  on  consumer  prices. 
If,  on  the other hand,  we  calculate the correlation between the 
incomes  of companies  and  wholesale prices  (manufactured goods  heading) 
we  obtain a  coefficient of correlation of 0.96 for the period 1953-1971  and 
one  of 0.95 for the period 1960-1971  without  any auto-correlation 
effect.  Consequently,  increases in the prices of these products have 
an undeniable although minimal  influence on the  income  of companies 
and  vice versa.  The  elasticity of wholesale prices  (manufactured 
goods  heading) to the income  of  joint  stock companies is only 0.17,  which 
explains why  the indirect  influence of the  incomes  of companies  on 
consumer  prices is negligible and cannot  be  demonstrated by the 
econometric method. 
CONCLUSIONS  : 
The  following conclusions may  be  drawn  from  the  econometric research 
carried out  in the context  of this chapter 
1)  The  ste~  improvement  in productivity in industry has  enabled 
wages  to rise much  more  rapidly than consumer  prices.  In the 
services sector,  productivity has not  improved at the same  pace, 
so that the rise in self-employed workers'  incomes  has had  a 
fairly marked  influence on  the prices of services and,  thereby, 
an indirect  influence on  consumer  prices. 
74 2)  The  growth in the incomes  of joint stock companies  has  had a 
limited influence on  the wholesale prices  of industrial  goods  and, 
thereby,  an  indirect influence on  consumer  prices.  This  influence 
has  remained limited thanks to improvements  in productivity in 
most  industrial sectors. 
3)  Wages  and the incomes  of self-employed workers  have  been pushed 
upwards  by  adjustments to the consumer  price index..  This  ''feed-
back" process  was  a  strong feature throughout  the period studied, 
but particularly during the later years.  It occurred with a  lag 
of several months. 
These  conclusions  are illustrated in schematic form  in Figure 1. 
~~  do  not  contain a  complete answer to the question of the relative 
contributions of its various  components  to the development  of the 
consumer price index.  Fbr the present,  we  only know  that the increase 
in the prices of services played a  major role and that the influence of 
the wholesale prices of manufactured goods  is probably minimal.  We  do 
not  know  the extent  of the influence of the development  of the wholesale 
prices of farm  produce or that of the profit margins  taken at the 
various  stages  of marketing. 
In the following chapters,  we  shall be studying first,  the role of the 
various  components  of consumer  prices in accounting for their development, 
and then the development  of profit margins  in the distributive sector. 
75 TABLE  13  Correlation bet;..-ee.n.  conS"!..i.:ner  :p:::-i -::es  and the wholesale prices 
(manui'acturcd  6"<>ods  he:iJ.i.n.s_r  ~l'l the  .:..1.comes  of companies. 




38,8 %  = 0,170 ln s  + 0,011 
(0,051)  (0,003)  (11,1) 
=SA+ 
95,7%  ln Dt  = o,oo8 ln s  + 0,328 1n st -0,004 
(0,02)  (0,025)  (0,001)  (190) 
1n It = 
-SA+  91,1 %  0,165 ln st  - 0,004 
(0,12)  (0,002)  (186) 
ln It = 
=SA+ 
88,5%  0,175 ln st  - o,oo2 
(0,019)  (0,002)  (85) 
Key  :  See Table 9. 
It +  wholesale prices,  manufactured goods  heading 
~A  =  non-wage  income  of  joint stock companies 
including direct taxation. 
r xy  £ 
.65  0,17 
.09  .96  o,oo 
.96  0,17 
·95  0,17 
D.W.  COL.  Iterations  D.L.  Period 
pl  ~2  n 
0,33  0,77  1,00  ·55  .51  3  15 
II 
0,33  1,60  0,69  .71  - 2  15  " 
1,29  1,00  - - 1  17  " 
1,30  1,00  - - 1  10  " FIGU~E 1. 
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~  , CHAPTER  IV;  Study  of the various  components  of the  consumer  price index. 
1.  Introduction. 
The  structure of the  consumer  price index was  changed  considerably in 1967. 
The  prices of services which,  according to the  conclusions of  Chapter III 
influenced the development  of the income  of self-employed workers  consider-
ably,  have  accounted for 21.43%  of the overall index since 1967,  as against 
only 7•7%  during the earlier years. 
The  proportion attributed to food  products was  reduced to 41.55%  and that 
attributed to non-food products to 37.02%,  as against  53.9%  and  38.5% 
respectively prior to the reform.  In fact,  the importance of food  products 
is still overestimated since,  according to the national  accounts,  expenditure 
on  these  products represented 30.6%  of private consumption in 1966  (1).  This 
distortion was  eliminated in March  1972,  since when  food  products  only 
account  for  30%  of the overall  index,  whereas  40%  is now  attributed to non-
food  products and  30%  to services. 
Since  we  are to devote all our attention to the development  of the prices 
of services, it is desirable to make  a  deeper  study of the development  of 
the various  components  of the  consumer  price index between 1967  and  1972. 
Before proceeding to this in-depth study,  it will be useful to make  a  brief 
analysis of the development  of the various  components  of the index during 
the period 1953-1972. 
2.  General  outline of the development  of the various  components  of the 
consumer  price index between 1953  and 1972. 
Graph  I  shows  the  growth rates of the three groups of prices according to 
which  the overall  consumer  price index is calculated.  In order to  compare 
their development  to that of the trade cycle in general,  we  have  added  a 
curve representing the annual  averages of the trade cycle index calculated 
by  the research and  documentation department  of the Kredietbank. 
(1)  Calculated on the basis of  "Comptes  nationaux 1957- 166  et  balances de 
paiements 1962-1966",  Statistical Office of the European  Communities, 
Brussels,  1967,  PP•  72-73,  100-101,  126-127,  156-157  and 184-188. 
78 This index represents a  s.ynthesis of a  number  of economic  quantities whose 
development  is characteristic of the trade cycle,  among  them  industrial 
production,  orders in the metal-working industr.y,  electricity production, 
textiles production,  imports and  exports calculated at  current  prices,  raw 
materials prices,  employment  vacancies,  interest on the call money  market 
and  industrial production calculated at wholesale prices (1). 
Comparison of the growth rates of the three headings of the price index 
shows  that,  virtually throughout  the period,  the rise in the prices of 
services was  higher than that in the prices of food and  non-food products. 
The  continual rise in the prices of services is more  structural than 
cyclical in character,  since it frequently becomes  sharper during periods 
of recession (in 1968,  for instance) and less marked  during periods of 
prosperity (in 1960-1961,  for instance).  In all probability,  therefore,  it 
is not  caused by fluctuations in demand.  It is more  a  result  of the efforts 
of those  who  render  services to increase their income  in line with that  of 
employees.  We  shall return to this theory of the influence of the middle 
class in the rise in the prices of services in Section 5 of this Chapter. 
Let  us take a  close look at the development  of the other two  components  of 
the  consumer  price index.  Food  prices have  followed  an irregular,  sharply 
rising trend,  which  appears to have been influenced by the trade cycle, 
although no  real parallelism can be  established.  This is accounted for by 
the fact that these prices are influenced by  divergent factors,  namely  : 
a)  the development  of farm prices on international markets; 
b)  the agricultural policies of the Belgian Government  and the Council  of 
Agriculture Ministers of the  Common  Market  countries; 
c)  the development  of wages  and profits in the food  industr.y; 
d)  the development  of profit margins in food distribution. 
Some  of these factors  (those mentioned under a) and  c) in particular) are 
strongly influenced by the trade cycle.  The  development  of others is not 
subject to this influence to the  same  extent  (the factor mentioned under d)) 
(2),  whereas the factor referred to under b) is almost  completely independent. 
(1)  Kredietbank,  Service d'Etudes et  de  documentation  :  '~n indice de  la 
conjoncture pour  l'economie belge",  Brussles,  18  September 1972,  pp.l & 2. 
(2)  See  Chapter IV,  Section 4. 
79 The  growth of non-food product  prices follows the development  of the trade 
cycle,  except during the period 1959-62. 
Between 1959  and 1962,  the rise in non-food product  prices was  virtually nil. 
This cannot  be accounted for in terms of wages,  since they rose regularly 
during the period {1).  This virtual stability is probably attributable to 
the following two  factors  : 
1)  the strengthening of international competition in consequence of the 
reduction of customs tariffs within the Common  Market; 
2)  the enlivenment  of competition in the distributive sector under the 
influence of the emergence  of the major retail multiples. 
We  shall return to the subject  of 2) in Chapter v. 
Between 1962  and 1966,  the prices of non-food products were  carried along 
by the decided upward  movement  of the trade cycle. 
The  downturn in 1967  brought  about  a  decline in the growth rate of these prices, 
but it is difficult to measure the  extent of this since the products included 
in the index for non-food product  prices were  changed  from  1 January 1967. 
The  development  of these prices after 1967  is studied in depth in the, 
following Section,  in which  we  shall be using annual data  {Dec~ber to 
December)  at first,  and then quarterly averages.  The  purpose of th;t.s  is 
to establish the influence of the trade cycle on  the various price indices 
more  clearly. 
3.  Develo  ent  of the various  com  onents of the consumer  rice index 
between 19  7 and 1972. 
In order to select the products and services whose  increases in price had a 
major influence on the increase in the consumer  price index,  we  calculated, 
on  a  year by year basis,  the average growth of this index and  eliminated all 
products whose  prices did not rise at a  rate exceeding any  of these averages. 
(1)  Revue  de Documentation et d 'Information de la Banque  Nationale de 
Belgique,  February 1956,  P•  177,  Graph VI. 
80 Tables 14,  15  and 16  itemise all the products whose  prices rose during the 
period 1967  to 1972  inclusive. 
Annual  growth rates in excess of the annual  average have been underlined  so 
that it is eas.y  to determine  which  products have made  the greatest  contribu-
tion to the acceleration of inflation during the period 1967-72. 
It becomes  immediately apparent that the prices of services and  some  food 
products  (meat,  bread) were those which  rose  sharply,  whereas most  non-food 
products rose at rates below the average  (1/77  of the overall increase). 
Among  food products,  bread and meat  in particular played a  decisive role. 
The  effect of the rise in the price of bread tailed off between 1967  and 
1972.  It accounted for 13.07%  of the overall increase in the  consumer  price 
index in 1967,  and only 3.25%  in 1972. 
The  role of beef,  on the other hand,  grew in importance.  The  proportion for 
which it accounted was  6.33%  in 1967  and 11.54%  in 1972. 
The  increases in the prices of pork,  veal  and  cooked meats  were  of less 
decisive importance,  but  nevertheless their absolute growth rates were  above 
the average in many  years. 
Dairy produce  pl~ed an important  part in the increase in prices in 1967  and 
1971,  in which years they accounted for more  than 5%  of the overall increase 
of the consumer  price index.  The  price of butter,  on the other hand,  rose 
only modestly and  actually fell in 1968.  This is no  doubt  attributable to 
the extremely high price of butter in 1967.  The  consumer  price was  approxi-
mately four times the wholesale price on international markets.  Not  surpris-
ingly,  in view of the growing resistance of consumers to this situation and 
the rising stocks of butter in the  Common  Market,  it would  have been difficult 
for the farmers'  organizations to introduce further increases. 
rr·he  price of potatoes fluctuates substantially from year to year. 
In 1967  and 1970,  it had a  moderating influence on the upward  movement  of the 
consumer  price index,  but  in 1969  it, together with the prices of beef and 
pork,  was  responsible for the acceleration of the rise in consumer  prices. 
Indeed,  the rate of increase rose between 1968  and 1969  by  slightly more  than 
2  points (of which more  than one  point is attributable to the  ri~e in meat 
and potato prices). 
Under the non-food products heading,  only the prices of textiles,  coal  and 
washing powder  and toothpaste rose to an extent  which  caused them to have 
an influence of more  than  5%  on the consumer  price index. 
81 TABLE  14  Increases in retail prices 
FOOD  PRODUCTS 
Code  Headings  1967  1968 
% 
1969  1970  1971  1972 
%  abs  1£_  abs  abs  %  abs  %  abs  %  abs 
1-2-3  Bread  13.07  8,45  3,18  6,46  5,80  3,25 
Qdl  0,20  0,15  0,20  2..tl£  0,20 
5-6-7- Meat 
8 
6,34  10,57  11,72  2,69  6,56  11,54 
0,21  Qd2  .Q.,j:1  o,o8  ~  Q.J.Q 
9-10- Pork  0,38  8,45  8,09  -2,69  1,83  2,64 
11  o,o1  0,20  QJl  -0,08  0,10  0,15 
12  Veal  1,14  1,59  1,73  1,08  2,21  2,78 
0,04  0,08  0,08  0,03  0,12  9.J.ll 
14-15  Cooked  meats  3,17  2,64  3,54  1,88  1,98  2,78 
0,10  0,06  0,16  o,o6  o,n  9.J.ll 
17-18- Dairy products  5,97  6,34  -3,73  o,Bl  10,08  2,67 
19-20  0,20  ~  -0,17  0,02  9.J...2.2  0,16 
21-22  Butter  0,38  -7,93  0,27  0,13  2,74  1,21 
0,01  -~  o,o1  o,oo  .Q....l2  0,07 
24  Potatoes  -10,53  3,17  10,27  -ll,  57  -1,38  8,23 
-0,34  Q&I.  0,47  -0,36  -0,08  ~ 
30  Chocolate  4,70  3,17  4,45  -2,69  -0,08  -0,05 
.Q....l2  Q&I.  0,20  -0,08  -0,00  -o,oo 
31-32  Beverages  2,03  - 0,09  2,02  2,98  3,62 
0,07  - o,oo  o,o6  0,16  0,22 
Food  products  40,36  33,47  48,8  18,57  32,9  41,64 
1,32  0,79  bn.  0,57  1,79  b.5.4. 
Index total  100  100  100  100  100  100 
3,27  2,36  4,57  3,07  5,44  6,10 rrABLE  15 
NON-FDOD  PRODUai'S 
I  !  !  1967  al 
1968  1969 
al  ' 
l  Code  Headings  i  1970  1971  1972 





33  - 34 
I 
Cigarettes and  8,48  i  - I 
2,35  I 0,84  i  2,38  3,09  I 
tobacco  0,28 :  0,11  0,03  :I 
Qd2. 
l  '  I  1  35- 36  ! 
Shoes  -2,38  I  1,11  3,41  3,62  4,41  3,61 
i  I  l  -o,o8 1  0,031  0,16  0,11  0,22 
I  I 
f 
I 
37  I Bespoke  2,38  1,58 
0,04! 
1,30  I  1,08  2,10  I  1,93 
38-39-401 
tailoring  0,08  o,oG  0,03  o,nl  .9.,.11. 
I  Textile  4,18  7,43  I  5,27  5,67  9,71  7,73 
j  41-42-431  products·  0,14  0,18  0,24  0,17  0,531  0,47  !  I  i 
44-45  I 
I  I  I  46-47-48j  Coal  -0,34  1  2,69  7,95  12,18  2,58  3,03 
j  49 
I 
-0,01 I  o,o6  ~  9.IJ1.  0,14  0,18 
l 
51  - 52  TO\"lels  and  3,05  1,58  1,79  2,65  4,01  2,96  l 
I 
dishcloths  0,04  0,08  0,08  0,22  0,13 
I 
o,1o I 
0,031  I  53 
I 
Furnitura  0,34  1,11  1,06  0,84  1,97  1,22 
I 
o,o1  0,031  o,05  0,11  0,08 
56  - 57  vlashing  powder  -0,34  2,06  5,19  1,45  -2,85  -0,26 
I  I 
and toothpaste  -0,01  o,05  0,24  0,04  -0,16  -0,02 
58  Petrol  0,79  0,47  -0,65  0,72  1,49  2,00 
i  0,03  o,o1  -0,03  0,02  0,08  0,12  I 
I 
6la  Exercise books  1,58  3,16 
9.zQII 
2,19  -0,36  2,03  0,90 
and  dictionaries  0,05  0,10  -0,01  0,11  o,o6 
59  - 60  Gas  and  - 1,58  0,33  - 1,49  -0,84 
electricity  - o  oa I  0,02  - 0,08  -0,05  '  ' 
Non-food  products total  17'  75  /  0,58  23,73  1 o,56  30,41 I  1,39  29,31 I  o,9o  31,99 I  1,74  24,92 I  1,52 
Index Total  100  3,27  100  2,36  100  4,57  100  3,07  100  5,44  100  6,10 TABLE  16 
SERVICES 
Code  Headings  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972 
%  a  %  a  %  a  %  a  %  a  '!o  a 
(6lb  School  fees  and  11,65  - o,o9  8,58  2,56  1,87 
(62  rail fares  0,38  - o,oo  0,26  ~  0,11 
64  - 65  Laund.;ry,mending  3,01  3,44  2,78  4,47  5,40  3,60 
&  dry cleaning  0,10  0,08  0,13  ~  9.J1..2.  0,22 
66  Medical  services  0,72  1,45  1,27  3,70  1,14  2,66 
o,o2  0,03  0,06  0,11  o,o6  0,16 
i 
67  Maternity ward  1,89  7,78  2,54  4,88  2,52  3,79 
I 
charges  0,06  0,18  0,12  Qd2  ~  0,23 
I  68  Haircutting  6,02  1,99  1,04  4,04  3,79  1,12 
I 
0,20  0,05  0,05  0,12  0,21  0,07 
69  Tram  and  bus  1,89  6,33  0,09  0,70  0,04  1,08 
fares  0,06  .9.J1..2  o,oo  0,02  o,oo  o,o7 
71  Postal and  3,73  - 3,62  - o,  79  6,08 
telephone  charges  0,12  - Q.al1.  - 0,04  QJ.ll 
73-74- Hotel,restaurant  4,98  6,24  3,95  7,75  2,56  4,49 
77  & cafe charges  0,16  2.&  0,18  .Q.,1.4  0,14  2.J1l 
75  Newspapers  3,41  3,39  o,o9  5,72  6,59  -
0,11  Q.J22  o,oo  0,18  0,36  -
76  Magazines  0,39  5,34  0,33  8,16  6,04  2,01 
o,o1  0,13  0,02  0,25  ~~  9.J._13 
Services total  41, 89  I .!..tl1  42,8o I  1,01  20,19 I  o,95  52,12 1 1,6o  35,11 I b.21  33,44 I  2,04 
Index Total  100  3,27  100  2,36  100  4,57  100  3,07  100  5,44  100  6,10 The  prices of services influenced the general  index particularly strongly 
in 1970,  when  price rises occurred in the transport,  hotels,  resturants and 
cafes sector,  and also in the newspaper  and magazine  publishing sector.  In 
that year,  they almost  completely cancelled out  the deceleration of the rise 
in food and  non-food product  prices.  They  accounted for more  than  4~~ of 
the rise in the index in 1967  and 1968,  and almost  a  third in 1972. 
In absolute figures,  the 1970  rise in the price of services was  greater 
than during all the preceding years,  which  proves that the prices of 
services were  drawn  along by the  sharp upward  movement  in food  prices  (1)~ 
The  substantial rises in the prices of services were  generally caused by  a 
series of increases in rates by private firms  or  self-employed workers, 
often preceded by  adjustments of the  charges of the railways or public bus 
and tram services. 
This  suggests that many  small traders and  craftsmen use  increases in public 
service charges as a  pretext to increase their profit margins  or rates 
themselves. 
This trend is generally held in check by the  commission for the regulation 
of prices,  whose  task it is to attempt  to avoid spectacular increases which 
could lead to applications for price and rate increases in other sectors. 
Accordingly,  this mechanism  gives rise to periodic rashes of increases in 
the prices of several  services which,  together,  cause the index of the 
prices of services to rise comparatively sharply,  although,  when  considered 
in isolation, they are generally relatively modest  (2).  We  shall return to 
this problem when  analysing the work  of the  commission for the regulation 
of prices. 
The  prices of food products fluctuated to a  less marked  extent  than those 
of services during the  period 1967-1972  (2).  The  movements  were  determined 
largely by the wide  fluctuations in the prices of potatoes and the almost 
continual rise in the price of bread,  various kinds of meat  and fish.  The 
(1)  It is worth noting in this respect  that there were  relatively substantial 
rises in maternity ward,  hotel,  restaurant  and cafe charges,  that is 
the  charges of concerns where  food  prices account  for  a  significant 
proportion of cost  prices. 
(2)  See  Graph  2. 
85 most  substantial advances  occurred when  there was  a  sharp increase in the 
price of potatoes in con,iunction with  a  rise in the prices of certain 
other products. 
This  occurred in the  second quarter of 1967  and  in that  of 1969,  and  also 
in the first quarter of 1970  and the third quarter of 1972. 
In the  second and third quarters of 1971,  on the other hand,  the rise in food 
prices  1~s mainly attributable to a  sharper increase in the prices of bread 
and various types of meat  (1). 
In the  following Section,  Ne  shall try to analyse the  causes of the rises 
in the prices of bread and  meat. 
The  rise in non-food product  prices was  fairly irregular during the period 
1967-72.  It did not  follow the trade cycle absolutely.  This fact  is 
largely attributable to the influence exerted by indirect taxation  (V.A.T.) 
on  the  prices of various non-agricultural products and to the raising of 
the prices controlled by the  authorities.  In the third quarter of 1967,  the 
excise duty on  cigarettes was  increased substantially,  while the prices of 
various varieties of  coal  were  also raised in order to lessen  the burden 
of  subsidies payable by the State to the  coal  industry (2). 
This  caused a  reversal  of the trend in the non-food price index which, 
during the  second quarter of 1967,  had probably been influenced by the 
do~mturn in the economic  cycle. 
During the period of  economic  recovery between the  end of 1967  and  the 
beginning of 1969,  the non-food price index rose  only very  slowly,  but  the 
announcement  of the  introduction of V.A.T.  on  1  January  1970  gave rise to 
a  sharp rise in demand  during the last quarter of 1969  'lvhich,  in turn,  caused 
the  prices of many  non-food products to rise. 
The  prices of textiles and  clothing rose in particular,  and those of various 
varieties of coal  were  also increased (3).  The  acceleration of  purchases 
of  consumer  durables during the fourth quarter of 1969  was  followed by  a 
reaction which  ended the rise in the prices of non-food products.  During 
the first  quarter of 1970,  these prices were  virtually static.  They  began 
to move  again during the  second quarter of that year,  probably under 
(1)  "Indices des  prix a la consommation",  :Moniteur  belge,  1  May  1971,  P•5•7007 
30  June  1971,  p.8.303,  31  August  1971,  P•  10.010 and  30  October 1971, 
p.l3.,083. 
(2)  "Indices de  prix a la consorrunation  d 1apres la nature des produits 1967" 
Annuaire  statistique de  la Belgique,  Nr.88,  year 1968,  PP•495-496.  ' 
(3)  Idem,  Annuaire  statistique de la Belgique,  1970,  op.cit.,  P•557• 
[J(-j 
86 the influence of a  sharp rise in demand,  since the prices of virtually all non-
food products began to  climb  slowly  (1).  This rise accelerated during the first 
quarter of 1971  as a  result of the effect  of the introduction of V.A.T.  (2). 
The  measures taken by  the  government  to prevent  galloping inflation checked 
the movement  and  phased it over  several months. 
With the influence of the  economic  recession at the  end  of 1971,  the upward 
movement  lost  some  of its impetus.  In the third quarter of 1972,  the rise in 
the prices of non-food  products became  rapid once again and,  by the fourth 
quarter of that year,  reached a  disturbing level of nearly 2%.  This was  brought 
about  by the increase in the excise duty on  petrol  and the rise in the prices of 
cigarettes,  most  textiles, men's and  women's  shoes,  various types of coal, 
furniture,  heating installations,  cookers  and refrigerators (3). 
We  can conclude that,  although the prosperity of the years 1969-70  contributed 
to the rise in non-food  product  prices,  the fiscal  policy pursued by the State 
is also responsible to a  large  extent  for the almost  continual  rise in these 
prices. 
For the present,  it is not yet  possible to apportion responsibility with accuracy, 
since the two  factors are closely interlocked,  particularly  d~ring the  period 
when  V.A.T.  was  introduced.  Thus,  the increase in the rates of indirect taxation 
occurred during a  period of stagflation characterised by  a  fairly substantial 
rise in wage  costs (4). 
This brings us to the  problem of the  extent  of the repercussions of the 
development  of the prices of basic industrial products on that  of non-food 
product  consumer  prices. 
This is an extremely complex  problem,  since it is necessary to take into account 
all the possibilities of substituting raw materials with others.  We  cannot 
make  an overall  examination of this problem,  since this is not  the  purpose  of 
this study.  We  shall merely attempt,  taking the development  of the prices of 
certain typical products as our basis,  to determine the mechanisms  by  which the 
movements  of industrial raw materials prices find their way  into food  and  non-





"Indices des prix a la consommation d'apres la nature des  produits", 
Annuaire  statistique de la Belgique,  Volume  91,  op.cit.,  pp.  525-526. 
"Indices des prix a la consommation",  Moniteur belge,  2  February 1971, 
PP•  1264-1265  and  1  May  1971,  PP•  5700-5701. 
Idem,  Moniteur belge,  31  October  1972,  pp.  12,092-12,093  and  30  December 
1972,  PP•  14,597-14,598. 
The  gross wage  index rose by  12.1% during 1971,  "Evolution recente de la 
situation de  l'economie belge",  Revue  de  la Banque  Nationale de  Belgique, 
November  1972,  P•  XIII,  Table III. 
87 4•  Comparison  of the development  of the retail Drices of certain products 
between 1967  and  1971  and the development  of the wholesale prices of the 
raw materials entering into their manufacture. 
In Chapter III,  we  found that the wholesale prices of industrial goods  are 
influenced by  increases in the profits of companies,  and vice versa.  We 
were  unable to reach any  conclusion as to the relationship between the 
development  of the wholesale prices of industrial goods  and  the movements 
of the  consumer  price index.  Logically,  we  can  assume  that  when  the whole-
sale prices of basic industrial goods rise,  two  effects can  occur  : 
a)  a  cumulative increase effect  : 
Not  only are increases in the prices of raw materials used in the prod-
uction of the various  consumer  goods  incorporated into the selling prices 
of these goods,  but  profit margins are also adjusted to take  such rises 
into account.  The  rise in the price of the raw material  provides the 
seller with an argument  justifying an increase in his selling price to 
the purchaser.  It is normal  for him  to take advantage of it to adjust 
his profit margin to the general rise in prices,  thereby causing a  greater 
increase in his selling price than that in his buying price,  in other 
words,  creating a  cumulative effect. 
b)  a  ratchet  effect  : 
The  prices of consumer  goods adjust to rises in the prices of the raw 
materials used in their production more  readily than to falls in these 
prices. 
Sellers take advantage  of the ignorance of the majority of consumers 
about  the development  of wholesale prices in order to maintain the retail 
price at the higher level fixed after the rise in the price of the raw 
material.  Nevertheless,  if competition becomes  too fierce,  sellers will 
be  obliged to reduce their prices or allow larger discounts. 
We  shall analyse the extent  to which  these two  effects were  in evidence at 
the time of substantial price increases during the period 1967-72.  We  have 
selected the  products which,  during this period,  rose in price at  an  annual 
rate in excess of the average for all products and  services.  In the case 
of non-food products,  these were  men's  shoes and  shoe repairs,  various 
varieties of coal  and newspapers  and periodicals. 
88 Cigarette prices have  not  been analysed,  since it was  an increase in the 
excise duty which  caused them to rise. 
The  food product  prices selected are those of bread,  potatoes and meat. 
A.  Prices of non-food products,  including newspapers  and  periodicals (1). 
a.  men's  shoes and  shoe  repairs 
The  price of leather rose by  approximately  2o%  during the period of 
prosperity between the  end of 1968  and the  summer  of 1969.  It then 
stabilised,  but fell  substantially during the second  and third quarters 
of 1970.  At  the beginning of 1971,  it was  back at its July 1968  level. 
The  prices of men's  shoes rose throughout  1969,  but  not to the  same  extent 
as the price of leather.  Thus,  the cumulative increase effect was  relatively 
low,  but the ratchet  effect occurred in 1970.  When  in 1972  the price of 
leather rose substantially again,  shoe repair prices adjusted with a  lag of 
some  three months,  whereas the prices of shoes  continued to climb  slowly. 
It m~  therefore be  concluded that although the ratchet  effect is easily 
identifiable, the cumulative increase effect is more  difficult to prove. 
This is probably attributable to the importance of the wage  factor in the 
cost  price of shoes. 
Coal  prices to the consumer  follow wholesale price trends fairly closely. 
In general,  they do  so  with a  certain time lag (approximately three months 
in 1970)  and the rise in retail prices is less marked  than that in whole-
sale prices,  which  proves that there is little or no  cumulative increase 
effect. 
There  was  no  evidence of the ratchet  effect,  since there was  no  substantial 
fall in coal prices at ~  time during the period under  consideration. 
(1)  Newspapers  and periodicals are incorporated in the index for the 
prices of services,  although they are non-food products. 
89 All the reductions in wholesale prices in 1967,  68,  69,  70  and 71  were 
of a  seasonal nature and were  reflected relatively faithfully in consumer 
prices.  Consumers  are aware that the price of coal is normally lower in 
summer  than in winter,  so that coal merchants are obliged to sell at  lower 
prices during the summer  months if they wish to keep their customers. 
c.  furniture  : 
Furniture prices were  not  influenced to ~  extent  by  wood  prices.  It has 
probably been possible to bring down  raw materials costs by  replacing wood 
by  chipboard and  plywood  panels.  The  sharp rise in wood  prices during 1969 
caused furniture prices to rise to a  limited extent  only.  Thus,  there was 
virtually no  evidence of the  cumulative increase effect. 
1~en wood  prices fell  substantially in the first quarter of 1971,  no  fall in 
furniture prices followed.  On  the contrary,  the upward  trend accelerated. 
This is probably attributable to the  steady rise in production costs in the 
furniture industr,y,  which  caused manufacturers to increase their prices 
regularly (1).  It is therefore not  possible to establish whether there 
was  any ratchet  effect in 1970. 
d.  newspapers  and  periodicals: 
Newspaper  and  periodical prices were  affected by the rising costs of raw 
materials and regular wage  increases (2). 
The  increase in paper prices during the first quarter of 197q  gave rise to 
a  more than proportional rise in the prices of periodicals and  newspapers. 
This was  an example  of the  cumulative increase effect.  Newspaper  and 
periodical publishers took advantage of this increase to justify a  substantial 
rise in the  selling prices of their publications,  thereby improving their 
profit margins.  The  fall in paper prices in 1972  was  in no  w~  reflected 
in the prices of nP-wspapers  and periodicals.  This  example  provides a  good 
illustration of the ratchet  effect. 
(1)  From  October 1966  to October 1971,  wages  in the furniture industry rose 
by 50.8%,  or almost  lo%  each year.  (Revue  de la Banque  Nationale de 
Belgique,  November  1972,  P•  29,  Table VI.2.) 
(2)  "Statistiques",  Revue  de la Banque  Nationale de  Belgique,  April 1973, 
p.29,  Table VI.2. 
90 B.  Food  prices 
a.~: 
As  we  saw  in the preceding section,  bread prices rose steadily during the 
period 1967-1972  and,  in so  doing,  contributed to the acceleration of 
inflation.  There was  little relationship between this phenomenon  and the 
development  of wheat  prices,  although the increases in wheat  prices in 
1970  and  1972  did contribute to a  certain extent to the acceleration of 
the relatively regular rise in the prices of the various types of bread. 
The  falls in wheat  prices which  occurred in 1968-69  and  from  1971  to early 
1972  had no  influence on  bread prices,  so that these were  prime  examples 
of the ratchet  effect. 
b.  ~: 
The  regular rise in the prices of the various varieties of beef made  a 
major  contribution,  in common  with bread prices, to the exacerbation of 
inflation.  Up  to the middle of 1971,  the only explanation for the rising 
prices was  an increase in distributors' margins.  Wholesale meat  prices 
fluctuated considerably,  but  they  stood at  roughly the  same  level on 
1  July 1971  as on 1  July 1967.  Thereafter,  the general world  shortage of 
meat  caused fresh meat  prices to rise.  Retail meat  prices followed the 
upward trend very closely.  The  percentage rises were  as high for retail 
prices as for wholesale prices,  which demonstrates that the cumulative 
increase effect took place. 
c.  potatoes  : 
The  very  sharp fluctuations in potato  prices influenced the overall food 
prices index very  strongly,  both upwards  and  downwards.  The  rises and 
falls in retail prices are less marked  than those of wholesale prices,  but 
they follow a  more  or less parallel course,  which  proves that this is a 
sector in which  competition between distributors is relatively fierce. 
This competition prevents excessive increases in profit margins,  whether 
wholesale prices are rising or falling;  in other words,  the cumulative 
increase effect  and the ratchet  effect  pl~ a  limited part  only.  On  the 
other hand,  the ratchet  effect  can be  observed at later stages (for 
example,  in the prices of chipped potatoes). 
91 CONCLUSIONS. 
1)  Throughout  the period between 1953  and 1972,  the prices of services rose at 
a  more  rapid rate than the prices to the  consumer  of food  and non-food 
products.  Prior to the reform of the consumer  price index in 1967,  the 
weighting of the prices of the various groups of products was  such that 
substantial rises in the prices of services could not  have  a  major 
influence on the consumer  price index.  After the reform in 1967,  the 
weighting was  adjusted so  that the prices of services have  had a  decisive 
effect  on  the course of the index for  several years.  In view of the marked 
parallelism (see  Chapter III) between the trend in the prices of services 
and the incomes  of self-employed persons,  we  can assume  that increases in 
the latter have been an important  cause of the rise in the consumer  price 
index and  have therefore made  a  major contribution to the activation of 
the whole  wage-pull inflation mechanism  by  causing prices and  wages  to rise. 
2)  The  rise in the consumer  price index during the years 1967-1972  was 
accelerated by  : 
(1) 
a)  repeated increases in the prices of certain basic food  such as bread 
and beef; 
b)  increases in indirect taxation through the introduction of V.A.T.  and 
the raising of certain excise duties  (on cigarettes and  petrol)  (1); 
c)  the raising of the rates of most  of the public services (railways, 
trams and  buses,  postal  services,  etc.), the purpose  of which  was  to 
reduce the weight  of the subsidies paid by the State or b,y  local 
authorities to the para-State bodies which  organise these services; 
d)  the favourable  economic  climate during most  of the period under 
consideration,  which  created an employment  situation favourable to 
wage-pull inflation and  increases in wholesale and retail prices. 
We  have  seen that the raising of the rates of certain public services 
(railways,  buses,  postal  services) and  certain basic foods is often felt 
by  a  large section of the population to be a  signal for a  general rise in 
prices.  It causes the various social groups to react  by  attempting to 
increase their own  incomes,  thereby generating further price increases. 
The  raising of the price of petrol was  only an important  factor in 1971 
and 1972  (Moniteur belge,  31  August  1971,  P•  10.011,  and  31  October 1972, 
P•  12.093). 
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• 3)  The  mechanisms  by  which  agricultural and industrial raw materials price 
rises come  to be  reflected in the prices of consumer  goods  vary from 
one  product to another.  We  have  been able to establish that the 
cumulative increase effect  and the ratchet  effect  occur mainly where 
the consumer  knows  little about  variations in raw materials prices, 
that is, in the case of products  such as furniture,  periodicals,  news-
papers and  shoes.  Where  such variations are  seasonal in character and 
fairly well known  to the  consumer  and  where,  in addition,  there is 
strong competition between distributors,  the latter are obliged to gear 
their prices to the real level of wholesale prices. 
In general,  there is an easily demonstrable ratchet  effect in the case 
of most  industrial products,  but it cannot  be  said that the tendency 
among  certain producers and distributors to increase their profit margins 
in absolute terms  each time raw materials prices rise is common  practice. 
In Chapter V,  we  shall attempt to determine whether the  cumulative increase 
effect  and the ratchet  effect have  given rise to an increase in small traders' 
profit margins  on most  products. 
95 CHAPrER  V  Study of the development  of certain categories of non-wage 
~-
1.  The  income  of small traders and craftsmen,  and the development  of profit 
margins. 
In Chapter II,  we  reported that the income  of traders and  craftsmen rose b,y 
approximately 117.6%  between 1953  and 1971;  this percentage being very much 
lower than that for the income  of most  of the liberal professions. 
We  suggested that this phenomenon is probably due to the decline in the number 
of small businesses in the trades and crafts sector rather than to a  lowering 
in the  standard of living of traders and craftsmen.  In this section,  we  shall 
be trying to determine the overall development  of small traders' and crafts-
men's average profit margins in order to establish whether the fall in the 
number  of businesses in this field has had the effect of making the  commcerical 
sector more  efficient, thereby benefitting the consumer.  Using the national 
accounts statistics,  we  began by calculating the overall turnover,  at  current 
prices,  of all distributive businesses (small traders,  craftsmen,  co-operatives, 
large stores,  chain stores,  self-service shops,  supermarkets). 
From  this total,  we  deducted the proportion accounted for by the large stores, 
chain stores,  supermarkets,  co-operatives and any other large-scale trading 
concerns. 
There are published figures for the turnover of the organized retail trade 
between 1964  and 1971,  so  that  we  were  able to determine the turnover of 
individual traders and  craftsmen for this period.  B.y  dividing the  small 
traders'  and  craftsmen's income  by their turnover,  we  obtained a  rough estimate 
of the average profit margin of this category of self-employed workers.  For 
the period prior to 1964,  it was  necessary for us  ~o use a  more  complicated 
method  of determining the turnover of the organized retail trade as a  whole. 
We  calculated the proportion of the overall turnover of organized retail 
trade accounted for  each year by the large stores and consumer  co-operatives 
during the period between 1964  and 1971.  The  proportion fell from  67.5% 
in 1964  to 46.2%  in 1971,  according to the formula y  =  atb, in which y  is 
the proportion accounted for by the large stores and co-operatives and t 
is the number  of years beginning from  1964.  Using this formula,  the relative 
proportion accounted for b,y  the large stores and  co-operatives can be extra-
polated for the whole  period between 1953  and 1963.  The  results of this 
96 calculation are  shown  in Table 18.  Since the I.N.S.  published the turnover 
of the large stores and  co-operatives from  1953  to 1964,  the probable 
turnover of all organized trade can be  calculated for each year in the 
period 1953  to 1963  inclusive,  b,y  applying a  simple rule of three. 
Having obtained this result,  we  adopted the  same  procedure for the period 
1964-71  and  calculated the entire series of average profit margins from 
1953  to 1971.  This series displ~s no  clear-cut trend.  Up  to 1969,  the 
profit margin fluctuated around 4o%,  but  one  has the impression that 1970 
saw the beginning of a  downward  movement.  Not  having any  statistics for 
1972,  we  are unable to determine whether this is a  structural movement 
which is taking place in response to the proliferation of supermarkets 
or a  dip accounted for by the economic  downturn which  occurred in 1971. 
At  all events,  it would not  seem  that the decline in the number  of  small 
traders and  craftsmen led to a  net fall in profit margins. 
The  large organizations increased their share of retail turnover from 
10.9%  in 1953  to 19.5%  in 1971,  but the modernization of distribution 
methods  seems to have  had  only very limited success in curbing the rise 
in consumer  prices.  In absolute terms,  retailers' profit margins have 
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Share of the  private  consumer market  taken b:v  individual 
tra..der.s. 
Large  stores and  Turnover of organised  Organised  Individual 
cooperatives  trade  (in millions)  trade  traders 
organised  private  private 
trade  consumer  consumer 
market  market 
80,- 18.932,340  10,9  89,1 
79,1  20.482,200  11,4  88,f 
78,2  22.142,244  11,9  88,1 
77,3  24.359,400  12,5  87,5 
76,3  25.350,528  12,2  87,8 
75,3  27.438,672  13,1  86,9 
74,2  28.602,276  13,3  8677 
73,1  31.117,380  14,4  85,6 
71,8  32.803,656  13,9  86,1 
70,5  35.272,668  14,2  85,8 
69,1  38.108,376  14,4  85,6 
67,5  41.775,528  14,8  85,2 
66,8  45.436,356  14,9  85,1 
64,7  49·553,268  15,3  84,7 
62,2  52.837' 128  15,6  84,4 
58,2  59.016,384  16,3  83,7 
53,6  68.319,276  17,4  82,6 
50,7  78.253,308  18,4  81,6 
46,2  90.688,008  19,4  80,6 
Calculated on the basis of I .N.s.  stati  sties on domestic trade. 
101 TABLE  18  a  :  Calculation .Jf the  prof~~ .T!arfilns  of indi  vidue~.l  traders. 
1953  1954  1955  1956  1957  1958  1959  1960  1961 
- Private consumer  market  174.205  179-997  185.452  195.197  207.719  208.847  215.567  216.008  235.439 
- Individual traders, %  89,1  88,6  88tl  87,5  87,8  86,9  86,7  85,6  86,1 
- Individual retail 
traders (turnover)  159-477  163.383  170-797  182.377  181.488  186.488  186.897  185.903  202.713 
- Retail trade income  64.100  67.300  69.500  71.600  71.100  71.200  73.640  76.000  79.300 
- Profit margin%  41,3  42,2  42,5  41,9  39,- 39,2  39,4  41,1  39,1 
1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971 
- Private consumer  market  247.693  263.987  282.330  305-762  323.240  338.713  361.495  392.953  425.825  466.443 
- Individual traders, %  85,8  85,6  85,2  85,1  84,7  84,4  83,7  82,6  81,6  80,6 
- Individual retail 
traders  (turnover)  212.521  225.973  240.545  260.204  273.784  285.874  302.571  423.579  247.473  376.356 
- Retail trade income  82.600  87.200  100.800  104.900  110.200  114.400  122.300  130.500  137.200  140.100 
- Profit margin%  39,- 38,6  41,9  40,3  40,3  40,0  40,4  40,2  39,5  37,2 
Source  Calculated on  the basis of I.N.S. statistics and  Table  18. 2.  The  income  of the professions. 
In Chapter II,  we  reported that the incomes  of members  of the professions 
rose much  more  substantially than the  incomes  of small traders and  craftsmen. 
This is partly explained by the increase in the number  of doctors,  dentists, 
chemists,  lawyers,  etc. 
By  dividing the year-by-year overall  income  of certain of these categories 
by their membership,  one  obtains their per capita income  and thus it is 
possible to assess the development  of their standard of living. 
a.  doctors and dentists : 
The  development  of the incomes of doctors and  dentists is shown  in Table 19. 
The  statistics for the numbers  of doctors and dentists were  calculated on 
the basis of data provided by the Ministry for  Public Health and Family 
Affairs. 
With  these statistics, it is possible to calculate the per capita income  of 
the profession. 
The  result  oDtained is slightly lower than the actual figures,  since  an 
average of 5%  of those holding medical qualifications do  not  practise. 
Accordingly,  all the statistics for  per capita income  have to be  increased 
by  approximately  5%•  This makes  not material difference to the rates of 
growth,  which  can be  compared  from  1959  onwards  with those for gross average 
salaries and  from  1967  onwards  with those for  consulting fees  charged by 
doctors as shown  in the  consumer  price index. 
From  1959  to 1971,  the per capita incomes  of doctors and dentists rose at  an 
exponential rate of 7•8%  (1),  whereas gross wages  rose by  only 7.5%  (2). 
Allowing for the fact that the incomes  of doctors and dentists are higher, 
so that they  p~ direct tax at  a  higher rate, it may  be  concluded that the 
net  incomes  of doctors and dentists rose at virtually the  same  pace as those 
of manual  workers. 
(1)  The  coefficient  of determination is much  higher when  one  calculates 
the rate of exponential  growth  (0.928) than when  one  determines a 
coefficient of linear growth  (0.887). 
(2)  The  coefficient of determination is 0.982 in the  case of exponential 
growth and only 0.942  in the  case of linear growth. 
103 TABLE  19  Per  c~pita inco~e or  doctors  and  ~entia~c. 
Item  1953  1954  1955  1956  1957  1958  1959  1960  1961 
Overall income  in 
millions of francs  3.250  3.500  3.640  3.890  4.040  4-490  4.900  5.160  5-270 
NUmber  of doctors  8.935  9,271  9-598  9-937  10.358  10.793  11.013  11.380  11.703 
Number  of dentists 
on 1/1/19  1.297  1.345  1.384  1.431  1.545  1.611  1.693  1.  757 
Average  for the year  1.321  1.364  1.407  1.464  1.521  1.578  1.652  1.725 
Total number  of 
doctors and dentists  10.592  10.962  11.344  11.822  12.314  12.591  13.032  13.428 
Per capita income  in 
thousands of francs  330,4  332,1  342,9  341,7  364,6  389,2  395,9  392,5  - ~ 
Rate of growth 
(  doctors' & 
~ 
dentists'  0,51  3,25  -0,03  6,70  6,  75  1,72  0,09 
incomes 
Gross wages  1,65  3,70  3,32 
Doctors'  consult-
ing fees 
Source  Ministry for Pu.llic Health and Family Affairs TABLE  19  a  :  Per  capita income  of doctors and dentists. 
Item  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971 
Overall income  in 
millions of francs  5-770  6.140  6.630  9-430  9.880  10.400  11.500  13.210  14.930  17.180 
Bum\er  of doctors  12.304  12.888  13.23~  13.473  13.793  14.176  14.517  14.922  14.991  14.887 
Bum•er  of dentists 
on 1/1/19  1.847  1.872  1.872  1.959  2.069  2.135  2.303  2.282  2.261  2.297 
Average  for the year  1.302  1.859  1.915  2.014  2.102  2.219  2.292  2.271  2.279  2.315 
Total num•er  of 
doctors and dentists  14.196  14.747  15.151  15.487  15.895  16.395  16.809  17.193  17.270  17.202 
Per  capita income  in 
thousands of francs  406,5  416,4  437,6  608,9  621,6  634,3  684,2  768,3  864,5  998,7 
Rate of growth 
~  dentists' & 
doctors'  3,57  2,44  5,09  39,15  2,09  2,04  7,87  12,25  12,52  15,52 
(  incomes 
Gross  wages  8,02  8,06  11,08  8,31  9,91  5,66  5,22  9,03  12,82  12,53 
Doctors'  consulting 
fees  1,87  2,78  4,65  9,20  4,91 
Source  Ministry for Pu•lic Health and Family Affairs TA13LE  20  Per ca:pitJ.  inco:ne  of chemists. 
Item  1953  1954  1955  1956  1957  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962 
Overall  income  in 
millions of francs  1000  1040  1180  1170  1190  1610  1790  1960  2120  2420 
Num'Ber  of chemists 
on  1.1.19  4334  4552  4691  4804  4927  5116  5218  5266  5383  5622 
Average  for the year  4443  4621  4747  4865  5021  5167  5242  5324  5502  5668 
Per capita income  in 
thousands of francs  225,1  225,1  248,6  240,5  237,- 311,6  341,5  368,1  385,3  427,-
Rate  of growth  o,o  10,44  -3,26  -1,46  31,48  9,60  7,79  4,67  10,82 
1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971 
Overall income  in 
millions of francs  2420  2480  4040  3940  4400  4920  4730  5510  5440 
Number  of chemists 
on 1.1.19  5714  5844  5968  6078  6171  6249  6533  6735  7000 
Average  for the year  5779  5905  6023  6124  6210  6391  6634  7000  7200 
Per capita income  in 
thousands of francs  418,8  420,- 670,8  643,4  708,5  770,- 713,- 787,1  755,6 
Rate  of growth  -1,92  0,29  59,71  -4,08  10,12  8,68  -7,40  10,39  -4,-
Source  Ministry for Public Health and  Family Affairs. Since there is no  moving  scale  system for the adjustment  of doctors'  and 
dentists' fees,  the per capita incomes  of these two  categories adjusted 
to the general rise in incomes  very irregularly.  Following a  long period 
during which they remained virtually static, doctors'  and dentists' fees 
rose  sharply in 1958-59,  and  then again in 1964-65  (1).  During the years 
1968-71,  doctors'  fees. rose at  a  faster average rate than gross wages. 
In addition,  this increase was  much  more  marked  than the increase in 
consulting charges.  It may  therefore be  concluded that the substantial 
growth in the incomes  of doctors and  dentists during this period is probably 
to be  accounted for,  partly by  the increase in charges and  partly ly an 
extension of the range of services offered by the medical  profession. 
However,  it may  be that  improved tax controls on the incomes  of doctors and 
dentists have  obliged them to admit  to higher earnings in their tax 
declarations,  so  that the statistical increase in their overall income  is 
greater than the real increase. 
We  can assume  that the tightening of tax controls has been one  cause of 
the substantial rise in the gross income  statistics. 
Most  doctors and dentists tried to increase their charges and their range 
of services in order to  compensate  for the effect of the heavier burden of 
taxation on their net  incomes. 
b.  chemists  : 
The  method used to calculate chemists'  per capita income  was  the  same  as 
that used for doctors and dentists.  The  exponential rate of growth is 
approximately 7.9%  per annum,  virtually the  same  as that for doctors and 
dentists.  The  differences between actual and theoretical incomes  calculated 
on  the basis of the exponential formula  (Y  =  289,7  e0,078689 t) are very 
substantial.  During the period between 1965  and 1968  inclusive,  chemists' 
per capita income  was  regularly higher than the theoretical income  calculated 
with the formula,  whereas the opposite occurred during the years 1969-1971. 
This is attributable to two  factors  :  firstly,  the stricter controls on the 
prices of pharmaceutical  products during the period 1969-1971  and,  secondly, 
the less marked  growth in the consumption of medicines during the later years. 
(1)  The  rate of growth of 39.35% in 1965 is abnormally high.  This is partly 
attributaile to the introduction of a  change  in the method of calculating 
doctors'  and dentists'  incomes. 
107 The  number  of chemists  continued to grow  at the rate of 4.2%  per annum, 
so that  a  greater number  of chemists had to share a  more  or less constant 
amount  of gross profits on  sales of pharmaceutical  products. 
The  slower growth  (there was  even  a  slight fall in 1971) in chemists' 
per capita income  does not,  therefore,  mean  that there was  ~  reduction 
in their profit margin.  Their profit margin is,  on average,  3o%,  but 
cooperatives and  a  number  of chemists grant  a  lo%  discount  {1).  It 
may  be that the decline in chemists'  per capita income  in 1970-71 is 
partly due  to the practice of granting discounts becoming more 
widespread in response to fiercer competition.  Unfortunately,  we  have 
no  data on the practice of granting discounts among  chemists. 
{1)  "Le  financement  de 1 1assurance-maladie" in "Leiding" - the bi-monthly 
journal of the league of Christian mutual  societies, no.  5,  September-
October 1970,  P•  232. 
108 , 3.  Rent  for private accommodation 
We  have  only very limited statistics on the development  of rental charges. 
The  Institut National de  Statistique has published average gross rents on 
a  year-by-year basis for the period 1949-1972 as part  of its work  on the 
calculation of national income.  The  method  of determining these amounts 
was  as follows  : 
Using data from  the general  censuses carried out  at the end  of 1947  and  the 
end of 1961,  the I.N.S.  estimated an average gross rent for  1947  and  1961. 
For the other years,  they multiplied the rent  for  a  base year by two 
coefficients,  one to take into account  the rise in the  cost  of living and 
the  other to allow for the effects on  rental charges of improvement  of the 
quality of accommodation  (1). 
It is clear that  such  a  method  of calculation can only give very approximate 
results,  so  that the amounts  and  indices given in TaDle  21  must  be interpreted 
with a  great deal  of circumspection. 
(1)  For the years 1970  and  1971,  it is possible to compare  the average rent 
used by the I.N.S.  for the purposes of its calculation of national  income 
with the results obtained in various surveys.  Two  I.N.S.  surveys,  carried 
out  in May  1970  and  May  1971  on  the basis of a  sample  of 50,000 rent-
paying households,  pointed to lower average rents than those used by the 
I.N.s.  :for  thA  nalculation of national  income.  According to the May  1970 
survey,  the  avera.ee  gross rent  in 1970  was  18,672 francs as opposed to 
21,600  francs,  or 11.3%  less.  According to the May  1971  survey,  the a 
alferage  gross r·ent  in 1971  was  20,171  francs,  or 9•  7%  less than the amount 
shov.n  in the table. 
However,  these figures do  not  include the rents paid by  self-employed 
persons and  are therefore too  low.  Moreover,  no  allowance  could be  made 
in the  survey for the fact  that  certain tenants enjoy preferential terms 
because their landlords are also their employers and  (or) because they 
render them  some  service (J.  DEMEULENAERE  :  Lea  loyers d'habitations en 
1970  en 1971,  Bulletin de  statistique,  Dutch version,  September  1972, 
PP•  491  and 496). 
The  Institut National du  Logement  also carried out  a  survey in 1970-71 
which  was  based on  a  sample  of 15,737 dwellings.  According to this survey, 
the gross average rent in 1970  was  2,028 francs per month,  or 24,336 francs 
per annum,  which is substantially above  the amount  estimated by  the I.N.s. 
However,  the findings of this survey related to rents at the end  of 1970, 
which  was  seven months  later than the date of the I.N.S.  survey.  In addition, 
the average amount  of 24,336  francs included rents paid b.y  self-employed 
persons for buildings not  used exclusively as accommodation,  but  also for 
business purposes  (Insti  tut lfational  du  Logement  :  "Rapport  sur la deuxieme 
enquete  concernant  la qualite du.  logement  en Belgique",  Dutch version, 
Brussels,  14  February 1973,  PP•  32-33). 























::>ources  : 
~velopment of gross  average rents  according to the national 
income  statistics of the I.N.S.  comp3.I'ed  with the development 
~  buildings  costs  and the oost of living. 
Gross  annual  Building costs index  Consumer  price 
rent  (1)  1953  = 100  index 
S.N.L.  (2)  I.N.S.  (3) 
11.127  100  100  100 
12.085  108,6  97,3  100,3 
12.533  112,6  99,8  100,8 
12.762  114,7  104,0  103,7 
13.136  118,1  109,3  107,0 
13.376  120,2  114,5  108,3 
13.620  122,4  108,0  109,6 
13.889  124,8  113,1  110,0 
14.196  127,6  111,9  111,1 
14.374  129,2  119,1  112,6 
14.738  132,5  132,9  115,0 
15.204  136,6  145,9  119,8 
16.062  144,4  157,4  124,7 
17.090  153,6  167,2  129,9 
17.924  161,1  163,9  133,7 
18.792  168,9  172,9  137,3 
19.863  178,5  180,0  142,5 
21.060  189,3  197,2  148,0 
22.333  200,7  210,4  154,4 
23.698  213,0  221,0  162,8 
~1)  I  • .N.::>. 
(2)  Index of the buildings costs of companies  approved by  the 
S.N.L.,  recalculated on  the basis 1953  =  100. 
(3)  Annuaire  statistique de  la Belgique,  Year  1971,  op.cit., 
PP•  523  and  524  (the indices for the years 1967-70 have  been 
recalculated on  the basis 1953 = 100)  and  Bulletin 
d 1information et de  Documentation de  la B.N.B.,  January 1972, 
P•  31  and  May  1973,  PP•  33-34  (the 1971  and  1972  indices 
have  also been recalculated on  the basis 1953  =  100). 
110 It will be  noted that the indices for average gross rent did not  follow 
those for  construction costs.  Between  1953  and  1963,  building costs rose 
less rapidly than rents,  but  thereafter,  according to the statistics on 
gross rents at  our disposal,  the opposite occurred from  1963  onwards. 
This can be  explained by  a  combination of three factors,  namely  : 
1)  legislation against  rent  increases: 
Before the Second  World  War,  there was  already legislation in Belgium 
limiting the rent  increases which  landlords could impose  on  their tenants. 
This legislation was  extended during the war  and  then renewed under the 
Law  of 12  March  1945,  supplemented by the Laws  of 5  December  1946  and 
revised under those of 13  July 1947  and  31  March  1948  (1).  According to 
these laws,  any increase in rent  by  lOa%  or more  above  that obtaining 
on  1  August  1939  had to be  sanctioned by  the  commercial  courts.  However, 
this measure  was  not  applicable to dwellings with a  rental value above  a 
certain amount,  those built or renovated after 1  January  1945,  or whose 
habitable area had been extended by at least  3o%  after that date  (2). 
These  legislative measures  split the rented housing market  in two.  The 
rents for  pre-1945 dwellings were  kept  at  a  level which  was  no  longer 
in keeping with building costs,  whereas the rents for new  housing were 
very much  higher.  Average  rents were  still abnormally low in 1953.  As 
new  housing building developed and the restrictions on  increases in the 
rents of old dwellings were  lifted,  average  rent  rose and,  since the 
initial level was  very  low,  it was  normal  for the index for rents to 
rise more  rapidly than building costs. 
In 1957,  all the restrictions were  removed,  but the sharp upward 
movement  probably  continued for a  number  of years.  Many  landlords 
were  obliged to wait  for leases to run out  before they were  free to 
adjust  rents to the open  market  level,  so  that there were  again many 
substantial rent  increases during the period 1958-63. 
(1)  Societe Nationale du  Logement,  1966  Report,  Dutch version,  Brussels 1967, 
P•  71. 
(2)  Ibidem,  P•  72~ 
Ill Towards  1961-62,  there were  various signs that the property market  was 
becoming  saturated, this being the result of the  sharp increase in housing 
building between  1953  and  1961  (1).  The  superabundance of houses had  an 
unfavourable influence on  the prices paid at  public auctions  (2)  and the 
building industry experienced a  serious recession in 1962  (3).  It is probable 
that the rented property market  was  also influenced and that the upward trend 
in rents was  curbed.  The  I.N.s. statistics on  the development  of rents are 
based on  estimates which  are too  approximate to provide us with any informa-
tion on this subject. 
The  sharp rise in building costs during the 1963-64 period of prosperity 
ended  the  pauses in the upward  movement  of rents.  Rising family incomes 
created a  strong demand  for better and more  comfortable housing at  a  time 
when  increasing building costs were  restricting supply  (4).  Fearing that 
rents would  rise too rapidly,  the government  reintroduced,  in the Law  of 
29  January,  1964,  rent  controls for modest  housing (5). 
This law is only applicable to a  very limited categor.y of dwellings and has 
had little influence on the rented housing market. 
Other reasons must  be  found to account  for the fact that the rise in rents 
during the period 1964-72  did not  follow the trend in building costs.  We 






Between  1953  and  1961,  investment  in housing property increased compara-
tively regularly from  year to year.  It amounted to 15,600 million francs 
in 1953  and  roughly 30,000 million francs in 1961,  an increase of 92.3%. 
Even  allowing for the fact that building costs rose by  approximately 
12%  during the  same  period,  the increase in real terms was  some  72%,  so 
that it m~  be  said that there was  a  real boom  in housing construction 
(for this calculation,  reference was  made  to  "L'economie belge  en  1959", 
Ministry for Economic  Affairs,  Dutch  edition,  Brussels 1960,  p.219; 
Ibidem in 1961,  Brussels 1962,  p.223). 
The  average price for a  manual  or clerical worker's house  sold at  public 
auction was  179,822 francs in 1960,  182,660 francs in 1961  and  only 
176,081 francs in 1962.  There was  a  more  marked fall in the  case of 
middle  class houses  (517,928  francs in 1960,  502,968 francs in 1961  and 
only 475,654 francs in 1962).  (For this calculation,  reference was  made 
to the property statistics in the Annuaire  statistique de  la Belgique, 
Volume  83,  Year  1962,  Brussels 1963,  P•  424.) 
"L'economie belge en  1962",  Ministry for Economic  Affairs and Energy, 
Brussels 1963,  PP•  XXXV  and  XXXVI. 
In 1963,  despite the favourable  economic  climateJ the  n~ber of housing 
building parmi  t s  was  below the level of 1960-6)  ~Annuaire statistique de 
la Belgique,  Year  1967-,  Volume  88,  Brussles,  p.613). 
Societe Nationale du  Logement  op.cit.,  P•  72. 
- 112 2) The  activity of the companies  approved by  the Societe Nationale du  Logement 
and the other organizations having as their object the  encouragement  of 
low-cost  accommodation  building. 
Throughout  the period between 1953  and  1972,  the housing property built 
by the  companies  approved by the Societe Nationale du  Logernent  was  placed 
at the disposal  of low-income  families at rents below those asked by 
private landlords.  At  the  same  time,  the State,  pursuant to the De  Taye 
Law,  was  providing grants to persons with low  incomes  and  large families 
to assist them  to have  houses built.  Quasi-governmental  financial 
institutions (Caisse Generale d'Epargne  et  de  Retraite,  Societe Nationale 
Terrienne) were  also granting loans to candidates for horne  ownership at 
lower rates than those available from  private banks and  mortgage  companies. 
These measures reduced the demand  for rented housing in the private sector 
and  also held back the rise in rents. 
Initially, the influence of the companies  approved by the Societe Nationale 
du  Logement  was  relatively limited. 
On  31  December  1947,  the approved  companies  accounted for  66,016  dwellings, 
either completed or under construction,  21,649  of which  had been sold,  so 
that  only 44,367  were  rented by these  companies  (1). 
On  the  same  date,  there were  2,816,000 occupied dwellings,  of which  61.09%, 
or 1,720,294 units,were rented (2).  Thus,  the  companies  approved  by  the 
Societe Nationale du  Logement  accounted for  2.6%  of the overall  supply of 
rented accommodation.  B.y  the end of 1961,  the number  of dwellings had 
risen to 3,016,000 units,  of which  only 50.25%,  or 1,515,540 dwellings, 
were  rented (3 ). 
Between  1947  and 1961,  the approved  companies built 81,901  dwellings, 
selling 16,319 of them,  so that the number  of dwellings they were  offering 
for rent rose from  44,367 to 109,949 (4). 
(1)  Annuaire statistique de  la Belgique et  du  Congo  belge,  Year  1957,  Volume  78, 
Brussels,  1958,  P•  371. 
(2)  Societe Nationale du  Logement,  1966  Report,  op.cit.,  PP•  73  and  74. 
(3)  Ibidem. 
(4)  Annuaire statistique de la Belgique,  Year  1962,  Volume  83,  Brussels 1963, 
P•  415. 
113 Thus,  the proportion of all dwellings available for rent  accounted for by 
the  approved  companies  rose from  2.6% to 7•3%;  it continued to rise during 
the  sixties.  B.y  the  end  of 1970,  there were  some  3,220,000 dwellings  (1). 
According to a  survey carried out  by the I.N.s.,  the  proportion of owner-
occupiers  was  49.75%  in 1961  and  65.6%  in 1970  (2),  so  that there were  only 
some  1,1087000  dwellings available for rent.  Of  this number,  156,187 dwellings 
belonged to companies  approved by the Societe Nationale du  Logement  (3);  this 
was  14.1%,  almost  double the  percentage in 1961. 
The  rents charged by approved  companies  are determined by  very strict regu-
lations under which  capital  supplied by the Societe Nationa.le  m~  not  be  used 
for  profit-making investments.  Because  of the  very  low  rates of interest 
(1.5%  up to 1  January 1971  and 2.5  since)  (4) at  which the Societe Nationale 
lends to the  approved  companies,  they are able to charge very much  lower rates 
than those in the private sector. 
(1)  The  results of the general  census of  31  December  1970 are as yet  only 
partly known.  The  number  of dwellings has not  yet  been established,  but 
the number  of households,  (3,232,710)  has already been calculated.  Of 
these households,  one  must  deduct  about  10,000,  since although Belgian, 
they have  no  place of residence in Belgium  (information supplied by the 
I.N.s.). 
(2)  Bulletin statistique,  September  1972,  P•  493. 
According to a  survey carred out  by the Institut National  du  Logement,  the 
percentage is only  55%.  This discrepancy is largely attributable to two 
factors,  namely  : 
a)  the I.N.S.  included among  home  owners  persons  who  do  not  have to pay 
rent,  either because they are related to the owner  or because they work 
for him  (as caretakers,  for instance)  ; 
b)  the I.N.S.  survey included more  dwellings in the  country and  in small 
towns than did the Institut National  du  Logement  survey.  Since the 
number  of owner  occupiers is higher in the  country and in small towns 
than in the  large towns,  the I.N.s. obtained a  higher  percentage of 
owner  occupiers than the Institut National  du  Logement.  We  have 
preferred to take the I.N.S.  figures as our basis,  because the  survey 
was  carried out  by professional researchers,  whereas  students were 
used in the Institut National  du  Logement  survey.  Moreover,  for the 
purposes of determining the number  of rented dwellings,  we  can exclude 
those made  available free  of charge to relations or servants  (informa-
tion provided by the Institut National du  Logement). 
(3)  Annuaire  statistique de la Belgique,  Volume  91,  Year  1971,  P•455· 
(4)  Institut National du  Logement  :  "Avis  du  Conseil  superior de  l'Institut 
National  du  Logement  concernant  les loyers d 1habitations appartenant a 
la Societe Nationale du  Logement  et a des  societes agreees,  Dutch version, 
Brussels,  20  June  1973,  p.2. 
ll4 From  Table 22,  it is possible to compare  the average gross rents estimated by 
the I.N.S.  and the normal  rents charged by the approved  companies.  It should 
be noted that these normal  rents include those paid by  households  whose  family 
circumstances are  such that they do  not  qualify for reductions.  However,  there 
are ver.y  few  such instances.  In 1953,  the average  reduced rent  for dwellings 
built before 1945  was  2.8%  lower than the normal  rent.  In the  case of dwellings 
built after 1945,  the difference was  11.5%.  ~  1965,  the percentages had 
Table  22  :  DeveJoument  of  avera~e gr9ss rents according to the national  income 
statistics of the I.N.S.  and of the normal  rents charged b:v  the 
r.ompanies  aoproved bv the Societe Nationale du  Logement. 
Year  Average  gross  Approved  companies'  normal  rents for  Indices 
annual  rent  dwelline;s  1953  = 100 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
(2)/(1) (3)/(1)  Built before  Built after  (1)  (2)  (3) 
1945  1945 
1953  11.127  5.402  9.042  48,6  81,3  100,0  100  100 
1954  12.085  5-543  9.060  45,9  75,0  108,6  103  100 
1955  12.533  6.159  9-343  49,1  74,5  112,6  114  103 
1956  12.762  6.360  9.686  49,8  75,9  114,7  118  107 
1957  13.136  6.769  10.033  51,5  76,4  118,1  125  111 
1958  13.376  6.753  10.543  50,5  78,8  120,2  125  117 
1959  13.620  6.895  11.355  50,6  83,4  122,4  128  126 
1960  13.889  7.125  11.050  51,3  79,6  124,8  132  122 
1961  14.196  7-251  11.718  51,1  82,5  127,6  134  130 
1962  14.374  7-474  12.481  52,0  86,8  129,2  138  138 
1963  14.738  7.603  12.668  51,6  86,0  132,5  141  140 
1964  15.204  7-926  13.061  52,1  85,9  136,6  147  144 
1965  16.062  8.066  13.447  50,2  83,7  144,4  149  149 
1966  17.090  8.117  14.196(1)  47,5  83,1  153,6  150  157 
1967  17.924  8.928  14.738(1)  49,8  82,2  161,1  165  163 
1968  18.792  9.298  15.552(1)  49,5  82,8  168,9  172  174 
1969  19.863  9-547  16.276(1)  48,1  81,9  178,5  177  180 
1970  21.060  9.806  17 .089(1)  46,6  81,1  189,3  182  189 
1971  22.333  10.258  18.355(1)  45,9  82,2  200,7  190  203 
1972  23.698  213,0 
Sources  Societe Nationale du Logement,  1966  Report,  op.cit.,  PP•  92-93  and 
information provided by the research department  of the Societe 
Nationale du  Logement. 
(1)  These  amounts  were  calculated on the basis of indices and are therefore 
only approximate. 
115 become  1.3%  and 7.4%  respectively (1). 
The  table  shows  that,  on  average,  the normal  rents charged by the  approved 
companies  for  pre-1945 dwellings are  5o%  lower than the average gross rent 
whereas,  in the  case of post-1945 dwellings,  the difference is only between 
15  and 25%•  This is accounted for by the rules according to which rents have 
to be  calculated (2).  Since the vast majority of dwellings rented by the 
approved  companies  were built after the Second  World  War,  the influence 
exerted by the low rents of the approved  companies  on the rented accommoda-
tion market  is not  as  strong as may  be  imagined from the data in the table. 
Furthermore,  account  must  be  taken of the fact that the dwellings of the 
approved  companies  can  only be rented to persons with low  incomes  (3). 
Households  living in these dwellings whose  incomes rise above  the  specified 
level have to  pay  a  surcharge of between 10  and  6o%  of the normal  rent, 
depending on  the  amount  of income.  On  31  December  1971,  15.18%  of the  social 
housing tenants were  p~ing surcharges,  the average being 29.85%  of the 
normal  rent  (4). 
(1)  For this calculation,  reference was  made  to the statistical data contained 
in  :  "Societe nationale du  logement",  1966  Report,  op.cit.,  PP•  92-93. 
(2)  To  prevent  any unfair advantage to the approved  companies  whose  buildings 
are mostly pre-1945,  the regulations provide that the rent is made  up  of 
two  component  parts.  The  first is calculated on  the basis of the 
building cost  price,  and the  second  on  the cost  price revalued at  current 
prices.  In the  case of a  unit  which  cost  40,000 francs before the war, 
the rent is made  up of a  fixed  component,  which is 3%  of the cost,  and a 
variable component,  which is 1.9%  of the cost multiplied by 10. 
Thus,  in the  case of a  unit  which  cost  40,000 francs in 1939,  the rent is 
3%  of 40,000 F  11200  F 
1.9%  of 40,000 F  x  10  lL§QQ_F 
8,800 F  per annum. 
In the  case of a  virtually identical unit built in 1963  for 400,000 francs, 
the  fixed  component  is 2.5%  of the  cost  and  the variable  component  is 1.9% 
of the cost multiplied by  2.  Thus,  the rent  for this unit will be 
2.5%  of 400,000 F  =  10,000 F 
1.9%  of 400,000 F  x  2  =  15,200 F 
25,200 F,  or almost  3  times 
the rent  for the unit built before 1945  (Institut National du  Logement, 
op.cit.,  pp.  8-10). 
(3)  According to the regulations introduced on  1  Mal  1973,  applicants for 
social housing tenancies must  not  be  earning more  than 162,300 francs if 
they have no  children,  171,900 francs if they have  one  child and 181,500 
francs if they have two  children (Institut National  du  Logement,  op.cit., 
P•  3). 
(4)  Societe Nationale du  Logement,  1972  Report,  Dutch version,  Brussels 1973, 
P•  53. 
116 In other words,  these people have little to gain by  remaining in social 
housing,  which  generally offers fewer  amenities than private houses and flats. 
Accordingly,  the only rents which  are  subject to any  strong influence from 
the approved  companies  are those for  low-cost  housing.  As  regards larger 
and  (or) better quality housing,  the State and  para-governmental organiza-
tions have  influenced the market  by  bringing down  the number  of young 
households  seeking rented accommodation  by  encouraging them to build or buy. 
The  success of this policy is not  entirely attributable to the benefits 
offered in the form  of subsidies and  preferential interest rates,  but  also to 
the effect of inflation on  the level of activity in the building sector. 
We  shall be discussing this latter aspect  in Section 3. 
117 3)  The  effect  of inflation on  the level  of activity in the housing 
construction sector  : 
The  relationship between levels of activity in the housing building sector 
and  rates of inflation are  shown  in the table below. 
Table  23  Levels of activitx in the  housin~ buildin£ sector and  ratP.R 
of inflation (based on  permits issued). 
Year  Number  of  Volume  Index for  Index for  Coefficient  of  Coefficient 
buildings  (100m3)  number  of  volume  increase (fall)  of increase 
buildings  (100m3)  in building  in consumer 
1953=100  1953=100  costs  prices 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
1953  35.536  227.635  100  100  ....  - 0,03 
1954  38.600  252.202  108,6  110,8  - 2,70  + 0,30 
1955  36.615  235.640  103,0  103,5  +  2,56  +  0,50 
1956  33.742  227.932  94,9  100,1  +  4,21  +  2,88 
1957  34.904  240.626  98,2  105,7  +  5,09  +  3,18 
1958  32.329  217.317  91,0  95,5  +  4,76  +  1,21 
1959  38.989  266.830  109,7  117,2  - 4,51  +  1,20 
1960  41.102  288.814  115,7  125,9  +  4,72  +  0,36 
1961  44.552  316.028  125,4  138,8  - 1,06  +  1,00 
1962  38.530  278.183  108,4  122,2  +  6,43  + 1,35 
1963  38.686  280.204  108,9  123,1  +11, 59  +  2,13 
1964  44.235  345·750  124,5  151,9  +  9,78  + 4,17 
1965  39.254  310.006  110,5  136,2  +  7,88  + 4,09 
1966  41.725  362.820  117,4  159,4  +  6,35  +  4,17 
1967  37.335  332.812  105,1  146,2  - 2,09  +  2,92 
1968  37.677  311.411  106,0  136,8  +  5,49  +  2,69 
1969  45.073  368.126  126,8  161,7  +  4,11  +  3, 78 
1970  34.728  97,7  +  9,55  +  3,86 
1971  30.072  84,6  +  6,69  +  4,32 
1972  +  5,04  +  5,44 
Source  (1)  and  (2)  :  Annuaire  statistique de  la Belgique,  Year  1967,  op.cit., 
P•  613,  Year  1971,  op.cit.,  P•  108  and Bulletin statistique,  May  1973,p.425. 
(5)  and  (6)  :  Indices calculated on  the basis of those in Table  21. 
(a)  The  statistics for the total volume  of buildings for which  permits 
were  issued have  not  been published since  1970.  The  I.N.s.  published 
statistics of the total volume  of buildings under  construction which 
are not  comparable  to those under  our heading. 
118 During the period 1953-1962  inclusive,  the  consumer  price index seemed to 
have  no  influence on the number  of building permits for this type of accom-
modation,  or  on  the total surface area.  The  building c9sts index,  on  the 
other hand,  generally falls  each time the number  of permits rises by more 
than 8%  (for instance,  in 1954,  1959  and 1961).  When  building costs rise 
substantially,  the number  of building permits falls (for instance,  in 1956, 
1958  and 1962).  This  shows  that,  up to 1962,  the conventional  supply  and 
demand  mechanism  operated.  When  building costs rose,  demand  fell and 
contractors were  obliged to moderate their demands.  When  building costs 
fell,  demand  increased and  prices rose again. 
From  1963,  building costs rose virtually continually.  Only the 1967  recession 
caused them to fall back  slightly,  but this did not  give rise to any 
increase in activity in the housing building sector.  Activity was  very high 
throughout  the period between 1961  and  1966.  This is not  shown  very clearly 
by the indices for the numbers  of buildings authorised for  construction, 
because there was  a  major development  in the area of the building of large 
houses and flats providing accommodation for  several households.  It can be 
seen more  clearly from  the volume  indices.  In 1964 7  the total volume  to be 
built for which permits had been issued was  almost  6o%  higher than in 1953, 
although the number  of buildings was  only 17.4%  higher than in the base year. 
After the 1967-68  recession,  activity in the  housing building sector picked 
up  again and,  by 1969,  the volume  to be  built,  and for which  permits had been 
issued,  was  6o%  higher than in 1953,  despite the  sharp rise in building 
costs during 1968  and  1969. 
It m~  therefore be  concluded that,  from  1963,  activity in the housing 
building sector was  largely determined by the general  economic trend,  and 
that the higher rate of inflation evidenced by the  coefficients for the 
rise in consumer  prices  (from 1963  the annual rise was  invariably above 
2%)  stimulated rather than curbed activity in this sector. 
Many  households probably realised that it was  useless to hoard money  in 
order to have  a  house built if the interest paid on  their savings did not 
compensate for the loss of their capital's purchasing power  caused by rising 
prices.  They  therefore decided to build or buy  as  soon as possible,  borrow-
ing the necessary capital from  para-governmental institutions, mortgage 
banks,  notaries,  parents or friends. 
119 As  the amount  they can afford to borrow is determined b,y  their incomes 
and the rate of interest, the level of housing building was  determined 
to a  large extent  b,y  these two  factors. 
The  rapid rise in the level of incomes during the periods of prosperity 
(1964-66  and 1969-70)  (1)  encouraged a  large number  of households to decide 
to accept  heavy monthly repayment  commitments  in order to purchase a  home, 
because they expected their incomes to rise so  that capital and interest 
repayments would  impinge to a  steadily declining degree  on their purchasing 
power.  The  rise in interest rates during the  second half of 1969  and the 
whole  of 1970  and the  spectacular increase in building costs put  an end to 
the expansion of activity in the housing building sector.  Many  households 
concluded that the sacrifices needed to purchase a  home  were  becoming 
excessive.  As  for private individuals and undertakings wishing to invest 
in property as a  hedge  against  inflation,  they found the building of housing 
property less attractive because rents did not fully keep up  with the rise 
in building costs.  Accordingly,  they preferred to invest their money  in 
factories,  offices,  garages,  shops  and  other buildings whose  main purpose 
was  not to provide housing.  These  investments withstood the increases in 
interest rates and building costs better than investments in housing property. 
Whereas  the volume  of building for housing was  on  average  41%  higher than for 
other types of building in 1969  (2),  the difference had fallen to 10.2% 
by  1970  and,  by 1971,  the volume  of building other than primarily for 
housing was  21.2%  higher than that for housing property (5).  This 
reversal of the  situation was  brought  about  partly by the  sharp fall in 
the building of housing property,  but  also by a  spectacular increase in 
building for other purposes  (4).  It  should also be remembered that 
the total volume  of housing building includes the  innumerable houses and 
(1)  Between 1963  and 1965,  income  in the form  of wages,  salaries and  emolu-
ments rose by  23.8%  in monetary terms and  by  14.2%  in real terms.  From 
1968  to 1970,  the rise in current  prices was  25.8%  and,  in constant 
prices,  16.7%  (for this calculation,  reference was  made  to the Annuaire 
statistique de la Belgique,  Year  1967,  op.cit.,  P•  650  and  ibidem,  1971, 
op.cit.,  P•  639. 
(2)  Buildings started not  later than 31  December  1969  (Annuaire  statistique 
de la Belgique,  Year  1971,  op.cit.,  p.  108). 
(3)  For this calculation,  reference was  made  to the statistics of the Bulletin 
statistique, ~  1973,  P•  425. 
(4)  From  1968  to 1971,  the total volume  of building for purposes other than 
housing under  construction on  31  December  of the year in question, 
increased by  62.4%,  an annual  average of 12.9%  (Ibidem). 
120 flats built by  private individuals and  companies,  not to be  let throughout 
the year,  but, to be used as  second homes  for their owners  or for letting 
to holidaymakers. 
This strong demand  from  the well-off and  property companies  prevented the 
fall in demand  for housing from  households from  bringing down  building costs, 
and they continued to rise,  although not to the  same  extent as in 1970. 
The  fall in interest rates and the improved  economic  situation in 1972  led 
to a  recovery of housing building,  but the volume  remained  slightly lower 
than that of building other than primarily for housing (1). 
We  may  conclude that,  although inflation brings about  a  rise in investment 
in the property sector, this does not necessarily lead to an increase in 
the supply of rented accommodation.  Where  those with capital find that the 
return from  rents is insufficient, the modern  society offers them 
opportunities to invest their money  in more  profitable property.  It follows 
that inflation only brings down  the real level of rents insofar as it 
encourages households who  wish to become  owner-occupiers to build their own 
homes.  Their opportunities to build or buy  are limited b,y  building costs, 
the amount  of their earnings and the various charges involved in long-term 
loans.  Consequently,  inflation only brings down  the real level of rents 
if it is not  accompanied  b.y  an excessive rise in building costs or a 
substantial rise in interest rates. 
As  to the activities of the companies  approved by  the Societe Nationale du 
Logement,  they played a  limited role only in determining rents for high 
or medium  quality housing,  but  quite an important role in the determination 
of rents for low-cost housing. 
The  fact that the average gross rent  index probably remained  lower than the 
building costs index is attributable partly to the activities of the 
approved  companies,  partly to the policy of subsiding low-cost  housing 
building pursued by the State and the provinces and,  finally,  to the enormous 
(1)  From  November  1971  to the  end  of October 1972,  the volume  of building 
other than primarily for housing purposes was  still 1.5%  higher than 
that of housing property (Bulletin statistique, ~  1973,  P•  425). 
121 stoCk of old houses with few amenities which are available for letting at 
rents below the normal rents (1). 
4•  Income in the form  of interest 
(1) 
A distinction must  be made  between the lending and borrowing rates of 
the banks  and other financial institutions and the rates paid on the 
securities issued by the State, urban and provincial authorities and 
para-governmental organizations.  From  the point  of view of the influence 
of trends in interest rates on the  development  of inflation,  lending rates 
are the more  interesting,  since they give an indication of the financial 
element  of contractors'  cost prices. 
Trends in borrowing rates and interest paid on securities are only of 
interest insofar as they give an idea of the effects of inflation on 
the available resources of those living on fixed incomes. 
These various rates generally follow the same  trend,  but the range of 
variation of lending rates is greater than that of borrowing rates and 
the rates of interest paid on securities.  Moreover,  since long-term 
investments hold very little attraction when  the rate is below 5%  -
the risk of the rate rising afterwards causing the  stock exchange 
quotation of the  security to fall becomes too great if the nominal 
interest is minimal - this rate can be  considered to be  an absolute 
minimum  for any  loan rep~able after five years or more. 
We  have taken the  lending rate applied by the Societe Nationale de 
Credit a 1 1Industrie for loans maturing at five years or more to be 
representative.  This rate gives a  good indication of the  cost to 
Belgian industry of interest payable  on industrial loans. 
In Wallonia,  where there are more  old houses than in Flanders,  the 
average gross rent  was  lower than in Flanders and Brabant,  according 
·to the survey carried out  by the Insti  tut National du Logement •  At  the 
end of 1970,  it was  only 1,806 francs in Wallonia,  as against  1,921 francs 
in the Flemish provinces and 2,505  in Brabant. 
In the Flemish provinces,  Eastern and  Western Flanders had the lowest 
average rents and these were the two provinces with the highest 
proportion of housing built before 1947.  (Institut National du Logement: 
"Rapport  concernant la deuxi  eme  enquet  e  • • • •" op.  cit  • ,  PP•  7 and  33 • ) 
122 Table  24  _Lendir}._g_rates  for investment  loans  maturi~  at five :vears  or more 
applied by  the Societe  Natio~ale de  Credit  a 1 1Industrie.  19~3-72. 
Year  and  Average  Average  Year  and  Average  Average 
quarter  quarterly  annual  quarter  quarterly  annual  rate 
rate  rate  rate 
1953  1  6,38  1964  1  7,01 
2  6,19  2  7,30 
3  6,10  3  7,30 
4  6,10  6,19  4  7,30  7,23 
1954  1  5,91  1965  1  7,30 
2  5,82  2  7,30 
3  5,82  3  7  t 30 
4  5,82  5,84  4  7,30  7,30 
1955  1  5,82  1966  1  7,30 
2  5,82  2  7,45 
3  5,82  3  7,93 
4  5,82  5,82  4  7,93  7,65 
1956  1  5,82  1967  1  7,93 
2  5,82  2  7,93 
3  5,82  3  7,93 
4  5,82  5,82  4  7,89  7,92 
1957  1  5,87  1968  1  7,77 
2  6,10  2  7,53 
3  6,29  3  7,53 
4  6,95  6,30  4  7,53  7,59 
1958  1  7,24  1969  1  7,59 
2  6,92  2  8,20 
3  6,29  3  8,76 
4  6,10  6,64  4  9,74  8,57 
1959  1  6,10  1970  1  9,89 
2  6,10  2  9,89 
3  6,10  3  9,89 
4  6,10  6,10  4  9,89  9,89 
1960  1  6,29  1971  1  9,62 
2  6,38  2  9,41 
3  6,38  3  9,41 
4  6,61  6,42  4  9,08  9,38 
1961  1  6,95  1972  1  8,64 
2  6,95  2  7,97 
3  6,95  3  7,90 
4  6,95  6,95  4  7,64  8,04 
1962  1  6,76 
2  6,33  --
3  6,27  1953-1957  5,99 
4  5,82  6,30  1958-1962  6,48 
1963  1  5,82  1963-1967  7,24 
2  5,90  1968-1972  8,69 
3  6,16 
4  6,47  6,09 
Source  Societe Nationale de  Credit a 1'Industrie 
123 The  s.N.c.I. lending rate for loans  rep~able at more  than five years was 
influenced by the rate of inflation.  Allowing for a  time lag of about  one 
year,  the fairly marked rise in consumer  prices from  1956  to the  end  of 1957  (1) 
was  followed by  an increased in the rate of interest.  The  same  phenomenon 
occurred after the rise in prices between the  end  of 1958  and the  end  of 
1959  (2),  which  was  reflected in the rise in the interest rate in 1960  and 
1961,  that is towards the end of the period of prosperity and the beginning 
of the recession (3).  After a  lapse of one  year,  the recession brought  about 
a  sharper fall in the rate of interest than in consumer  prices,  which  only 
weakened  slightly during the third quarter of 1962  (4).  ) 
The  1963  recovery,  followed by  a  period of prosperity during 1964-65,  led 
to a  sharp rise in the interest rate which  remained at  a  high level until 
the next  period of recession was  fully under way,  that is until the middle 
of 1967.  Prices rose  sharply throughout the period of prosperity,  but their 
upward  movement  was  held in check b,y  the freezing of prices from  6 ~  1966 
to 2 September  1966  (5).  In 1967,  the  consumer  price index continued to 
rise despite the unfavourable  economic  situation and,  from  1968,  it accelerated 
(6),  while the interest rate fell  slightly.  In 1969,  the rate began to rise 
again and  continued until the  spring of 1971,  when  the recession caused it 
to fall. 
Consumer  prices were  probably swept  along by the forces of structural 
inflation,  which  seem  to have  gained the ascendancy over those of the trade 
qycle from  1960  onwards,  since prices continued to rise during the recessions. 
As  regards its effect  on the interest rate,  structural inflation restrained 
the downward  movement  in the rate during the periods of recession.  It was 
unable to prevent  a  fairly substantial fall in 1972,  because exceptional 







Banque  nationale de  Belgique  :  Bulletin d 'information et  de  documenta-
tion,  January 1957,  P•45  and July 1958,  P•  62. 
Ibidem,  January 1959,  P•  58;  January 1960,  P•  46;  January 1961,  P•  74. 
The  industrial production index rose less strongly after the summer  of 
1960  ("Politique de  conjoncture" - Rapports  :  L1etat dans 11economie 
mixte",  Association pour 1 1economie  - Onzieme  congres flamand de  science 
economique  - Louvain 4-5 ~  1973,  P•  494). 
Banque  nationale de  Belgique  :  Bulletin d'information et de  documentation, 
January 1963,  P•  56  and  January 1964,  P•  52. 
M.  VAN  MEERHAEGHE,  op.  cit., P•  258. 
Annuaire statistique de la Belgique,  Brussels 1971,  Volume  91,  P•  524. 
124 The  influx of foreign capital had created a  surfeit of money  at a  time when 
a  rather bleak economic  outlook was  causing undertakings to hold down  the 
level of their investment.  This naturally led financial institutions like 
the S.N.C.I. to reduce their rates of interest to attract business.  The 
rate of interest nevertheless remained  above 7  .5%,  whereas it had fallen 
to 5.8%  during the 1953-54  recession.  Thus  the influence of structural 
inflation on  the interest rate applied by  the S.N.C.I. is undeniable.  It 
is difficult to formulate any rule as to the relationship in time between 
movements  in the rate applied by  the s.N.c.I. and the pattern of the trade 
cycle.  The  S.N.C.I. did not  al~s increase the lending rate when  it had the 
opportunity to do  so,  because it did not  wish to hold back  economic  develop-
ment.  Accordingly,  it did not  increase its rate after the serious recession 
in 1953-54 until the beginning of 1957,  or practically at the peak of the trade 
cycle  (1).  However,  the influence of the general rise in prices and the strong 
demand  for capital from  undertakings frequently  caused it to be  slow to reduce 
its rate at times when  downturns in the trade cycle called for  such a  measure. 
In 1966,  for  example,  the S.N.c.I. did not  react to the decline in economic 
activity which  was  becoming  apparent  (2),  but,  on  the contrary,  raised its 
rate further as part of the government's counter-inflation policy.  It was  not 
until 1968  when  the recovery was  already under way  (3)  that the S.N.C.I. 
reduced its rate for loans repayable after five years or more. 
It will be  appreciated that, under these conditions,  there cannot  be  a  strong 
correlation between movements  in the interest rate in question and the other 
components  of trade cycle trends.  Nevertheless, if one  calculates the annual 
averages of the interest rate and that of consumer  prices,  one  obtains a 
coefficient of correlation of 0.8997  on  condition that a  one  year remove  in 
time between the consumer  price index and the interest rate is applied.  The 
coefficient  of correlation is only very slightly lower if.the remove  in time 
is extended from  one  to two  years (0.8959  as opposed to 0.8997)  (4). 
(1) "Politique de  conjoncture",  op.cit.,  P•  493. 
(2)  Ibidem. 
(3)  Ibidem. 
(4)  Virtually identical results are obtained if, instead of using the linear 
regression functions  it = a  +  b  Pt-l and  it = a  +  b  Pt_2  respectively, 
one  uses the logarithmic functions 
ln it = 1n a  +  b  ln Pt-l  and  ln it = lna +  b  ln Pt_2 
In the latter case the coefficient of correlation is 0.9160  for the one 
year remove  in time and 0.8997  for the two  year remove  in time. 
- 125 This proves that the rate of inflation definitely influences the level of 
interest,  although the effect is not felt until after a  remove  in time of 
more  than a  year.  The  s.N.c.r.  can put off raising its lending rate for a 
time,  but it cannot  continue to pursue  such a  policy for ver,y  long,  since it 
also has to borrow money  at market  rates. 
Among  the financial institutions' borrowing rates,  those for deposits  ~able 
on  demand  and  at fifteen days are  so  low  and  var,y  so little that it may  be 
stated immediately that they have  ver,y  little influence on inflation,  and 
vice versa.  As  for the rates of interest paid by the banks for deposits 
payable at  one  month  or more,  they only became  significant during 1958  and 
1959.  Before 1958,  the majority of deposits were  payable on  demand  or at 
fifteen days.  On  31  December  1953,  deposits payable at more  than one  month 
accounted for o;1ly  9.6%  of all bank  deposits (1).  By  31  December  1959,  the 
proportion had risen to 32.4%  (2)  and by  31  December  1971,  they accounted for 
52.5%  of all deposits held by the banks  (3). 
The  raising of the interest rates for time deposits was  the principal cause 
of this exceptional rise.  Prior to the  signing of the Association Belge 
des Banques  protocol of 7 November  1957,  the return offered by the banks for 
time deposits was  scarcely better than that for deposits payable  on  demand 
or at fifteen days.  There  was  therefore little incentive to depositors to 
forego  the right to withdraw their deposits at the most  convenient  time for 
themselves.  Under  the terms of the protocol of 7 November  1957,  the banks 
agreed to raise the rates for all their time deposits and  undertook to adjust 
the various rates to fluctuations in the discount rate of the Banque  Nationale 
de  Belgique.  On  12  November  1957,  the rate for deposits payable at  one  month 
was  raised from  1.1% to 2.3%,  and that for deposits payable at three months 
from  1.4%  to 2.5%  (4).  The  recession between February 1957  and February 
1959  led to a  series of reductions of the  Ba.nque  Nationale discount  rate and 
this automatically brought  about  a  series of falls in the interest rates 
paid by the banks on the various categories of time deposits.  Thus the banks 
compensated for the loss of earnings caused by the fall in all lending 
(1)  For this calculation,  reference was  made  to the  "Annuaire statistique de 
la Belgique",  Year 1956,  Vol.  77,  P•  357• 
(2)  For this calculation,  reference was  made  to the  "Annuaire statistique de 
la Belgique",  Year  1963,  Vol.  84,  P•  419. 
(3)  Bulletin statistique,  September 1972,  P•  584. 
(4)  Revue  de  documentation et d'information de  la Banque  Nationale de 
Belgique,  April 1958,  P•  303,  April 1959,  P•  308  and  April 1960,  P•  191. 
126 rates  (1)  on their time  deposits which,  by the end of 1959,  were  only earning 
1.2% in the  case of deposits payable at  one  month  and  1.5% in that of those 
payable at three months  (2).  The  raising of the discount  rate from  3.25% 
to 4%  on  24  December  1959  led to a  rise in the rates paid by the private 
banks as from  1  January 1960.  The  less favourable  economic  climate in the 
second half of 1961  brought  about  a  reduction in the Banque  Nationale dis-
count  rate (3)  ~rhich was  automatically reflected in the rates paid for 
time deposits by the private banks.  The  private banks wished to have more 
freedom  and  entered into an agreement  lfri th the  Banque  Nationale de  Belgique 
to the effect that,  as from  1  January 1962,  the automatic adjustment  of 
time deposit  interest rates to the  B.N.B.  discount rate would  be abolished 
and that  any  change in such rates Hould be  the  subject  of an  agreement  being 
taken of the money  market  situation, the balance of payments  and the  state 
of the  economy  (4). 
Hith five or six exceptions,  all the banks  subscribed to an inter-bank 
agreement  governing borrowing interest rates.  The  large banks  apply the 
general  scale of rates,  which is decided upon in agreement  with the  Banque 
Nationale,  the medium-size banks  can apply rates which  are 0.25% higher than 
those in the general  scale and  the smaller banks  can  exceed the larger inst-
itutions' rates by 0.65%.  In the  event,  the vast majority of banks  applied 
the  general  scale and the regional banks were  alone in granting more  generous 
rates of interest to their customers  (6). 
During the period from  1962  to 1972,  rates were  adjusted regularly to the 
economic  position;  they were  reduced during the recessions in 1962  and  1967 
and raised during the periods of prosperity in 1964-66  and  1969-70.  In 1969, 
the rates paid by the banks  on  time deposits were  raised to  5%  for deposits 
payable at  one month  and  6%  for deposits payable at three months,  the purpose 
of this being to curb the  speculation against  the  Belgian franc  which  had 
developed during the  summer  and autumn  of that year.  In the  sprine of 
1972,  however,  the rate for deposits payable at three months  was  reduced 
(1)  See Table 25. 
(2)  Revue  de  documentation et d'information de la Banque  Nationale de  Belgique, 
April  1960,  P•  191. 
(3)  The  Banque  Nationale discount  rate was  reduced to  5%  on  24  August  1961, 
and to 4·5%  on  28  December  1961  (Annuaire  statistique de  la Belgique, 
op.cit.,  Year  1963,  P•  399). 
(4)  Revue  de  documentation et d'information de  la Banque  Nationale de Belgique, 
August-september 1966,  P•  291. 
(5)  Banque  Nationale de  Belgique,  Revue  de  la Presse,  Belgium,  8  June  1973, 
p.l  (Review of an article by G.  DEPAS  in Le  Soir of 8  June 1973). 
(6)  Ibidem and  Revue  de  documentation et  d'information de  la Banque 
Nationale de Belgique,  September 1967,  P•  358(1). 
127 to 2.75%,  not  only because  of the recession which  began towards the  end 
of 1970  and  lasted until the spring of 1972 1  but  also as a  result  of the 
abundance  of liquidity brought  about  by  the influx of foreign capital. 
Consequently,  we  can  conclude that if interest rates followed the trend 
in the  economic  situation at  a  remove  of a  few  months  during the period 
1962  to 1972,  movements  in the balance of p~ents position also  pl~ed a 
relatively important  role in the fixing of interest rates on  time deposits. 
Table 25  Rates of intAT'eRt  on  various tynes of savings available 


























Bank deposits  C.G.E.R.  savings 
one  month  three months  book  (1) 
1,100  1,40  3,00 
1,100  1,40  3,00 
1,100  1,40  3,00 
1,100  1,40  3,00 
1,264 m 
1,578  (17l  3,00 
1,771  2,171  )18  ..  3,30  (32) 
1,203  1,503 119  3,00 
2,292  ~5  3,186  ~20~  3,30 
~~l 
2,776  6  3,395  )21  3,30 
1,887  r  2,712  22~  3, 30 
1,767  8  2,584  23  3,193 
2,593  9  3,404 (24)  3,40  (34) 
3,000  3,500  3,50  (35) 
3,100  (10(  3,650  ~25l  3,50 
3,066  ~11.  3,666  26  3,50 
2,334  12<  3,107  (27  3,50 
3,702  ~13  4,510  r8  4,00  (36  ~ 
4,927  14  5,927  29l  4,50  (37 
3,642  ~15  4,624  30  4,50 
1,938  16  2,938  (31  4,051  (38) 
Revue  de  documentation d'information de  la Banque  Nationale de 
Belgique and  annual reports of the  Caisse Generale d'Epargne 
et  de  Retraite. 
Rates of interest available on  deposits up to 75,000 francs.  This 
ceiling was  raised to 1001000  francs on  1  Januar.y  1955,  200,000 francs 
on  1  July 1957 1  350,000 francs on  1  January 1965  and  500,000 francs 
on  1  January 1967. 
The  rate was  1.1 %until 11  November  inclusive.  It was  raised to 2.3% 
on  12  November. 
The  rate was  2.3%  from  1  January to 26  March  inclusive,  and  reduced to 
2.05%  on  27  March,  to 1.8%  on  5  June,  to 1.55%  on  3 July and to 1.35% 
on  28  August. 
1~8 (~)  The  rate was  1.35%  from  1 to 7  January inclusive,  and  was  reduced to 
1.2%  on  8  January. 
(5)  The  rate was  1.9%  from  1  January to 3 August  inclusive,  and  was  raised 
to 2.85%  on  .(  August. 
(6)  The  rate was  2.85%  from  1  January to 23  August  inclusive,  and  was  raised 
to 2.65%  on  2~ August,  and to 2.4%  on  28  December. 
(i)  The  rate was  2.~% from  1  January to 17  January inclusive,  and was  reduced 




From  January to the end  of October,  the rate was  1.  7%,  and it was  raised 
on  1  November  to 2.1%. 
From  January to 22  March  inclusive,  the rate was  2.1%,  from  23  March  to 
23  June  inclusive it was  2.3%,  from  24  June to 13  July it was  2.5%  and 
from  13  July until the end of the year,  it was  3%. 
From  January until 30  June  inclusive,  the rate was  3%,  being raised to 
3.2%  on  1  July. 
(11)  From  January until 30  April inclusive, the rate was  3.2%,  and  was  reduced 
to  3%  from  1  May. 
(12)  From  1  January to 7  April inclusive,  the rate was  2.7%,  and  was  reduced to 
2.2%  on  8  April. 
(13)  From  1  January to 14  February inclusive,  the rate was  2.2%;  it was  raised 
to 2.7%  on  15  February,  to 3.2%  on  1  April,  to  4%  on  10  June,  to 4.5% 
on  1  September and to 5%  on  10  November. 
(14)  From  1  January to 8 November  inclusive,  the rate was  5%;  it was  reduced 
to  ~-5% on  9 November. 
(15) 
(16) 
From  1  January to 31  January inclusive,  the rate was  4·5%;  it was 
reduced to 4.25%  on  1  February,  to 3.5%  on  1  April  and  to  3%  on  2  November. 
From  1 to  1~ January inclusive,  the rate was  3%;  it was  reduced to 2.5% 
on  15  January and to 2.75%  (sic) on  13 March.  It was  raised (sic) to 
2%  on  1  December. 
(17)  The  rate was  1.4% until 11  November  inclusive;  it was  raised to 2.7%  on 
12  November. 
(18)  The  rate was  2.7%  from  1  January to 26  March  inclusive;  it was  reduced 
to  2.~5% on  27  Mar~h, to 2.2%  on  5  June,  to 1.95%  on  3  July and to 
1.75%  on  28  August. 
129 (19)  The  rate was  1.75%  until 7 January inclusive;  it was  reduced to 
1.6%  on 7 January. 
(20)  The  rate was  3%  from  1 January to 3 August  inclusive;  it was  raised 
to 3.45%  on 4  August. 
(21)  The  rate was  3.45%  until  23  August  inclusive;  it was  reduced to 
3.3%  on  24  August  and to 3.15%  on  28  December. 
(22)  The  rate was  3.15%  until 17  January inclusive;  it was  reduced to 
3%  on  18  January,  to 2.75%  on  22  March  and to 2.5%  on  9 August. 
(23)  The  rate was  2.5%  until  31  October inclusive;  it was  raised to  3% 
on  1  November. 
(24)  From  1 January to 23  June  inclusive,  the rate was  3.3%;  it was 
raised to 3.5%  on  24  June. 
(25) From  1  January to 30  June  inclusive,  the rate was  3.5%;  it was 
raised to 3.8%  on  1  July. 
(26)  From  1 January to 30  April  inclusive,  the rate was  3.9%;  it was 
reduced to 3.6%  on  1 May. 
(27)  From  1 January to 7 April  inclusive,  the rate was  3.4%;  it was 
reduced to  3%  on  8 April. 
(28)  From  1  January to 14  February inclusive,  the rate was  3%;  it was 
raised to 3.5%  on  15  February,  to 4%  on  1 April,  to 4.75%  on  10  June, 
to  5.25%  on  1 September  and to  6%  on  10  November. 
(29)  From  1  January to 8 November  inclusive,  the rate was  6%;  it was 
reduced to  5.5%  on  9 No·vember. 
(30)  ~rom 1 to 31  January inclusive,  the rate was  5·5%;  it was  reduced 
to  5.25%  on  1 February,  to 4.5%  on 1 April and to 4%  on  2 November. 
(31)  From  1  to 14  January inclusive,  the rate was  4%;  it was  reduced to 
3.5%  on  15  January,  to 2.7%  on  13  March  and then raised to  3%  on 
1  December.  · 
(32)  Including the fidelity bonus of 0.3%,  which  was  abolished during the 
year 1959,  but  reintroduced in 1960. 
(33)  On  1 January 1963,  the interest rate was  reduced from  3 to 2.75%,  and 
the fidelity bonus  from  0.3  to 0.275%•  On  1 May  1963,  the rate was 
raised to  3%  and the fidelity bonus back to 0.3%. 
(34)  The  fidelity bonus  was  raised from  0.3%  to 0.4%  on 1 July 1964;  since 
it was  paid at the end  of the year on  amounts  deposited through the 
savings book  from  15  January,  this increase applied for the entire year. 
(35)  The  fidelity bonus was  raised to 0.5%  as from  1 January 1965. 
(36)  The  fidelity bonus  was  raised to 1%  as from  1 January 1969. 
(37)  The  rate of interest was  raised to 3.5%  as  from  1 January 1970,  so that 
together with the 1%  fidelity bonus,  it made  a  total of 4.5%. 
130 (38)  The  fidelity bonus  was  reduced to 0.75%  as from  1  January 1972,  and the 
basic interest rate was  reduced to 3.25%  as from  16  March  1972. 
In general terms,  rates were  higher between 1962  and 1972  than between 1953 
and  1961  inclusive.  This is undoubtedly attributable to the acceleration of 
inflation.  Private individuals and undertakings  sought  to raise the  income 
from  their capital by investing in time deposits rather than those payable on 
demand,  hoping to recover part  at  least  of the loss incurred as a  result  of 
the  erosion of the value of money.  The  banks reacted by introducing slight 
increases in the rates for time deposits in order to attract  customers.  In 
so  doing,  they became  dangerous  competitors of the Caisse Generale d'Epargne 
et  de  Retraite and the private savings banks which,  prior to 1962,  had been 
offering much  higher rates on their savings books than were  available from 
the banks for one  and three month  deposits.  The  C.G.E.R.  reacted by  granting 
all manner  of advantages  (fideli~y bonus,  preferential rates for  customers 
seeking mortgage  loans,  free tickets for tombolas,  etc.) to faithful  savers, 
and also by  creating new  investment  opportunities  (time deposit  savings books 
on  which  the rate of interest was  higher than that  payable  on  ordinary books). 
It was  only with reluctance that it raised its rate of interest  on  ordinary 
savings books. 
At  the  end  of 1969,  when  the private banks'  rate on  time deposits was  6%,  the 
C.G.E.R.  was  still offering a  rate of  3%  on  savings books,  with a  fidelity 
bonus  of 1%,  making  a  total of 4%.  It did not,  however,  follow the banks in 
taking advantage  of the  abundance  of capital  and the recession in 1972  to 
reduce its rates of interest  substantially.  Even  at the  end  of March  1972, 
which  was  the lowest  point  during the recession,  its basic rate was  still 3.25% 
and the fidelity bonus  was  0.75%,  making a  total of 4%,  whereas  the banks  were 
only paying 2.75%  on  deposits payable at three months. 
In general,  the rates of interest  paid on  time deposits and  savings books  were 
frequently insufficient to compensate  for the  erosion of the value of money. 
Even  when  one  disregards the  2o%  tax retention,  the rise in the  cost  of living 
absorbed  almost  all the  income  from  interest on  capital invested at  one  or three 
months  in bank  accounts or ordinary savings accounts in many  of the years 
during the period 1962  to 1972.  Table 26  outlines the development  of net 
income  in the form  of interest after deduction of the erosion of capital caused 
by the rise in the cost  of living. 
131 Table  26  Net  income  in the form  of net  interest  (after deduction of the 
erosion of capital  caused ey  the rise in the  cost  of li  vin,e:l• 
Year  Bank  deposits  C.G.E.R.  savings 
one  month  three months  book 
1953  1,13  1,43  3,03 
1954  o,8o  1,10  2,70 
1955  o,6o  0,90  2,50 
1956  -1,78  -1,48  0,12 
1957  -1,92  -1,60  -0,18 
1958  0,56  0,96  2,09 
1959  - 0,40  1,80 
1960  1,93  1,82  2,94 
1961  1,78  2,40  2,30 
1962  0,54  1,36  1,95 
1963  -0,36  0,45  1,06 
1964  -1,58  -0,77  -0,77 
1965  -1,09  -0,59  -0,59 
1966  -1,07  -0,52  -0,62 
1967  0,15  o, 75  0,58 
1968  -0,36  0,42  0,81 
1969  -0,08  0,73  0,22 
1970  1,07  2,07  o,64 
1971  -0,70  0,30  0,18 
1972  -3,50  -2,50  -1,39 
Source  For these calculations,  reference was  made  to the interest rates 
shown  in Table  25  and the rates of growth of consumer  prices 
indicated in Table 23. 
The  table proves that the  classical theory according to which  those living 
on  fixed  incomes  suffer during periods of prosperity but  regain the advantage 
during economic  crises and recessions does not  conform entirely with the 
facts as they occurred in Belgium  between 1953  and 1972.  Since 1954,  there has 
been no  fall in the  cost  of living,  so that  even during recessions,  those 
living on  fixed incomes have  seen the  income  from their interest  eaten into 
by the erosion of the value of money. 
As  regards the periods of prosperity (1955-56,  1959-60,  1963-65  and 1969-70) 
the rise in prices has not  always been sufficiently substantial for depositors 
to lose all the  income  from their capital as a  result  of the erosion of the 
value of money.  During the periods of recession,  the absence of any fall in 
prices made  it impossible for depositors to regain the lost  purchasing power 
on their income  from  capital during the periods of prosperity.  The  less 
pronounced rise in prices during the recessions is generally compensated for 
by  a  reduction of the banks'  borrowing rates. 
132 In fact,  true to the prediction of G.  SCHMOLLER,  the rate of interest  on 
capital placed on  time deposit  has fallen in the  second half of the twentieth 
century to about  1.5%  (1). 
The  situation is slightly better for those able to place their capital on 
deposit  for more  than one year or to invest in securities.  Nevertheless,  it 
must  not  be forgotten that  the rise in interest rates on  medium  and  long term 
investments brought  about  by the erosion of the value of money  brings down  the 
quotations of securities issued before the rise occurred at  less favourable 
rates,  so  that it is not  necessarily advantageous for all those whose  capital 
is invested at fixed rates.  From  1957  to 1972,  the Banque  Nationale de 
Belgique has calculated the average yield from  loan stock issued by the State, 
the  provinces,  para-governmental  organizations and municipal authorities for 
periods of between five  and twenty years;  separate figures  have  been produced 
for loans issued before and after 1  December  1962. 
Income  from  loans issued after 1  December  1962  is subject to a  2o%  tax 
deduction at  source.  Because  of this difference,  the gross yield from  loan 
stock issued after 1  December  1962  is lower than that  from  those issued before 
this date  on  identical terms.  Were  it only necessary to take into account  the 
net  income  after deduction at  source of 6%  on  notes  and  securities issued before 
1  December  and  2o%  on notes and  securities issued after that date respectively, 
the difference in yield on  a  security bearing 6%  interest  should be  approx-
imately 1%  (2).  In fact,  it is generally less than this,  since it is also 
necessary to take into account  the fact  that the conditions on  redemption are 
identical, there being no  tax on this transaction.  In fact,  the difference 
in gross yield has varied between 0.75%  and 1.3%. 
(1) 
(2) 
Quoted  b,y  G.  CASSEL  :  "Theoretische Socialokonomie,  Lehrbuch der allgemeinen 
Volkswirtschaftslehre",  L.  POHLE  (ed),  Volume  II,  Leipzig,  1918,  pp.214-215. 
The  net yield from  a  security bearing 6%  interest issued before 1  Decamber 
1962  with a  par value of 1,000 francs is :  6.oo- (6.00 x  o.o6) = 5.64%. 
The  net yield from  an identical security with  a  par value of 1,000 francs 
issued after 1  December  1962  is only  :  6.00 - (6.00 x  0.20) = 4.8o%.  If 
net  income  only is considered,  a  security issued after 1  December  1962  can 
only give the  same  net yield as a  security issued before that date if its 
quoted price is :  1,000 F x  4.80 _  851  F 
5.64  - • 
Thus,  the gross yield from  the first  security is 6%  and that  from  the 
second is 60  x  100 = 7.06%,  so  that the difference is 1.05%. 
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Sources  : 
Average yield  from  fixed  incom~ securit.ie8  quot~d on  t.he 
Brussels  s·hok exella.n.ge. 
Average  yield from  loans issued  Average  net yield from  loans 
(1)  (2) 
before  after  before  after 
1 December  1962  1 December  1962  1 December  1962  1 December 
4.42  (3)  3.92 
4.63  (3)  1.75 
5.82  2.64 
5.62  4.41 
4.98  3.78 
5.23  4.87 
5·17  4·11 
5·34  5.00 
4.91  2.78 
5o 50  6.41  1.33  2.24 
5·50  6.46  1.41  2.37 
5·75  6.66  1.58  2.49 
5-77  6.]6  2.85  3.84 
5·53  6.59  2.84  3.90 
6.49  ].26  2.71  3.48 
6.65  ].8]  2.79  4.01 
6.01  7.36  1.69  3.04 
- 6.91  - 1.53 
issued 
1962 
(1)  Revue  de  Documentation et  d'information de  la Banque  Nationals de  Belgique. 
(2)  Net  average yield = gross yield - rise in the consumer  price index. 
(3)  Median  value of the various yields from  notes,  securities,  etc. 
The  average yield from  loans issued before 1 December  1962  follows the trend in 
the  economic  position at  a  longer remove  in time than the interest rates on time 
deposits.  The  prosperity of 1955-56  was  not  reflected in the yield from 
securities and notes until 1957,  and the influence of the 1957-58  recession can 
clearly be  seen in the 1959  yield. 
A similar time lag of approximately one  year also occurred during the sixties. 
This is probably attributable to the  influence of the yield from  the  shares of 
publicly quoted  companies  on  the yield from  securities.  vfuen  dividends rise, 
part  of the  capital invested in securities and notes is realised and placed in 
variable yield investments.  This leads to a  fall in the quotations of fixed 
interest  securities,  thereby increasing their average yield.  As  company  profits 
are distributed about  a  year after they are made,  it takes about  a  year for the 
rise in dividends to follow the upward trend in the trade cycle. 
134 Since the return from  fixed interest securities is strongly influenced by 
that  on variable return investments, it also has to follow the trend in the 
business cycle at  a  remove  in time  of about  a  year. 
However,  it is also necessary to take into account  the volume  of liquidity 
seeking investments.  When  the liquidity supply is low,  as in 1969  following 
the  speculation against the Belgian franc,  the yield is higher than when 
there is excess liquidity,  as in 1971  following the influx of speculative 
capital from  abroad.  Moreover,  rates would  have been lower in 1971  and  1972 
if the State had not  taken advantage of the abundance  of capital to borrow 
large  sums  on  the domestic money  market.  This  enabled it to repalf most  of 
its foreign debt  and,  in addition,  to finance  a  very substantial extra-
ordinary budget  (1). 
(1)  In 1970,  the State borrowed 18,400 million francs from  private banks, 
12,600 million francs from  savings banks  and para-governmental  companies 
and  6,100 million francs from  other companies  and institutions and 
private individuals,  making  a  total of 37,100 million francs. 
In 1971,  total borrowings by the State was  69,400 million francs,  a 
record figure  (Banque  Nationale de  Belgique  :  Rapports  sur les 
operations de l'exercise 1972,  Brussels,  26  February 1973,  P•  71). 
135 CONCLUSIO~~. 
Of  the four  categories of non-wage  income,  namely that  earned by traders and 
craftsmen,  that  earned by members  of the professions,  that  earned by the 
landlords of housing property and that  earned by  the holders of time  deposits, 
savings accounts and  fixed  interest  securities, the earnings of the  second 
group have  risen most  rapidly and must  be  considered to be  one  of the  causes 
of structural inflation.  However,  although it is growing,  this group only 
constitutes a  small  sector of the population and the influence of the rise 
in their income  on  prices and  wages  should not  be  overestimated. 
As  regards  self-employed workers,  it would  appear that the  small traders have 
generally been able to maintain their relative profit margins,  that is their 
profit margins  expressed as a  percentage of their selling prices. 
The  price increases introduced by  producers were  magnified by  small traders 
and  passed on to the  consumer,  so  that the  small trader has not  only been the 
intermediary,  but  also the instigator,  of price increases. 
The  opening of large numbers  of chain stores of the  supermarket  type towards 
the  end of the sixties seems  to have  led to a  slight narrowing of the profit 
margins  of small traders and  craftsmen.  However,  this finding is based on 
too  short  a  period (1970  and 1971)  for it to be  possible to draw definitive 
conclusions. 
The  income  of housing property landlords did not  adjust  fully to the  sharp 
rise in building costs,  which  was  much  higher than the rise in consumer  prices 
during the period 1965-72.  Thus,  tte trend in rents did more  to curb than to 
accelerate inflation.  Income  in the form  of interest  rose  substantially with 
the increase in the  amount  of capital invested in time deposits with the banks, 
in savings accounts with the  C.G.E.R.  and the  private savings banks in one  or 
other of these  forms  or in some  other form  with para-g0vernmental  financial 
institutions or in loan  stock issued by the State,  the provinces,  the municipal 
authorities and the para-governmental  companies. 
The  average yield from  all these forms  of investment  followed the development 
of the  economic  situation after time  lags of varying duration,  but it was  also 
influenced by other factors  such as the  influx of capital from  abroad.  The 
sustained rise in consumer  prices from  1954  to 1972  inclusive meant  that the 
holders of these various forms  of investment  were  unable to take advantage of 
recessions to recuperate losses suffered as a  result of the erosion of the 
value of money  during the periods of prosperity. 
136 Consequently,  the rise in income  in the form  of interest is largely fictitious. 
In fact,  during the years when  prices rose rapidly (1966,  1972)  most  savers 
lost money. 
The  effect of the rise in interest rates on  demand  for goods  and  services 
m~  therefore be  considered to have  been minimal;  in other words,  it was 
not  a  source of demand-pull  inflation.  However,  it can be  a  cause of cost-
push inflation when  money  is in short  supply,  as in 1969-70  when  many  firms 
had to borrow money  at  abnormally high rates. 
We  shall return to this problem in our discussion of economic  policy in our 
final  chapter. 
137 CHAPI'ER  VI  Counter-inflationary policy and its effects on  prices and 
incomes. 
1.  Introduction. 
Before drawing conclusions from  this study as to the policy to be  followed 
in combatting inflation, it is necessary to outline the counter-inflationary 
policy which has been pursued to date.  This policy has been conducted at 
two  levels:  at national level and at  European  Community  level. 
At  national level,  the Belgian government  has  endeavoured to curb inflation 
by restricting the money  supply and  by means  of price controls. 
Unlike other countries  (England,  for instance),  Belgium has not hitherto 
applied any wages  policy.  Nor  has it pursued the systematic application 
of a  fiscal  policy designed to level out  the disposable  income  of households, 
thereby cushioning against  the effects of cyclical fluctuations.  Whereas, 
when  a  recession was  foreseeable at the beginning of 1972,  the Minister for 
Economic  Affairs,  Professor Dr.  H.  SIMONET,  budgeted for  a  deficit  on  current 
account  in order to encourage  investment  by means  of subsidies,  the clear 
recovery during the  second half of 1972  did not  give rise to  any limitation 
of public  spending.  On  the contrary,  in order to find  a  solution to the 
contradictory claims of the  Community  and ideology,  the new  coalition govern-
ment  made  provision for new  expenditure in its budget,  so that there was  still 
a  slight deficit at  a  time when  the economy  was  in the middle of a  period of 
prosperity. 
The  effect  of the graduated coding of direct  personal  income  tax is accent-
uated as prices and  incomes  adjust to inflationary pressures and holds down  the 
rise in demand  from  private individuals.  However,  the State spends its entire 
return from  taxation,  so that the increase in the demand  from  the State for 
goods  and  se~vices compensates for the decline in demand  from  the private sector. 
It may  be  concluded,  therefore,  that restrictions on  increases in incomes  have 
not  been used in Belgium  as a  means  by  which to pursue a  policy of limiting 
demand.  However,  such a  policy has been initiated on  the basis of two  other 
means,  namely  controls of credit  sales of consumer  durables  (1)  and  a 
restrictive monetary policy. 
(1)  Moniteur belge,  23  February 1973,  PP•  2412-2414. 
138 The  monetary  polic.y has eeen carried out  by the Banque  Nationale de Belgique 
in conjunction with tke Ministry of Finance.  The  methods  have \een revised 
on numerous  occasions,  aut they are designed to reduce the private banks' 
capacity for  creating bank money  through the imposition of coefficients of 
solvency,  liquidity and  (or) reserves and the limitation of  scope to 
rediscount  with the central bank  (1). 
A restrictive monetar.y  policy became  an aBsolute necessity from  1971  when,  as 
a  result of the influx of short term capital, the money  supply was  growing 
constantly at a  rate in excess of the growth rate of the gross national 
product,  thus creating the danger of serious demand-pull  inflation (2). 
Since analysis of monetary developments falls outside the  scope of our  stu~, 
which  deals with the influence  ~f the development  of non-wage  income  on  price 
movements,  we  are unable to discuss the consequences of the growth of the 
money  supply in detail.  Nevertheless, it should be  pointed out that the fall 
in interest rates in 1972  (see  Chapter V)  was  probably caused by the snarp 
growth in monetary and  quasi-monetary liquidity during 1971  and 1972  and, 







From  the end  of 1969 to the  end  of M~  1973,  the rediscount  ceiling imposed 
on the "Danks  was  reduced from  12%  to 7.25%  of their resources  (own  re-
sources,  loans issued in the form  of deBentures and notes,  sight  and time 
deposits,  excluding \ank accounts in credit)  (Agefi,  14 June 1973). 
According to the statistics of the Banque  Nationale,  the growth in monetary 
and  quasi-monetary liquidity,  the gross national product  and prices 
progressed as follows  : 
1970  Growth  as a  percentage 
1971  1972 
Monetary liquidity (from the 
end of the preceding year to 
the end  of the current year)  + 8,3  + 10,1  + 14,0 
Monetary + quasi-monetary 
liquidity (i\idem)  + B,o  + 13,2  + 16,6 
Gross national product  (at 
constant  prices)  +  6,2  +  3,7  +  4,1  (a~ 
Provisional estimate 
Source  :  Bulletin de  la Banque  Nationale de  Belgique,  April 1973,  PP•  III-
XXIII. 
139 As  for price policy,  it clearly has a  direct  effect  on  inflationary trends, 
and this will be  studied in the next  Section. 
The  policy of the European  Community  on  inflation is still in its infancy. 
It is pursued on  two  fronts.  On  the  one  hand,  the  Council  of Ministers of 
the  Community  has made  recommendations for the curbing of inflation to the 
governments  of the Member  States (1),  and  on  the other hand,  the Commission 
has taken action under Articles 85  and  86  of the Treaty of Rome  designed to 
guarantee a  minimum  degree  of competition between  producers in the  Common 
Market. 
In pursuing its competition policy,  the E.E.C.  has opposed the artificial 
raising of prices through monopolistic practices and,  in so  doing,  has 
contributed towards the reduction of inflationar,y stresses.  We  shall return 
to the  subject  of this policy in Section 3. 
2.  The  prices policy of the Belgian Government 
The  prices policy originated after the war.  The  Legislative Decree  of 
22  January 1945  concerning measures to curb infringements of the regulations 
on  the procurement  of supplies empowered  the Minister of Economic  Affairs to 
fix maximum  prices for goods  and  services and to instigate legal proceedings 
against  firms not  adhering to these prices.  At  the  same  time,  the Minister 
received powers to fix the profit margin to  be taken by  any  seller or 
intermediar,y. 
This legislative decree also prohibited the selling of any product  or service 
at prices above the normal  prices in cases where the Minister had not  fixed  any 
maximum  price  (2 ).  Interpretation of the meaning of "normal  price" is a  matter 
for the  courts.  In theory,  they should determine the normal  price on  the basis 
of the  cost  price,  profit margins and the  state of the market;  in general,  the 
prices charged b.y  firms have  been regarded as the normal  prices in case law (3). 
(1)  "Les mesures  de  la politique anti-inflationniste dans la Republique Federale 
allemande et  en  France,  aux Pays-bas et  en Belgique",  Bulletin de la Banque 
Nationale de  Belgique,  April  1973,  Dutch version,  p.  13  and European  Coal 
and Steel  Community,  European  Economic  Community,  European  Atomic  Energy 
Community  - Commission  ;  Sixth Report,  1972,  Dutch  version,  Brussels, 
Luxembourg,  Februar,y  1973,  PP•  66-67. 
(2)  Legislative Decree  of 22  January 1945,  Moniteur belge,  24  January 1945· 
(3)  M.  VAN  MEERHAEGHE  :  "The  Belgian Prices Commission",  Weltwirtschaftliches 
Archiv,  1967,  Volume  2,  PP•  259-260. 
140 The  maximum  prices were  gradually abolished during 1948  and  1949  as supplies 
of goods  in most  sectors became  sufficient to meet  demand. 
The  Korean  War  led to price rises on  such  a  scale that it was  considered 
desirable to reintroduce the controls  system  (1). 
The  Ministerial Order of 20  December  1950  stipulated that,  from  that date it 
was  compulsory for firms to notify the Ministry  of Economic  Affairs of their 
intention to increase their prices for any of the goods  and  services 
referred to in the Order. 
In February 1951,  a  Prices Commission  was  set up  with a  membership made  up 
of representatives of the various sectors of economic  life,  the trade unions 
and  civil  servants from  the various ministries concerned with economic  problems 
(Ministries of Economic  Affairs,  Agriculture,  Labour,  the Ministry for the 
Middle  Classes,  etc.). 
This  commission  commenced  activities on  2  April  1951.  It was  an institution 
which  gave  opinions to the Minister of Economic  Affairs on all problems 
affecting the  cost  of living.  It was  also part  of its brief to  stu~ trends 
in prices and to  submit  suggestions on  prices policy to the Minister of 
Economic  Affairs.  During the fifties and  sixties,  the list of goods  and 
services whose  prices could not  be  increased without  authorization was  enlarged, 
so  that the government's influence on  movements  of prices was  increased. 
In addition,  the three-day period was  extended,  first to eight days and 
subsequently  (Ministerial Order of 8  October 1959) to twenty-one days  (2). 
The  acceleration of the rise in consumer  prices in late 1965  and early 1966  (3) 
obliged the government  to take stricter measures to curb the inflationary 
trend.  The  Ministerial Order of 9  May  1966  introduced a  total freeze on  all 
prices and  services.  This measure  enabled prices to be held down  (the consumer 
price index in August  1966  stood at the  same  level  as that of April of the 
same  year)  (4),  but it could not  be kept  in force,  since allowance had to be 
made  for movements  in raw material  costs and  wages,  or undertakings would  have 
been  caused to go  bankrupt. 
(1)  CH.  VAN  HERBRUGGEN,  "Les moyens  de  la politique des prix",  Socialistische 
Standpunten,  1972,  No.  6,  P•  336. 
(2)  Ibidem. 
(3)  From  April  1965 to April  1966,  the  consumer  price index rose by almost  5% 
(Bulletin de  documentation et  d'information de la Banque  Nationale de 
Belgique,  August-September 1966,  Table VII,  4).  According to the Federation 
des Industries Belges,  overheating of the economy  leading to a  stretched 
employment  market  and  increases in wages  was  the main  cause of the rise in 
prices (Federation des Industries Belges,  Conseil d'administration,  meeting 
of 22  June  1966,  Brussels 1966,  P•  2). 
(4)  Bulletin de  documentation et d'information de  la Banque  Nationale de 
Belgique,  September  1967,  Table VII,  4. 
141 Under the Ministerial Order of 2 September 1966,  the price freeze  was 
removed  but  the  system of declaring increases was  extended to all goods  and 
services,  being applicable to producers and those classed with producers, 
and  to importers. 
In preparation for the introduction of V.A.T.  to Belgium  and  in order to make 
it possible to pursue a  more  thorough-going policy of coordination,  the 
Prices Commission  was  replaced by  a  Commission  for the Regulation of Prices 
under the Royal  Decree of 3 June 1969.  The  new  commission is constituted on 
almost  the same  basis as its predecessor,  but it has a  secretariat  comprising 
several civil servants to make  preparations for its sessions.  It has taken 
over the terms of reference of the Prices Commission,  but  in addition,  it has 
been assigned the following tasks  : 
a)  preparation and negotiation of the execution of programme  contracts between 
the private sector and  the government  and  the  submission of proposals 
regarding the content  of such contracts to the Minister of  Economic  Affairs; 
b)  supervision of the execution of these contracts and the  submission of 
suggestions to the Minister of Economic Affairs for measures and  possible 
sanctions to be  applied in order to ensure  compliance with the terms of 
these contracts (1). 
The  Decree  stipulated that two  sections be  set  up in the  Commission for the 
Regulation of Prices.  The  first was  to take over the functions of the Prices 
Commission  and the preparation and negotiation of programme  contracts.  The 
other,  under the terms of the Decree,  was  to be responsible for the  super-
vision of the execution of these contracts. 
It was  provided that  a  standing committee  would  be  set up in the first  section 
to fulfil the following functions  : 
1)  observing fluctuations in prices; 
2)  bringing to the attention of the Minister of Economic  Affairs the problems 





assembling the necessary documentation (in this task,  the committee is 
supported b,y  the secretariat which,  in turn,  can call on the prices 
department  of the Ministr,y of Economic  Affairs); 
giving its opinion in the name  of the  commission  on  files concerning 
.an undertaking (2). 
"Arrete royal instituant une  commission pour la regulation des prix", 
Ministere des affaires economiques,  Moniteur belge,  30  July 1969,  P•  7396. 
Ibid.,  PP•  7297-7398. 
142 It quickly became  clear that it was  preferable for the people  supervising the 
execution of programme  contracts to be those who  negotiated the terms. 
Consequently,  the  commission  was  not  divided into two  sections,  but  the members 
of the  standing committee  from  the first  section were,  for the most  part, 
appointed as members  of the  committee for the  supervision of the  execution of 
programme  contracts. 
In view of the programme  contracts formula,  it became  necessary to amend  the 
Legislative Decree of 22  January 1945.  This was  done  in the Law  of 
23  December  1969,  which  provides that the Minister of Economic  Affairs can 
conclude programme  contracts with individual undertakings or groups of under-
takings in which the undertakings enter into obligations concerning,  inter 
alia, the level of the prices which  they will be applying (1). 
In order to enable the Commission  for the Regulation of Prices to examine  the 
declarations of price increases submitted by  one  or more  firms,  the  21-d~ 
period was  extended to 30  d~s under the Ministerial Order of 5  January 1970, 
which  came  into force  on 7 February. 
Four  programme  contracts were  concluded during 1970,  one  covering imported 
wood  (14 May  1970),  one  covering chocolate  (27  November  1970),  one  covering 
the products,  commodities  and  merchandise  sold and the services rendered by 
FEBECOOP  (the federal organisation of socialist  cooperatives)  (17  December 
1970)  and finally one  covering Fort  products  (concluded on  31  December  1970). 
Negotiations with the  chemicals sector and the pharmaceutical  and cement 
industries were  inconclusive but,  during the first half of 1971,  further 
programme  contracts were  concluded with bakery retailers and  producers 
(19  February 1971),  the non-ferrous metals sector  (12  May  1971)  and the 
domestic appliances sector  (12 ~  1971)  (2). 
The  government  had hoped that the  system of price controls developed during 
1969  and 1970  would  make  it possible to prevent the introduction of V.A.T. 
on 1  January 1971  from  unleashing a  general rise in prices. 
The  Minister of Economic  Affairs succeeded in limiting the rise in retail prices 




"Pro jet de  loi modifiant  1 'arret&-loi du  22  janvier 1945  concernant la 
regression des infractions ala reglementation relative a l'approvision-
nement  du  pays",  Documents  parlementaires,  Chambre  des Representants, 
Session 1970-71,  28  May  1971,  doc.  no.  966/7,  Annex  I,  P•  38. 
"Projet de loi modifiant  l'arret&-loi •••••" op.cit.,  PP•  16-17. 
Ibidem,  p.  10. 
143 that, in view of the very great diversity of products and  services,  it was 
extremely difficult for him  to make  decisions on  a  constantly increasing number 
of applications for price increases within one  month  of their submission. 
The  decree of 5 April  1971  extended the period from  one  to two  months  as from 
8 April  1971  (1).  Although this made  it possible to curb prive rises more 
efficiently, it led certain firms to increase their prices without  having received 
the prior agreement  of the Minister of Economic Affairs.  From  the beginning of 
January 1971  to the  end  of May  that year,  the general  economic  inspectorate for 
infringements of the regulations on prices forwarded  965  sets of papers to the 
King's prosecutors,  five times as many  as during the  corresponding period in 
previous years  (2).  A high proportion of these cases were  resolved in settle-
ments  which  were  generally not  very costly to those in contravention of the 
regulations and,  in those cases where  there was  a  ruling against  them  by the 
courts,  the fine was  generally too  low in comparison with the advantage gained 
by  increasing selling prices illegally (3). 
In order to remedy this situation,  the Minister of Economic  Affairs obtained 
the  enactment  on  30  July 1971  of a  law empowering  him  to fix,  for a  maximum 
period of six months,  a  maximum  individualised price on  the occasion of the 
declaration of a  price increase for a  product  or service by  several undertakings 
representing a  limited section only of their market. 
However,  before taking a  decision fixing a  maximum  price,  the Minister of 
Economic  Affairs must  consult the Commission  for the Regulation of Prices.  The 
law provides that,  in the event  of an infringement,  after giving formal  notice 
by registered letter to a  firm refusing to reduce its price to the stipulated 
maximum,  the Minister can order the temporary closure of the  premises of the 
firm in contravention of the regulations for a  period of up to five days.  During 
the five days following notification of this measure,  the firm may  appeal to 
the court  of first  instance,  which will then give a  ruling within one  week  (4). 
Thus this law made  it possiBle to oblige a  firm which  increases one  or more  of 





"Projet de  loi modifiant  l'a.rrete-loi  •••  ",  op.cit.  annexe III,  P•  49 
Ibidem,  P•  13. 
Ibidem,  PP•  13-14. 
"Loi  sur la reglementation economique  et les prix- loi modifiant  l'arrete-
loi du 22  janvier 1945  concernant  la repression des infractions a 1a regie-
mentation relative a l'approvisionnement  du pays",  Moniteur belge,  31  August 
1971,  PP•  9990-9991. 
144 to the maxima  laid down  by the Minister and  to cause  such  firms to suffer 
substantial losses if they refuse to comply  with the Ministerial Order  (1). 
The  "Cools Law"  was  followed by the Ministerial Order of 22  Decemoer  1971 
which  revised the  system for the declaration of price increases as organized 
under the Ministerial Order of 8 October 1959. 
In the new  system,  firms are obliged to supply the prices department  of the 
Ministry of Economic  Affairs with a  minimum  amount  of information on  the points 
stipulated in the Order  and,  in the event  of their failure to do  so,  the prices 
department  or the  commission  could take the view that their declarations are 
incomplete and  request  additional information,  asking for the  60-d~ period 
to commence,  not  on  the date of declaration,  but  on  the date of receipt  by 
the prices department  of the additional information. 
The  "Cools Law"  and the Ministerial Order of 22  December  1971  were  heavily 
criticised in industrial and professional circles. 
The  opponents of this legislation also pointed out  that the prices department 
could prolong the two  month  period by  asking for additional information in 
respect  of each price increase declaration,  thereby holding back price increases 
at the  expense  of firms,  preventing them  from  adjusting their selling prices 
to their costs. 
The  Minister generally fixes increases in percentage terms.  Small  firms, 
charging higher prices for individual articles than their more  efficient  comp-
etitors charge for  similar products which are nevertheless different  from 
theirs,  experience no  difficulties as a  result of the application of such 
measures.  They  are able to increase their prices by  the  specified percentage, 
thus retaining their profit margins. 
It is only in cases where  a  firm applies a  price increase before receiving 
authorization and this increase is deemed  to be  excessive by  the Minister or 
the  Commission  for the Regulation of Prices that the Minister  imposes  a  maximum 
price. 
However,  it is considered that  such a  measure  should be  exceptional.  The  fact 
that firms are  a.ble  to make  price declarations through their trade associations 
reduces the number  of declarations and relieves small undertakings of the  costs 
involved in preparing them. 
(1)  Article 2  of the  Law  provides that the closure of the undertaking can be 
avoided by  payment  of a  sum  of money  so  that national production does not 
necessarily have to suffer from  the  consequences of measures taken to enforce 
prices policy decisions.  (La loi sur la reglementation ••••  op.cit.  P•  9991.) 
145 Furthermore,  it was  laid down  in the Ministerial Order of 20 April  1972  that 
the obligation to declare all price increases is not  applicable to undertakings 
whose  turnover does not  exceed  5 million francs  excluding value  added tax (1). 
The  Ministerial Order of 1  August  1973  amends  the Ministerial Order of 
22  December  1971,  reimposing the price increase declaration on  undertakings 
whose  business is connected with a  product  or service which,  in the  sector 
under  consideration,  is homogeneous  or is charged for at  comparable  rates. 
The  following sectors are  considered to be homogeneous  : 
servicing,  repair and  washing of motor vehicles,  car parks,  maintenance and 
repair of heating and  plumbing installations and  equipment;  cleaning and 
disinfection of buildings,  chimney  sweeping;  shoe repairs;  laundries,  public 
wash-houses  and  dry cleaning;  hairdressers'  shops;  hotels,  boarding houses, 
resturants and  camping  sites. 
In the vast majority of cases,  the Minister has followed the  recommendation 
of the  Commission  for the Regulation of Prices  when  it has  proposed a  lower 
increase than that  applied for  by  producers or importers.  Where  the  commission 
has been unable to reach an unanimous  opinion,  the Minister has either accepted 
the application  for the increase or limited it to a  lower  percentage or amount. 
Undertakings are  obliged to  infor~ the prices department  of all price reductions 
on  the actual  date of their introduction. 
They  can apply for  a  "price rise credit" which,  when  granted,  entitles the firm 
to increase its price up to the previous level without  having to wait  for the 
two  month  period provided for in the Order of 22  December  1971  (2) to  elapse. 
In addition,  the  Commission  for the Regulation of Prices has  powers to propose 
price reductions  on  its own  initiative.  The  commission has  only taken advantage 
of this right  on  a  few  occasions,  notably in the cases of meat  and  coffee prices. 
The  Minister has  on  two  occasions imposed  slight reductions in meat  prices 
but,  in the  case of roasted coffee,  there was  no  price reduction because  raw 
coffee  prices rose again  subsequently (3). 
(1)  Arrete ministerial  completant  l'arrete ministerial du  22  decembre  1971 
prescrivant  la declaration de  ha~ae de  prix, Moniteur belge,  25  April  1972, 
P•  4,911. 
(2)  Article 8  of the Ministerial Order providing for the declaration of price 
increases,  op.cit.,  p.  15,246. 
(3)  The  prices for Santos  (Brazil)  raw  coffee were  very low at the beginning 
of 1972,  but  they rose by  some  35%  from  the beginning of January 1972 to 
the beginning of January 1973.  (Information on  the prices of Santos raw 
coffee  on  the New  York  commodities  exchange  supplied by the Societe 
Commerciale  Anversoise.) 
l-16 It must  be  acknowledged that little progress has been achieved over programme 
contracts since M~  1971.  The  programme  contracts covering the selling prices 
of bread and  domestic appliances were  renewed  on  5 April  1972  (1) and 
27  September  1972  (2) respectively. 
A further programme  contract  covering non-ferrous metals was  signed in June 
1973.  The  programme  contract for imported wood  prices will probably be renewed. 
The  programme  contracts system has the merit  of avoiding the disadvantages of 
the necessity to declare price reductions in sectors where  raw materials prices 
pl~ an important role.  These  contracts include provisions to the effect that 
prices can be  increased (reduced) by  a  certain amount  if raw materials prices 
rise (fall) by  a  specified percentage or amount.  In other cases,  they stipulate 
that the price m~  be  reviewed if wages  and  social contributions rise above  a 
certain level  (3). 
This  system  enables firms  subscribing to the programme  contract to adjust their 
selling prices to increases in their costs rapidly.  Where  there is no  pro-
gramme  contract,  they may  have to wait  two  months  or even more  before having 
their applications for prices increases accepted.  For the government,  the 
system has the advantage  of setting up machinery for the adjustment  of prices 
to both upward  and  downward  movements  in costs. 
From  the point  of view of the  struggle against inflation, it has to be acknow-
ledged that these programme  contracts could present the disadvantage of acting 
as a  medium  for the transmission of increases in prices and  incomes  from  one 
sectors to others.  Thus,  the  conclusion of such contracts is only advantageous 
in the case of products whose  raw materials are  subject to major upward  and down-
ward  price fluctuations  (tropical vegetable products,  minerals,metals).  It 
should be  further noted that  programme  contracts can be  used to regulate the 
methods  of fixing consumer  prices as well as the actual level of prices. 
(1)  "Contrat  de  programme  relatif au prix de  vente des appareils electro-
menager",  Ministere des affaires economiques,  administration du  Commerce, 
Service des Prix,  Brussels 1972,  P•  4. 
(2)  "Contrat  de  programme  relatif auxprix des pains",  Ministere des affaires 
economiques,  Service des prix,  Brussels 1972,  P•  4• 
(3)  C.F.,  for example,  "Contrat de  Programme  relatif aux prix des pains", 
op.  cit.  PP•  2-4. 
147 This was  the  case with the programme  agreement  concluded by  the Minister of 
Economic  Affairs on  12  May  1971  with the producers and  importers of domestic 
appliances.  The  producers and  importers party to this agreement  entered into 
undertakings as to their selling methods  (prohibition of the marking of goods 
with  "slashed" prices and of resale price maintenance)  and an obligation to 
specify the services included in selling prices and the  systems  on  which the 
calculation of their selling prices is based  (limitation of increases in 
administrative and  sales costs to  2%  per annum)  (1). 
All these provisions were  carried over into the new  programme  contract 
covering the  selling prices of domestic appliances  concluded on  29  September 
1972  for  a  period of two  years  (2). 
A Ministerial Order  of the  same  date  stipulated that  firms not  subscribing 
to the programme  agreement  will be  prohibited from  applying any price 
increases without  the prior agreement  of the Minister of Economic  Affairs {3). 
The  programme  agreement  concerning the  selling prices of domestic appliances 
has led to the disappearance of the practice of resale price maintenance in 
this sector.  The  producers and  importers using this system had generally 
allowed their distributors very generous profit margins.  Retailers had 
taken advantage of these profit margins to attract clients by  granting 
discounts on  the prices imposed  by their suppliers.  This practice caused 
the market  to lack transparency and also involved both retailers and  consumers 
in much  time-wasting in haggling over prices.  From  the  economic  point  of view, 
it may  therefore be  concluded that the return to more  normal  competition in 
the distribution of domestic appliances is a  positive result  of the applica-
tion of a  programme  contract.  However,  this does not  mean  that  the average 
prices paid by  consumers for these products are  lower  ted~ than prior to 
the introduction of this programme  contract. 
The  counter-inflationary effect  of the prices policy lies mainly in the 
powers to oblige undertakings to give notice before they are allowed to 
increase their prices. 
{1)  Bulletin de  Fabrimetal,  5 July 1971,  Dutch version,  PP•  304-305. 
(2)  Contrat  de  programme  relatif au prix de vente des appareils electro-
menagers,  op.cit.,  PP•  2-4. 
(3)  "Les mesures de la politique anti-inflationniste dans la Republique 
Federale allemande,  aux Pays-bas et  en Belgique",  art. cit., P•  20. 
148 It is typical that,  at  a  time  when  stronger  curbs on  inflation are 
becoming necessary,  the Minister of Economic  Affairs  extended the 
waiting period once  again,  in his Ministerial Order of 1 March  1973. 
The  periods imposed  were  :  four months  for all price increases 
declared after 1 March  1973,  three months  for increases declared after 
1 July 1973  and two  months  once  again for  price increases declared 
after 1  January 1974  (1). 
(1)  "Arrete ministeriel instituant des mesures transitoires en  matiere 
de  prix",  (Moniteur belge,  6 U~rch 1973,  p.  2862),  amended  by  the 
Ministerial Order of 20  July 1973  (Moniteur belge of  24  July 1973). 
149 3.  The  competition policy of the  Common  M~ket Commission. 
The  rules on  competition laid down  in the Treaty of Rome  are sufficiently well 
known  for it to be unnecessary to discuss them  in extenso. 
Suffice it to recall that Article 85  is directed against  concerted practices 
which  may  directly or indirectly prevent,  restrict or distort  competition within 
the  Common  Market,  while Article 86  deals with undertakings which  have  a  dominant 
position within the  Common  Market  or within a  substantial part  of it and 
exploit this position in an improper manner. 
However,  the Commission  is only  empowered  to act if such  concerted practices or 
the presence of  such undertakings in dominant  positions are likely to affect 
trade between the Member  States. 
The  application of Article 85  was  organized by Regulation 17  issued by  the  Council 
of Ministers on  6  February 1962.  Under  the terms of this regulation,  it is in 
principle for the heads of undertakings themselves to determine  whether  agreements 
between undertakings,  decisions by  associations or undertakings or concerted 
practices between them  are in contravention of Article 85,  paragraph 1.  \fuere this 
is the case,  they must  either terminate their concerted practice or apply for an 
exem  ion.  Such  an  exemption is granted by the  Commission  pursuant  to Article 85, 
paragraph 3,  if the agreement  or  concerted practice contributes to improve  the 
production or distribution of goods  or to promote  technical or  economic  progress 
and,  in addition,  meets  certain other requirements  (for instance,  consumers  must 
be allowed a  fair share of the benefit resulting from  these advantages)  (1). 
Where  heads of undertakings are in doubt  as to whether  an  agreement  between them is 
prohibited under the terms of Article 85,  paragraph 1,  they can guard against the 
danger of being fined by  the  Commission  or having proceedings instituted against 
them  by third parties whose  interests have  been prejudiced by notifying the 
Commission  of their agreement,  decision to associate or concerted practice,  request-
ing the  Commission to issue a  statement to the effect that it is not  prohibited. 
Regulation 27  of 3 M~  had provided that,  in order to obtain  such a  negative 
clearance,  firms  had to submit  a  form  (form A)  in which  they answered  a  number  of 
questions  regarding the nature and  effects of the agreement  and another form  (form 
B),  which  contained a  series of similar questions,  was  used for applications for 
authorisation.  Since many  firms,  when  submitting applications for negative clear-
ances,  submitted applications for  exemption at the  same  time in case the negative 
clearance was  withheld,  a  single form  (form A/B)  to be  used for both types of 
application was  introduced under Regulation 1133  (1968)  (2). 
(1)  L.  CARTOU  :  "Precis des organisations europeennes",  Fourth Etlition, 
Paris,  1973,  P•  175. 
(2)  European  Coal  and Steel  Community,  European  Ecnomic  Community,  European Atomic 
Energy  Community  - Commission  :  Second  General Report  on the Activities of 
the  Communities  in 1968,  Brussels,  Luxembourg,  February 1969,  PP•  52-53· 
150 Regulation 17  also made  provision enabling third parties who  consider that their 
interests have been prejudiced by action taken pursuant to an agreement  to 
lodge a  complaint  with the  Commission.  Thus,  the existence of agreements or 
practices referred to in Article 85,  paragraph 17  of which  the  Commission  has 
not  received notification can be brought to its attention and,  if appropriate, 
it can  impose  fines on  firms infringing the provisions of this article. 
The  functioning of the  system  set up under Regulation 17  was  hampered initially 
by the large number  of notifications  (on 31  March  1966,  38,045 sets of papers 
were  in the  course of being processed)(l),  but  when  the  Commission  had ruled 
on  a  number  of typical cases,  undertakings were better placed to  judge  whether 
their application for a  negative clearance or an exemption would  be  accepted 
or not.  An  end  was  put  to a  number  of unacceptable agreements  and  others were 
changed or reformulated so that they were  no  longer in contravention of Article 85, 
paragraph 1,  of the Treaty of Rome  or could be  considered for the granting 
of an exemption. 
The  Commission  has also used the formula of "exemptions by categories"  (2 ), 
for which provision is made  in Article 85.  By  the terms  of Order 19  of 
2 March  1965,  the  Council  of Ministers empowered  the  Commission  to grant  a 
generic  ememption to all exclusive represention contracts and licensing contracts 
to which there are only two  parties and  which meet  the conditions stipulated in 
Article 85,  paragraph 3.  On  26  August  1966,  a  generic exemption was  granted by 
the  Commission  for all exciusive representation agreements  concluded oetween 
two  parties only which met  a  series of conditions guaranteeing that the exlusive 
representative cannot take improper  advantage of his privileged position to 
obtain an  excessive profit margin  (3).  This measure  enabled  some  13,000 exemption 
applications for exclusive representation agreements to be  approved at  a  stroke. 
(1)  European Economic  Community:  Ninth General Report  on  the Activities of 
the  Community  from  1  April 1965 to 31  March  1966,  Brussels June  1966,  P•  69. 
(2)  P.  REllTER  :  "Organisations europeennes",  Paris,  2nd  edition 1970,  P•  317. 
(3)  Official Journal  of the European  Communities,  Dutch version,  26  August  1966, 
P•  2865. 
151 In this way,  the  Commission  made  known  its intention not to attach too much 
importance to the great  mass  of  small  agreements and to devote all its 
attention to large-scale concerted practices which  can lead to the elimina-
tion of all competition over all products in a  sector of industry in Europe  (1). 
This increased the effectiveness of the  Commission's action,  which  has taken 
three forms,  as follows  : 
1)  The  Commission  has taken action to prevent the formation of cartels.  The 
risk of incurring heavy fines  and having legal  proceedings instituted 
against  them  by  firms  which  have  suffered prejudice as a  result  of agree-
ments  or concerted practices and  claim damages  has encourages the members 
of cartels to disband. 
For instance,  the  Commission,  acting on  its own  initiative,  instituted a 
series of investigations in the flat glass sector.  In this very important 
sector of Belgian industry,  a  number  of firms had  entered into agreements 
under which they apportioned the national market  among  themselves,  thereby 
causing a  substantial reduction in trade between the Member  States.  With 
economic  development  and,  more  particularly,  the expansion of the market, 
it was  no  longer in the interests of  some  of these firms to comply  with 
the terms of the agreement.  The  fact that the parties to the agreement 
were  aware  that  the  Commission  was  looking into the situation and was 
going to oblige them  to terminate or change their agreement  led them to 
stop pressing their defaulting members  to adhere to the agreement.  The 
agreement  was  terminated and the secretariat  set up to operate it was 
disbanded  (2). 
2)  The  Commission  has taken corrective action by  encouraging heads of under-
takings who  have given notice of their agreements or concerted practices 
to change  them to make  them  acceptable for a  negative clearance or an 
exemption.  In this way,  agreements which  prevented all competition were 
replaced by  others which,  although organising the market,  made  it 
possible for a  minimum  degree of competition between the firms party 
to the agreement  to be maintained.  We  can quote  several  examples  of 
action by  the  Commission  affecting the Belgian economy.  Firstly, there 
is the  case of Cobelaz  (Comptoir belge de  l'azote).  Before the inter-
vention by  the  Commission,  Cobelaz  monopolised the exports of 
(1)  P.  REUTER,  op.cit.,  P•  367. 
(2)  Bulletin of the European  Communities,  August  1970,  No.  8,  PP•  62-63. 
152 all Belgian producers in the nitrogen industry,  thus preventing these producers 
from  competing with  each other on the markets of the other Member  States of 
the  Common  Market.  After the Commission  had informed the firms  concerned that 
the activities of Cobelaz  were  incompatible with Article 85,  paragraph 1,  of 
I 
the Treaty and that an exemption  could not  be granted,  they ·decided that 
Cobelaz  would no  longer be  involved in their exports to Common  Market  countries (1). 
Of  course, this in no  way  guarantees that there will be  coLJ.peti tion between 
Belgian producers on their own  market.  The  Commission is not  empowered  to concern 
itself with the manner  in which  Belgian producers behave  on  the Belgian market, 
but it can strengthen competition there by taking action against  agreements 
limiting deliveries b,y  producers from  other Member  States (2). 
B.y  its action, it succeeded in having the constitution of the Comptoir  franyais 
de  l'Azote (c.F.A.)  changed  in a  w~  which  ensured that the members  of this 
organisation will be  able to compete  with each other freely on  the Belgian 
market  (2 ). 
A second typical  case is that of the Belgian perfumery  and toiletry trade 
association.  This organization was  applying a  system  of resale price maintenance 
and  had  set up a  distribution organisation which  represented an obstacle to free 
competition.  Following pressure from  the  Common  Market  Commission,  this  assoc-
iation abolished its resale price maintenance  system and its market  organisation 
arrangements and then,  in 1972,  obtained negative clearance from  the  Commission 
for its other activities (3). 
Finally,  we  would  mention the case of the "ceramics convention"  subscribed to by 
ten building materials manufacturers in Belgium,  the Netherlands and  Germany  and 
two  Belgian dealers'  and  fitters' trade associations.  This agreement,  which  had 
been notified to the  Commission,  established arrangements for reciprocal and 
collective exclusive purchasing and  selling rights on the Belgian market  between 
purchasers approved  b,y  a  trade  bo~ and manufacturers.  The  Commission  sent  a 
recommendation to the parties to the agreement  asking them  to terminate the 
agreement,  since it placed severe restrictions on  the opportunities of other 
manufacturers to sell in the Belgian market  and was  therefore cont:r.rary  to the 
provisions of the E.E.C.  Treaty on  competition.  The  parties to the agreement 
sent a  revised text  of the agreement  which  provided for 
(1)  European  Coal  and Steel Community,  European Economic  Community,  European 
Atomic  Energy  Community,  Second  General Report,  op.cit.,  p.  47. 
(2)  Ibidem. 
(3)  European  Coal  •••••••  ,  Fourth General  Report  on the Activities of the  Comm-
unities during 1970,  Dutch  edition,  Brussels,  Luxembourg,  February 1971,  p.25. 
153 some  relaxation of the conditions of admission and  removed  the obligation 
on  purchasers to obtain supplies from  the manufacturers in the cartel 
exclusively.  Since the agreement  still represented an obstacle to the 
freedom  of access to the market  of manufacturers not  party to the agreement, 
the Commission  once  again refused an  exemption and the agreement  was  finally 
cancelled. 
We  could quote m~  other cases in which  the  Commission  has had a  corrective 
influence,  either by  obtaining changes in agreements which  restrict 
competition,  or by  obliging the firms  concerned to abandon their restrictive 
practices. 
3) The  Commission  has taken repressive action in the cases of groups of under-
takings which had not notified it of their agreements or concerted practices, 
or had  continued them after the Commission  had refused to grant  an exemption 
or negative clearance. 
As  long ago  as June  1966,  the  Commission  pointed out  in its general report 
that horizontal restrictions of competition between undertakings operating at 
the  same  stage of business activity were  being brought  to its attention less 
often than exclusive contracts and  licensing contracts,  for which  a  negative 
clearance or  exemption were  easier to obtain.  The  Commission  concluded from 
this that it would  be necessary for it to  seek out  such horizontal restrictions 
of competition itself (2). 
In 1969,  the  Commission  imposed its first fines on  firms maintaining agreements 
which  were  incompatible with the  Common  Market  policy on  competition.  These 
firms were  members  of an international quinine cartel and  a  group of dye 
manufacturers (3).  During the  course of 1971,  the Commission  took action 
against  cement  cartels in Germany,  France and the Netherlands  {4). 
(1)  Bulletin of the European  Communities,  Secretariat-General of the 
Commission,  1971,  no.  12,  P•  44• 
(2)  European  Economic  Community  :  "Ninth General Report  on  the Activities 
of the Community  from  1  April  1965  to 31  March  1966", PP•  68-69. 
( 3)  European  Coal  and Steel  Community,  European Economic  Community,  European 
Atomic  Energy  Community  :  "Third General Report  on the Activities of the 
Communities  during 1969",  Dutch  version,  Brussels,  Luxembourg,  February 
1970,  P•  69. 
(4)  Idem,  Fifth General  Report  on the Activities of the  Communities,  Dutch 
version,  Brussels,  Luxembourg,  February 1972,  P•  104. 
154 During the following year,  it continued to work  towards the  establishment 
of normal  conditions of competition on  the Belgian and  Dutch  cement  markets 
and  fined firms  which  attempted by artificial means  to maintain differences 
between selling prices on the markets of the various Member  States of the 
Community  (1). 
In the  same  year,  it exercised its powers  in taking action against the sugar 
cartel,  whose  membership  includes the principal producers and distributors 
of  sugar in the  Community. 
On  2  January  1973,  the  Commission  decided to impose  heavy fines on  these  firms 
in order to oblige them  to put  an  end  to the  compartmentalisation of  sugar 
markets which they had  achieved by means  of a  series of agreements under 
which the majority of deliveries from  one  country to another were  controlled 
by the members  of the cartel  (2). 
The  firms affected by this decision appealed to the  Court  of Justice of the 
European  Communities,  so that it is not yet  possible to predict  whether the 
Commission  will be  successful in obliging the major  sugar manufacturers in 
the  Community  to abandon their restrictive practices. 
It is interesting to note that the Raffinerie Tirlemontoise  was  found  guilty 
of infringing Article 86  of the Treaty of Rome  as well  as Article 85. 
According to the  Commission,  it had taken advantage  of a  dominant  position 
on  the Belgian market  and  exerted  economic  pressure on Belgian producers to 
oblige them to limit their exports  (3). 
This brings us to the question of the relationship between Articles 85  and 
86,  which  we  have not  yet  discussed. 
For a  long time,  the  Community  avoided invoking Article 86  because it can be 
rather difficult to determine the point  at  which it may  be  stated that  a  firm 
has a  dominant  position on a  market  (4).  The  trend towards increasing 
concentration in various sectors of European industry has  obliged the 
Commission to pay the closest  attention to developments in the positions of 
large firms  on national markets  and the  Community  market. 
(1)  Ibidem,  Sixth General  Report  on  the Activities of the  Communities,  Dutch 
version,  Brussels,  Luxembourg,  February 1973,  P•  68. 
(2)  Commission  of the European  Communities,  "Decision of the  Commission  of 
2  January 1973  concerning a  procedure for the application of Articles 85 
and  86  of the E.E.C.  Treaty  (IV/26.918- European Sugar Industry), 
Brussels,  2  January 1973,  PP•  76-82. 
(3)  Ibidem,  P•  77. 
(4)  In attempting to define a  market,  it is necessary to take differences 
between prices and transport  cost  into account  as well as political 
frontiers and  customs  costs. 
155 In 1971,  Article 86  was  applied for the first time to a  German  copyright 
firm  ("Gesellschaft  rur musikalische AufrUhrungs - und  mechanische 
Vervielraltigungsrechte"  (GEMA))  which  had a  monopoly  of the German  market 
and was  using it improperly to restrict the financial  freedom  of composers, 
authors and publishers of music  (1). 
In the  same  year,  the  Commission  also took action against  an American  company 
which  had \ought the largest  packaging manufacturing plants in Germ~  and 
the Netherlands and was  limiting freedom to ottain packaging materials to 
an excessive extent  (2). 
On  14  December  1972,  the Commission  sent  an  order to deliver to the  suesidiary 
(Instituto chemioterapico Italiano- I.C.I.) of an American  company  and  the 
parent  company  (Commercial  Solvants Corporation- c.s.c.) which  together had 
a  dominant  position on the Italian market  in aminoautanol  and  nitropropane. 
These  firms were  taking improper  advantage of this situation to refuse del-
iveries of aminobutanol  and nitropropane to the Italian firm Laboratorio  Chimico 
Farmaceutico Giorgio  Zoja S.p.A.,  which  needed them  for the manufacture of 
dextro-ethambutol,  a  medicinal preparation used in the treatment  of tuber-
culosis of the lungs. 
To  prevent I.C.I. and  c.s.c. from  continuing their boycott  against  Zoja,  the 
Commission  imposed  on them  a  daily charge of 1,000 units of account  payable 
from  the thirty-first day  following that  on  which I.c.I. and  c.s.c. were 
informed of the obligation imposed  upon  them in respect  of each  subsequent 
~  on  which they continued to fail to comply  with the Commission's  order. 
In addition,  they will have to pay  the  Commission  a  fine of 200,000  units of 
account  for abuse of a  dominant  position (3). 
The  sugar cartel decision proves that the notion of abuse of a  dominant 
position can be invoked in conjunction with that of the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition. 
(1)  European  Coal  and Steel  Community,  •••••  "Fifth General Report 
op.cit.,  P•  107. 
(2)  !\idem,  PP•  107-108. 
"  .... 
(3)  Bulletin of the European  Communities,  Dutch  version,  31  Decem\er  1972, 
PP•  299/51  to 299/58. 
156 However,  it must  be  admitted that,  hitherto,  the  Commission  has only 
invoked Article 86  in exceptional cases;  this is probably attributable 
to the need to allow European undertakings to concentrate into larger 
units in order to be better equipped to withstand competition from  the 
subsidiaries of American  companies. 
Before concluding this outline of the Commission's action in the field of 
competition policy,  it should be mentioned that,  since the fusion of the 
Communities,  the  Commission  has also been responsible for the application 
of Articles 65  and  66  of the Treaty of Paris setting up the  European  Coal 
and  Steel  Community. 
Article 65  of the Treaty of Paris,  like Article 85  of the Treaty of Rome, 
is directed against  agreements,  decisions by associations of undertakings 
and  concerted practices which  may  directly or indirectly prevent,  restrict 
or distort the normal  effects of competition within the  Common  Market, 
whereas Article 66  covers concentrations,  stipulating the prior agreement 
of the Commission  for all mergers of undertakings in the coal and  steel 
sectors (1).  In general,  the Commission  has not  opposed mergers because, 
in view of the virtually permanent  state of crisis in the coal sector and 
the periodic crises in the steel  sector,  rationalisation was  desirable. 
In 1969,  for  instance,  it sanctioned the merger of two  major Belgian iron 
and  steel undertakings,  Cockerill-Ougree-Providence and  S.A. Metallurgique 
d'Esperance-Longdoz,  because it was  of the  opinion that,  together,  they 
did not  hold a  dominant  position in the  Common  Market  considered as a 
geographic entity (2). 
This does not  mean  that the  Commission  has not  taken action against 
mono-polistic tendencies in the coal and  steel sectors. 
In 1970,  for  example,  it imposed fines on  25  German  undertakings which 
had  operated quota and price agreements in their purchases of scrap metal 
for a  number  of years (3). 
(1)  L.  CARTOU,  op.cit.,  P•  180. 
(2)  European  Coal  and Steel Community  •••••  ,  Third Report  ••• ,  (1969), 
op.cit.,  P•  63. 
(3)  Idem,  Fourth Report,  op.cit.,  P•  30  • 
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1)  Currently,  the Belgian Government's prices policy machinery falls 
into the following four  categories of systems  : 
a)  The  normal  prices system,  as introduced into Belgian legislation 
b,y  the Legislative Decree  of 1945•  In the absence  of a  contract 
programme  or maximum  price,  the  charging of prices higher than 
normal  prices is prohibited.  Furthermore,  irrespective of the 
prices system,  undertakings are never allowed to make  abnornal 
profits. 
b)  The  price increase declaration system which,  since the Ministerial 
Order of 1 September 1966,  has in principle been applied to all 
prices,  even those fixed by  order,  in cases where  the prices 
charge pi  or to a  decision to make  an increase are within the 
prescribed maximum. 
c)  The  programme  contracts  system. 
d)  The  maximum  prices system,  under which  maximum  prices are laid 
down  for  sectors or individual products (1). 
In practice,  the price increase declaration system has been the main 
mechanism  by  which  price rises have been held back.  The  main  feature 
of the policy of the Belgian Ministry of Economic  Affairs and the 
Commission for the Regulation of Prices is the holding back of 
inflation by imposing a  waiting period on  undertakings wishing to 
increase their prices.  This  system for holding back prices is quite 
efficient  and,  to  some  extent  (although other factors,  such as the 
high level of savings and trade unions'  moderation of their demands, 
must  also be borne in mind),  explains why  the rate of inflation has 
generally been lower in Belgium than in neighbouring countries. 
(1)  M.  VANHECKE,  "Politique des prix- quelques  cas nationaux 
caracteristiques,  Benelux",  OECD,  to be  published in 1973. 
158 However,  it has the weakness  of placing undertakings which  are confronted 
regularly with increases in the prices of their raw materials or wage 
demands  which  cause  substantial rises in their cost prices,in a  position 
of disadvantage. 
If the curbing of price increases is taken too far,  it creates distortions. 
Investment  will be  channelled towards  sectors in which  a  sharp rise in 
productivity combined  with constant  prices can  enable profits to be 
increased,  rather than towards  sectors which  are only able to meet  wage 
demands  from  the trade unions by  increasing their selling prices.  To  avoid 
such distortions,  the Minister of Economic  Affairs  should oblige  sectors 
where  there are  sharp rises in productivity or reductions in the prices 
of raw materials or auxiliar.y materials to reduce their prices. 
As  was  pointed out  in Section 2,  the  Commission  for the Regulation of 
Prices has,  as yet,  only proposed price reductions to the Minister in 
exceptional  cases.  Even  the recent devaluations of the dollar did not 
prompt  any  attempt  on  the part of the commission to bring about  reductions 
in the prices of goods  imported from  the dollar area. 
A further criticism can be  levelled at the Commission for the Regulation 
of Prices,  namely that its policy is influenced unduly by  considerations 
of full  employment.  The  trade union members  of this commission  sometimes 
allow themselves to be  convinced of the need to increase the selling 
prices of certain products when  the  employers'  representatives are able to 
prove that, if prices are not  increased,  certain large undertakings will 
be  obliged to  close down  and(or) lay off large numbers  of workers.  This 
provides artificial sustenance for old undertakings which,  although they 
provide work  for many  people,  are badly managed  and  have  out-of-date 
methods,  so that they act  as a  brake on  the progress of average productivity 
and therefore have  an inflationar.y influence on  the Belgian  econo~. 
2) The  efforts of the Common  Market  Commission  to eliminate agreements and 
concerted practices whose  object is to prevent,  restrict or distort  competition 
and abuses of dominant  positions,  have  increased considerably in scale over 
recent years.  It is very difficult to assess the results of such a  policy. 
During a  period of inflation,  the enlivening of competition in a  given sector 
159 will not  generally cause prices in this sector to fall but,  at best, it 
m~  slow dow.n  the rate of increase.  Since the movements  of prices are 
influenced by  other factors (rise or fall in raw materials prices,  movements 
of wages  and  social contributions), it will be necessary to carr.y out  a 
sector-b,y-sector and product-by-product  analysis to draw any valid conclusion. 
We  have not been able to devote the necessary attention to  such an analysis, 
since this would fall outside the  scope  of our  study,  and  cannot  therefore 
draw  any valid conclusions. 
Nevertheless,  on the basis of the brief outline of the Commission's action 
in the  sphere of competition policy,  we  can make  the following observations 
a)  Among  the firms which  have notified agreements or concerted practices 
and  (or) which  have  been fined by the  Commission,  there is a  large number 
of Belgian firms,  which  suggests that restrictive practices are often 
employed  b,y  Belgian commercial  and industrial firms.  This is probably 
attributable to the shortcomings of Belgian law on  competition.  Indeed, 
the Belgian Law  of 27  May  1960  on  "protection against  abuse of economic 
•  power"  confers ver.y  limited powers  on the Minister to combat  restrictive 
practices and,  moreover,  has only been applied to a  limited  e~ent (1). 
b)  During recent years,  the  Commission  has devoted most  of its attention to 
action against the large cartels.  To  be able to do  so,  it has  adopted 
a  ver.y  tolerant attitude towards exclusive representation agreements and 
licensing agreements,  about  which it has received large numbers  of 
notifications (2). 
The  Commission  only refuses to issue  exemptions in cases where  the exclusive 
representation enjoys total territorial protection. 
(1)  Although the Law  authorises the commissioner responsible for  enqu~r~es to 
carry out  investigations on  his own  initiative in order to obtain infor-
mation about  any  abuses of economic  power  in a  given sector,  nearly all 
enquiries are instigated b,y  the lodging of a  complaint.  The  commissioner 
then attempts to obtain a  settlement  between the  complainant  and the 
defendant. 
(2)  As  a  result of the adoption of this policy, it was  possible to reduce the 
number  of files to be  processed from  36,401  on  31  March  1965 to 2,873  on 
31  December  1972  (European Economic  Community,  Hautiere  Committee,  report 
on the activities of the Community  (1 April 1964-31 March  1965),  op.cit., 
P•  10  and  European  Coal  and Steel  Community  •••  ,  Sixth Report,  Dutch 
version,  op.  cit., P•  67 ). 
160 The  Belgian courts have  also adopted this distinction and apply it when  they 
have to  judge  on  the validity of an exclusive  sales agreement  not notified 
to the  Commission.  The  commercial  court  of Brussels ruled on  6 September  1966 
that  an exclusive sales contract  conferring absolute territorial protection 
was  void if not  notified in good  time to the  Common  Market  Commission  (1). 
The  Liege  court  of appeal,  for its part,  ruled on  6 June  1966  that  such  a 
contract which  did not  confer  absolute territorial protection was  valid,  and 
that the fact that it had not  been notified to the  Common  Market  Commission 
entitled the Belgian  judge to rule himself as to whether  or not  such  a  contract 
constituted an infringement  of Article 85,  paragraph 1,  of the Treaty of Rome  (2). 
Since most  judges restrict themselves to upholding the  principle of adherence 
to contractual obligations,  it follows that most  of the exclusive sales 
contracts notified to the  Commission  will be  declared valid as long as there 
is no  proof of absolute territorial protection. 
The  desirability of  such  a  development  is open to question,  since it malf  be 
argued that it will  contribute to the maintenance of large numbers  of repres-
entation agreements under which  the profit margins to the exclusive repres-
entative are higher than those normally obtaining in wholesale trade.  Although 
tax differences must  also be taken into account,  the wide  differences between 
the prices of identical products in various countries of the  Community  are 
largely attributable to the activities of exclusive representatives,  who 
contribute to the development  of inflation through the maintenance of their 
excessive profit margins. 
A similar problem arises in the  case of contracts which  impose  prices.  Article 
85,  paragraph 1,  of the Treaty of Rome  mentions  such  contracts among  the 
practices which  are infringements "per se",  but  Order 17  classifies them  among 
the minor  infringements on  condition that  only one  supplier is involved (3). 
In its sixth report  (1962-63),  the  Commission  acknowledged that it is difficult 
to determine the role plalfed by  contracts in which  prices are  imposed in trade 
between the Member  States  (4)  and,  in a  reply to a  question put  by  the Dutch 
member  of parliament,  Mr.  Nederhorst,  it stated that Article 85  is not  applicable 
to a  system of imposed  prices unless it influences trade between Member  States (5). 
(1)  Anwendung  der Art.  85,  Abs.  1  auf einen Alleinvertriebsvertrag mit  Gebiets-
schutz,  Wirtschaft  und  Wettbewerb,  1967,  No.  5,  PP•  362-363. 
(2)  Anwendung  der  Art.  85,  Abs.  1,  auf Alleinvertriebsvertrag ohne  absolute 
Gebeitsschutz",  Wirtschaft  und  Wettbewerb,  1967,  No.  5,  PP•  358-359· 
(3)  G.  VANDEWALLE  :  "Droits d'exclusivite et prix imposes dans le Marche 
Commun",  Tijdschrift  voor Sociale Wetenschappen,  1965,  No.  2,  P•  304. 
(4)  Ididem. 
(5)  H.  VAN  DER  GROEBER  :  "Le  role de la concurrence dans le Marche  Commun", 
Voorlichtingsdienst  van de  Europese  Gemeenschappen,  Brussels,  1966,  P•  13. 
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for the  Commission to intervene,  so that it is for national  judges to decide. 
':Phe  Belgian courst  have  always upheld  such  contracts (1).  It follows that 
the  situation regarding contracts in which  prices are imposed is unlikely 
to evolve in the  same  way  in Belgium as in Germany,  where  such contracts are 
only valid if the  product  is not  sold ~here  at  a  lower price than the 
imposed  price.  Now  the opposition of Community  law to contracts prohibiting 
exports or re-exports has made  it impossible for German  producers to maintain 
a  system of imposed  prices intact  (2).  The  German  Government  has  changed 
the  law to make  the imposition of selling prices on retailers prohibited as 
from  1  January  1974,  although the  recommendation of selling prices by a 
supplier to his retailer client will still be permitted (3).  At  its meeting 
of 5  December  1972  on the  subject  of counter-inflationary measures to be taken, 
the  Council  of Ministers called upon Member  States to be  strict in the applica-
tion of legal  sanctions against  contracts which  impose  prices (3).  The  effect 
of  such a  policy is to make  this practice disappear  completely in Germany, 
whereas the recommendation is without  significance in Belgium,  where there 
are no  laws against this practice (4). 
(1)  On  13 May  1958,  the fourth  chamber  of the  commercial  court  of Brussels 
clearly set  out  the principle which  forms  the basis of the position 
taken up by the Belgian courts: 
"The  legitimacy of imposed  prices is beyond question insofar as they do 
not  impinge  on  public order  (by the infringement  of a  regulation currently 
in force)  or the public interest,  in the proper sense of the term." 
Moreover,  the  same  court ruled that  :  "Independently of the contractual 
relationship between the parties,  the existence of the agreement  represents 
a  value which is part  of their assets and,  whether it confers absolute or 
relative rights,  the agreement,  by the terms of Article 1382  of the  Civil 
Code,  must  be  honoured by all parties.  A third party is at fault  accord-
ing to the terms of the  said Article if,  without  being motivated by any 
malevolent  intention towards the injured party but  solely by the desire 
to further his own  interests, if he  causes detriment  to the assets of the 
said injured party despite his knowledge  of the existence of the contract, 
and this by virtue of the  damage  which  he  causes to these assets by his 
action".  (Revue  de  la Jurisprudence belge,  1958,  PP•  436-437.)  This 
ruling makes  any person who  sells below the price generally imposed  on 
retailers liable to damages,  even if he has not  entered into a  contract 
with the  supplier under the terms of which  he is obliged to adhere to 
the imposed  price. 
(2)  European  Coal  and Steel  Community  ••• ,  Third Report,l969,  op.cit.,  P•  64. 
(3)  W.  SCHULTER  :  "Wohin  geht  es mit  der Preisempfehlung",  Der Verbraucher, 
July 1973,  PP•  8-9. 
(4)  E.W.G.  :  "Wettbewerbspolitische Massnahmen  zur Inflationsbekampfung, 
Wirt schaft  und  Hettbewerb 197 3,  No.  3,  PP•  182-183. 
162 In conclusion,  therefore, it ~  be  stated that,  although action b,y  the 
Commission  against the large cartels can exert  a  moderating influence on 
the rise in prices, this should not  lead to neglect of the need to stimulate 
competition in the distributive sector also. 
The  shortcomings of Belgian legislation and the conservatism of Belgian 
courst,  compounded  by the great  caution of the  Common  Market  Commission in 
this area,  have  so far proved obstacles to the establishment of a  satisfactory 
poliqy on  competition in the distributive sector. 
163 Chapter VII  :  Conclusions and  considerations of economic  policy. 
In Chapter I,  we  stated that the purpose of this study was  to determine the 
extent to which  the movements  of certain non-wage  incomes  have  contributed 
to the initiation,  exacerbation or curbing of inflationary trends. 
Analysis of the movements  of the various forms  of non-wage  income,  the 
components  of the consumer  price index,  profit margins in the retail trade 
and  crafts,  the per capita incomes  of members  of the professions,  average 
rents and interest rates,  has  enabled us to register a  series of facts and 
relationships which,  taken overall,  give an idea of the probable mechanisms 
by  which movements  of the various forms  of non-wage  income  influence trends 
in the cost of living. 
Since there were  only a  few  short  pauses in the rise in consumer  prices 
during the period under consideration, it cannot  be  claimed that  any increase 
in non-wage  income  was  responsible for initiating an inflationary trend. 
However,  in the light of the development  of the "services"  component  of the 
consumer  price index,  we  can  assume  that,  at  various stages,  the rise in 
prices for the services rendered by  self-employed workers  prevented an 
economic  recession from  causing the cost  of living to fall.  Before 1967, 
the consumer  price index only included the prices of two  services rendered 
by  self-employed workers,  namely hairdressing and  laundering,  so that it was 
extremely difficult to assess the effect  of increases in certain forms  of 
non-wage  income  on  the cost  of living. 
Since 1967,  the prices of more  services  (for instance,  shoe  repairs,  car 
servicing,  resturant meals,  hotel rooms,  medical  services) have been included 
in the calculation of the  consumer  price index.  As  a  result, it is possible 
to observe that the standstill in prices which  could have  been expected 
during the last quarter of 1967  did not  materialise because of a  sharp rise 
in the prices of services rendered by  self-employed workers  (1).  The  same 
phenomenon  occurred again during the  second quarter of 1970.  Following an 
economic  downturn in March  1970,  food  and  non-food product  prices rose more 
slowly,  but  at that time the prices of services rose by 3.5%  in a  single 
quarter,  thereb.y reactivating the inflationary wage-price spiral  (2). 
A question arises as to the main  cause for the increases in the charges of 
self-employed workers and members  of the professions which frequently occur 
(1)  Cf.  above 
(2)  Ibidem. 
Chapter IV,  Section 3· 
164 at times when  the economy  is running down.  A possible answer is the need of 
the middle classes to safeguard their incomes  against the effects of the 
erosion of the value of money.  Since there is no  moving  scale  s,ystem  for 
self-employed workers  and members  of the professions,  it is normal  that they 
too  should wish to adjust their nominal  incomes after a  period during which 
the cost  of living has risen in order to maintain the same  standard of living. 
Analysis of the amounts  by which  they adjust their incomes  shows  that they 
generally exceed the rise in the cost  of living.  In other words,  self-employed 
workers and members  of the professions have not  merely maintained their standard 
of living,  they have  improved it.  Since the growth in productivity of the 
work  os craftsmen and  members  of the professions is virtually nil or very 
limited,  the professional associations of these middle class categories have 
needed to apply substantial rises in charges in order to achieve an increase 
in their members'  real income.  These  categories have  not  been  content to 
maintain their traditional level of real income,  because they have felt a 
psychological need to ensure that  a  differential subsists between their standard 
of living and that of the social classes  (manual  workers,  clerical workers, 
farmers)  whose  station they consider to be inferior to their own. 
While manual  and clerical workers and farmers have  become  able to afford 
categories of goods  (cars, television sets) and  services  (holidays abroad) 
which had previously been the exclusive preserve of the well-off,  the latter 
have found new  consumer  durables  (motor boats and  sailing boats,  villas and 
flats by the sea or in the country)  and  services (cruises,  luxury  sports like 
golf and riding) which those with modest  incomes  are unable to afford. 
As  has been pointed out  by the English economist,  M.  SHANKS,  it is mainly the 
lower strata of the middle classes,  that is small traders,  craftsmen and middle 
managers,  who  tend to be  obsessed by the need to assert themselves by  forms  of 
consumer  spending which distringuish them  from  the working class (1).  It is 
tor this reason that any substantial improvement  in the standard of living of 
aanual  and clerical workers increases the financial aspirations of the middle 
classes,  and  a  sharp rise in wages  towards the end  of a  peak  in the trade cycle 
is often followed by no  less substantial a  rise in the incomes  of craftsmen and 
aembers of the professions during the next  phase of the cycle,  which  is a  recession. 
(1)  M.  SHANKS  :  "The  Stagnant Society - A Warning",  Harmondsworth  1964, 
21st  edition,  PP•  169-170. 
165 Since the volume  of demand  for most  of the  services offered by  craftsmen 
and  members  of the professions is only influenced by economic  conditions to 
a  very limited extent,  they have no  call to fear that they will bring a 
sharp fall in turnover upon themselves by increasing their charges during 
a  period of recession. 
We  would  point  out that the theory of increases in the incomes of craftsmen 
and  members  of the professionals is entirely consistent  with the theory of 
"Productivity Inflation" as developed 1y P.  STREEI'EN  (1).  Sharp rises in 
productivity in monopolistic sectors lead to substantial increases in wages 
in these  sectors.  Such  increases inevitably lead to adjustments of the 
wages  of manual  and  clerical workers in less prosperous sectors.  The  rise 
in prices resulting from  these adjustments  and  the  improvement  in the 
standard of living of the  entire working class triggers off middle  class 
claims,  and this causes inflation to accelerate or prevents it from  decel-
erating in response to the  influence of the deflationary forces  set up by 
the improvement  in productivity and the absorption of purchasing power  by 
rising prices. 
The  position of  small traders is not  entirely parallel to that  of craftsmen 
and members  of the professions,  since they as a  group do  not  enjoy a  monopoly, 
but  have to  cope  with competition from  the large stores,  chain stores, 
cooperatives and  hypermarkets and  discount  stores in particular.  Moreover, 
their turnover is generally more  sensitive to cyclical movements  than those 
of craftsmen and members  of the professions.  It follows that they generally 
avoid increasing their prices unless they are able to give their customers 
solid reasons  justifying their decision to do  so.  An  increase in the 
wholesale prices of the goods  sold in their shops gives them  the opportunity 
to increase their profits;  in other words,  they apply the  "mark-up"  system, 
adding their contribution to the upward  trend. 
If the wholesale prices of certain products fall again following a  fall in 
raw materials prices,  the intermediaries avoid passing on the benefit  of 
this to the consumer,  thus taking advantage a  second time  of movements  in 
wholesale prices to increase their profit margins. 
In Chapter V,  we  calculated the progress of the overall gross margin of 
traders and  craftsmen on  products  sold to the  consumer. 
According to the results of these calculations,  profit margins,  taken overall, 
(1)  Cf.  above:  Chapter r.,  Section 5· 
166 varied little from  1953  to 1970,  but  probably tended to fall from  1971  on 
as a  result  of the increasingly strong competition from  the multiple chain 
stores. 
In Chapter IV,  we  proved that neither the  "mark-up"  system  ( cu.mulati  ve  increase 
effect) nor the device  of increasing profit margins when  wholesale prices fall 
(ratchet effect)  can be  applied to all products.  For example,  if wholesale 
price fluctuations are  seasonal in character  (potatoes,  coal)  and  are therefore 
fairly well known  to the consumer,  it is not  possible for intermediaries to 
keep their prices up when  there is a  seasonal fall without  running the risk 
of losing business. 
Movements  in income  from  rents had a  moderating effect  on the rise in land 
prices and  building costs on  housing costs.  This is partly attributable to the 
moderating influence on  rents exerted by  the  enormous  stock of old housing and 
partly to government  policy,  which  influenced rents for modest  housing in 
particular by  providing low-rent  accommodation for large numbers  of families 
through the intermediary of the  companies  approved by the Societe Nationale du 
Logement,  and also by  helping many  families to build or buy  homes.  As  for 
interest,  the net yield from  capital invested in time deposits,  savings 
accounts,  securities or bills was  virtually nil or at  least  very mediocre. 
Moreover,  the "rentier" as  such has  almost  completely disappeared and  a  high 
proportion of investments today are not  intended to provide an  income  to be 
spent,  but  to  compensate  for the loss of value of capital with the income 
from  movable  property. 
The  overall  amount  of capital investment  at notice with the banks,  in savings 
accounts,  securities or notes increased to  such an extent  between 1953  and 
1972  that the annual total of gross interest rose  sharply.  Since a  high 
proportion of this interest  was  incorporated into the  capital  so that the 
capital would  retain its purchasing power,  this enormous  income  in the form 
of interest did not  give rise to demand-pull  inflation. 
In view of the movement  in prices, it must  be  acknowledged that  the  lending 
rates of the S.N.C.I.  remained fairly moderate  throughout  the period.  Even 
during the rapid inflation in 1971-72,  the net  interest rate (after deduction 
of the price increase coefficient) did not  rise above  6%  (1). 
(1)  Cf.  above  Chapter V,  Section 3 (Table 23)  and Section 4  (Table 26). 
167 Thanks to their policy of low borrowing rates,  the banks  were  also able 
without  difficulty to apply fairly moderate  lending rates.  They neverthe-
less achieved large profits.  This policy encouraged investment,  thereby 
contributing to the maintenance of economic  activity at  a  high level virtually 
throughout  the period from  1960 to 1972.  Indeed,  the recessions were  only 
short-lived and  caused no  major falls in production.  On  the other hand, 
this policy helped to push  prices up by  making bank  loans  easy to obtain. 
Since it did not  fall within the  scope  of our  stu~ to analyse the monetary 
aspect  of inflation,  we  have not  paid very much  attention to the effects of 
movements  of interest rates on  the trade cycle.  We  would merely mention 
that  the trends in the financial institutions' borrowing and  lending rates 
alike follow the trends in the trade cycle at  a  remove  in time  of one  or 
even more  years;  in other words,  from  this viewpoint,  the classical theor.y 
of the trade cycle remains  completely valid. 
The  complex nature of inflation calls for  prudence in the  selection of 
economic  policy measures to curb it.  Since structural inflation as we 
know  it today is primarily the  consequence  of clashes between the  excessive 
material aspirations of the various  social  classes,  any policy whose  objective 
is to combat  the rise  in the cost  of living must  run counter to many  economic 
interests.  In order to pursue a  rational counter-inflationary policy,  there-
fore,  the government  must  first  determine the  extent to which it is willing 
and  able,  bearing in mind  possible resistance from  the various interest 
groups,  to tone down  their demands  to make  them  consistent  with greater 
price stability.  This is primarily a  political problem rather than an 
economic  problem. 
The  government  must  make  a  choice between two  political options.  If it 
wishes to maintain the existing structures,  it must  oppose all wage  increases 
which are in excess of the average growth of productivity in the  economy  as 
a  whole.  If,  on  the  other hand,  it wishes to make  progress towards a  more 
egalitarian society,  it can  show  greater latitude towards the working class 
and  concede  wage  increases whose  volume  is greater in percentage terms than 
that  of the average productivity of the whole  economy,  but  which  are  justified 
by  the rise in average  productivity in the industrial  sector. 
168 If it does this,  however,  it will have to resist the attempts of the middle 
and upper classes to increase their incomes in parallel with those of the 
working class.  In most  of the countries of Western Europe  in general,  and  in 
Belgium more  specifically,  gradual  progress towards material equality has the 
better chance  of being accepted by  the majority of the population,  so  that  a 
policy designed to achieve this objective could also call for the active 
cooperation of this majority. 
In the  context  of such  a  policy,  it is possible to bring home  to the various 
social classes the limits which  they  should place on their material aspirations 
if they wish to avoid the development  of a  trend towards galloping inflation 
which  would  be damaging to the interests of all. 
As  regards  small traders,  craftsmen and members  of the professions,  the growth 
in their incomes  must  be kept  within reasonable limits,  partly by means  of a 
price controls policy and partly by  competition policy. 
Price controls,  as applied in Belgium,  have  been fairly effective,  at  least 
from  the point  of view of holding down  the rise in prices. 
The  effectiveness of the policy on  prices could be improved  further,  notably 
by the following measures  : 
a)  Closer coordination between the bodies responsible for policy on  prices 
the minister,  the prices department,  the  Commission  for the Regulation 
of Prices and  more  specifically the economic  inspectorate. 
The  results of the minister's recommendations to the various  sectors are 
largely dependent  on  the checks carried out  and the information fed back 
to the decision-making bodies. 
b)  The  setting up of economic  tribunals whose  jurisdiction would  include 
matters relating to prices.  Indeed,  the civil courts are rather conservative 
in their attitude and  look upon the concept  of a  direct  policy on  prices with 
little favour.  As  a  result,  the sanctions imposed for infringements of the 
regulations on  prices are often neither very stringent nor  exemplary. 
c)  ~ension of the competence  of the commission to cover all prices and 
charges without  exception.  It is desirable to avoid the setting up of ad 
hoc  committees with competence  for prices in one  or other field,  such  as 
electricity or oil.  A special problem arises in relation to prices over 
which the national authorities have  no  competence,  such as prices for  ECSC 
products and  farm  prices.  No  decision should be  taken in connection with 
such prices until there has been consultation with the national bodies 
responsible for the general level of prices. 
169 d)  Greater caution regarding the fixing of the charges for public  services 
and the modification of rates of indirect taxes and  excise duty directly 
affecting the level  of prices.  All decisions in this area should take 
account  of the state of the  economy,  the nature of the  service and the 
timing of the implementation of such measures in order to avoid adding 
impetus to the rise in prices. 
e)  Strengthening of the representation of  consumers  on the  commission,  which 
could check the temptation to resolve certain industrial policy problems 
by means  of price increases to provide resources for  self-financing. 
f)  Abolition of all gearing of the prices of goods  and  services (for instance, 
electricity charges,  insurance rates,  rent,  water,  etc.) to the  consumer 
price index.  Where  prices are  geared to the index in this way,  they can 
be  increased without  any need for  justification on the basis of trading 
results.  Furthermore,  this constitutes a  form  of discrimination against 
undertakings which are obliged to declare price increases.  The  widespread 
introduction of the gearing of prices to the  consumer  price index would 
lead rapidly to a  situation in which  prices rise automatically by  a 
ripple effect. 
g)  The  laws  on the declaration of price increases  should be  extended to 
cover the distributive sector also.  The  minister should have  powers to 
intervene over  excessive profit margins in the distributive trades. 
h)  The  commission  should pay more  attention to opportunities to bring down 
certain prices in order to counteract the tendency among  producers and 
intermediaries to take advantage of lower  cost  prices to increase their 
profit margins. 
In the  case of products incorporating raw materials whose  prices fluctuate 
sharply,  the programme  contract  system is the most  suitable method  by 
which  selling prices can be adjusted to variations in cost  prices.  However, 
as we  saw in Chapter VI,  the trade associations are displaying little 
eagerness to enter into such agreements,  since they know  that if they do, 
their members  will be  obliged to reduce their prices whenever their raw 
materials prices fall  substantially whereas,  in the absence  of  such an 
agreement,  they will not  be  obliged to do  so.  It is necessary for a 
committee to be  set up in the  commission to follow trends in the wholesale 
prices of the various raw materials on  a  continuing basis and to  submit 
suggestions to the minister concerning prices which  should be reduced. 
170 As  regards the monopolistic  sectors where  productivity is generally rising 
relatively quickly,  it would  be desirable for the  selling prices of the  products 
of these  sectors to be  subject to  strict controls to prevent  them  from  being 
kept  at  levels far in excess of real costs. 
In order to determine the  sectors in which the  structure of the market  is mono-
polistic or oligopolistic in character and the prices for which  stricter control 
measures are necessary,  it would  be desirable to  set up  a  commission  of special-
ists along the lines of the  "Monopolies  Commission"  in England,  to  study the 
markets in various products and  report  regularly to the Minister of Economic 
Affairs and the  Commission  for the Regulation of Prices. 
It is also regrettable that the Belgian  Law  of 27  May  1960  on  "protection against 
abuse  of  economic  power"  does  not  give more  scope to the Minister of Economic 
Affairs to take action against  firms  which  increase distributors' margins  on 
their products artificially by the imposition of prices or by  exclusive 
representation arrangements. 
As  is proved by the  example  of domestic appliances,  it is sometimes  possible 
to eliminate  systems of imposed  prices by the  conclusion of a  programme 
contract.  However,  the number  of  such  contracts remains too  low  for this 
policy to have  had  any  clear influence on  the level  of prices. 
A law against  the  imposition of prices on distributors would  cause the Belgian 
courts to  cease to uphold  contracts stipulating such obligations  even  when  they 
are  shown  to be against  the public interest  or when  the defendant  is not  party 
to  such a  contract but,  by  selling the  products in question at  a  lower  price 
than the price imposed by the producing or distributing firm,  has  prejudiced 
the interests of that  firm  (1). 
As  regards exclusive representation agreements,  the  Commission  for the Regula-
tion of Prices  should  palf  closer attention to movements  in prices determined 
by  intermediaries enjoying  such  advantages.  Where  an  exclusive representative 
is seen to be  charging prices which  are substantially higher than those  obtaining 
in the  other countries of the  Community,  the  commission  should recommend  the 
imposition of a  maximum  price to the minister. 
All these measures are consistent  with the maintenance  of competition,  since they 
are only designed to take effect in cases where  competition has been  excluded from 
the market.  In addition,  it would be desirable for the Belgian Government  to 
follow the  example  of the  governments  of neighbouring countries in establishing a 
policy designed to promote  competition at the level of distribution as well  as that 
of production.  Such  a  policy  should be  a  national  extension of the policy 
pursued by the  Common  Market  Commission.  Since this Commission  devotes most 
(1)  Cf.  above  Chapter VI,  Section 4. 
171 of its energies to taking action against  the large cartels,  thereby seeking 
to revive competition between major producers,  the action of the Belgian 
Government  would  be best directed against  contracts and restrictive 
practices likely to restrict competition at the distribution stage. 
This calls,  not  only for a  complete  review of the Law  of 27  ~  1960, 
but  also for great vigilance in order to detect measures likely to 
restrict  freedom  of establishment. 
In particular, it is necessary to prevent  organisations invested with 
disciplinary powers  over their members,  such as the  chemists•  association, 
from  abusing such  powers  with a  view to limiting access to their 
profession.  Although  some  restriction on the right to open new  dis-
pensaries is desirable,  it would  be  dangerous to allow decision in this 
matter to lie exclusively with the chemists'  association.  The  chemists 
are of course entitled to oppose the opening of an excessive number  of 
new  dispensaries,  but they should not  abuse this right in order,  for 
example,  to eliminate competition from  cooperative dispensaries whose 
practice of allowing discounts brings down  the real cost  of medicines to 
a  significant  degree for a  substantial sector of the population. 
Similarly,  although  some  r9strictions on the opening of large new  stores 
appear  justified, it would  be dangerous to make  this a  generalised principle 
and  take advantage of the town  planning laws to prohibit the opening of 
all new  stores of the  supermarket  type.  In fact,  as we  pointed out  in 
Chapter V,  Section 1,  stronger competition from the large stores probably 
prevented  small traders and craftsmen from  "marking-up"  price increases, 
thereby keeping their relative profit margins at a  constant  level.  It 
would  be  a  shame  to suffocate this revival of competition by measures 
designed to strengthen the effective monopoly  enjoyed by  small traders 
and  craftsmen in certain areas of the  country while at the  same  time 
creating a  privileged position in other areas of the  country for the large 
stores already established. 
We  consider it desirable for various forms  of distribution (small traders, 
multiple  chain stores,  department  stores,  supermarkets,  cooperatives) to 
continue to co-exist,  so  that it will be impossible for  any group to 
establish a  dominant  position. 
172 It mq be concluded from the analysis of movements  in rents that new 
legislation restricting increases in rents is undesirable and that all 
the government's efforts should be concentrated on means  of bringing 
down  building land prices and building costs.  The  companies  approved 
by the Societe Nationale du Logement  should be reduced in number  by 
means  of mergers.  This would  enable them to organize the building of 
houses and flats on  an industrial scale and to standardize a  large 
number  of components,  so that  significant reductions in cost prices 
can be achieved through mass  production.  Such  standardization has been 
carried out in the United States. 
Land prices could be brought  down  by the introduction of a  special tax 
on unused building land located in urban areas.  Such  a  measure would 
encourage the owners  of such sites to sell and would therefore bring 
down  prices. 
At  the  same  time,  the merging of the approved companies into larger 
units with greater financial resources at their disposal  should enable 
them to purchase large areas of land at a  time,  which would  enable them 
to buy more  cheaply. 
In order to curb the effect  on building costs and building land prices 
of demand  for flats and villas from  wealtey persons wishing to have  a 
second home,  it would  be desirable to limit the investment  of enormous 
volumes of oapi  tal in such lu1ury purchases by introducing a  tax on 
second homes  like that in France. 
Finally,  in connection with economic  policy regarding interest, it does 
not  seem  that the mediocre real interest paid on  time deposits and 
savings accounts has  caused azzy  decline in investment;  on the contrary, 
money  was  in abundant  supply throughout the sixties,  except in 1969,  and 
this was  caused by special factors explained above. 
173 However,  it may be that, if the upward trend in prices accelerates,  many 
savers will realise that they are the victims of the erosion of the value 
of money  and  seek to invest their money  in luxury articles as a  hedge 
against monetary depreciation.  Such  a  development  would  add the forces 
of demand-pull  inflation to those of structural inflation. 
In order to curb  such a  development,  it would  be necessar,y to increase 
borrowing rates above  the rate of inflation,  but  such a  measure  would 
cause the banks to increase their lending rates,  which  are alrea4y above 
12%  for cash loans currently. 
Although it is difficult to claim that hitherto,  except  in 1969,  net 
interest  costs (after deduction of the effect of the general rise in 
prices) have  represented a  serious obstacle to a  significant number  of 
industrial investments,  it is clear that there are limits to rises in 
prices and interest rates which it would  be better not  to exceed.  When 
rates are too high,  available capital is channelled increasingly towards 
speculative investments (in commodities,  for instance) and the uncertainty 
of the market  prevents genuinely productive investment. 
Above  lo%,  in fact, it is risky for a  firm to contract  a  long term loan 
since it cannot  be  sure that prices will  continue to rise so that the 
real rate of interest will remain well  below the nominal rate in the 
future. 
Consequently,  what  is required is an  economic  policy designed to attack 
the  sources of structural inflation themselves,  namely  excessive claims 
from  the various social strata,  rather than certain of the  consequences 
of structural inflation,  such as the rise in nominal  interest rates or 
the decline in the propensity to save. 
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